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Abstract  
This thesis examined media convergence in terms of its concept, discourse, and influence. Based 
on the examination of Korean case, it was argued that media convergence was an ambiguous 
concept. And as the concept was not clarified enough, the term seemed to be easily manipulated 
with liberal ideology to form ‘convergence discourse’. The discourse accelerated the spread of 
media convergence, and in particular, it justified deregulation and the reform of media policy 
system. However, despite a rather exaggerated expectation for the development of media 
convergence, the actual impact of media convergence on Korean broadcasting and 
telecommunication markets was restricted. More specifically, the change was limited to happen in 
network and device levels in media value chain. Furthermore, the overall changes in legal and 
jurisdictional systems in broadcasting and telecommunication were also limited. Interestingly, the 
development of media convergence caused divergence as well as convergence, in relevant markets 
and policy fields. Furthermore, the newly integrated broadcasting-telecommunication agency in 
Korea, KCC, brought some side effects. First, it introduced competition-oriented style and the 
marginalisation of sector-specific policies. Second, it prompted the concentration of power and the 
deterioration of political independence in media governance. Third, it brought about organisational 
conflicts between broadcasting and telecommunication agencies. However, notwithstanding the 
prevalence of competition-centred approach of KCC, the sector-specific regulations in Korean 
newspaper, telecommunication and broadcasting were generally maintained. More precisely, 
despite of the overall deregulation trends in the fields, broadcasting was still a more complicated 
and tightly regulated area, compared to newspapers and telecommunications. All those 
examinations of Korean media in the last decade show that there can be a strong inertia in the 
markets and the policy fields of media, even when the expectation of new technology is high.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  12 
Abbreviation  
CJHV: CJ Hello Vision 
CP: Content Provider 
DMB: Digital Multimedia Broadcasting 
DPS: Double Play Service 
FTC: Fair Trade Commission  
IPTV: Internet Protocol Television 
KCC: Korea Communications Commission 
KCSC: Korea Communications Standards Commission 
KCT: Korea Cable Telecom 
KISDI: Korea Information Society Development Institute  
KOCCA: Korea Creative Content Agency  
KPF: Korea Press Foundation  
KT: Korea Telecom  
MCT: Ministry of Culture and Tourism  
MIC: Ministry of Information and Communication 
MPP: Multiple Programme Provider  
MSIP: Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning  
MSIT: Ministry of Science and ICT  
MSO: Multiple System Operator  
MSP: Multiple System Operator and Programme Provider   
OTT: Over the Top 
PP: Programme Provider 
QPS: Quadruple Play Service  
SKT:SK Telecom  
TPS: Triple Play Service 
VOD: Video-on-Demand 
VoIP: Voice over Internet Protocol 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  13 
Part I 
1. Introduction  
Digitalisation and the development of transmission technologies brought considerable changes in 
media technologies. Digitalisation meant that the data process technology in media could be 
simplified. As analogue signals could be translated into digital signals, traditional media such as 
newspaper, film, radio and television could be handled in a single digital format. This meant that 
any kind of digital media contents could be seen in any digital device, technically. For example, 
the introduction of smart digital media such as smart phone changed the way people communicate 
and use media contents. By using the smart device, which can be described as a connected mobile 
computer, people can make a phone call, browse the internet, buy something and enjoy loads of 
media contents in their hands. Moreover, by using smart device, people can participate in group 
video chatting and meetings, and can produce audiovisual contents and share them online with 
others. Therefore, digitalisation technology simplified traditional methods of media production 
and consumption. When it comes to the matter of transmission, the development of transmission 
technology increased the speed and scale of data transmission. This enabled digitalised media 
contents to be transmitted in any single digital network. Compared to analogue system where 
different media had to use different modes of transmission, it meant a significant degree of 
simplification in media network. Consequently, the development of digitalisation and transmission 
technology brought more simplified environment in media. This meant that the technological 
difference between analogue media became less significant than before.  
 In this background, the concept of media convergence was emerged. The concept describes 
these simplification trends in media, which was based on the technological developments 
presented above. But the development of media convergence was not limited to the technological 
levels. Its development affected industries, market and policy fields, too. But the process of 
development was not a simple. In the process of development, various stakeholders in media, such 
as government, business, and civil societies were involved. This research is to investigate how 
those stakeholders reacted in the process, and what practical results were made by the development 
of media convergence. To this end, the thesis will examine the concept itself, some relevant 
discourses in the policy debate, and its influence on media markets, governance systems and actual 
media policies.  
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1.1. Research gaps 
There are at least three research gaps in the field of media policy studies regarding media 
convergence. Firstly, there have been little interest in the concept of media convergence. Most of 
relevant studies focused on governance reform issues and converged regulator’s policy styles. 
However, the more fundamental analysis can be made by examining the relationship between its 
concept and practical results of media convergence. Indeed, as shown in Frank Webster (2014)’s 
Theories of the Information Society, a concept in communications policy can lead to considerable 
changes in actual media policies. Particularly, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, the concept of 
media convergence has not been defined clearly, and this might have caused the confusions in 
understanding the phenomenon. Therefore, this thesis tries to fill the conceptual gaps in media 
policy studies, by examining and clarifying the concept of media convergence.  
 Secondly, the studies on the ideological aspect of media convergence was not followed up 
well so far. Some studies pointed out the ideological aspects of the concept and relevant discourses 
by examining some Western countries’ cases. But those were mostly relevant to the early stages of 
discussion on media convergence in around the early 2000s. But the changes in those discourses 
after this period was not examined well. Furthermore, those studies were mostly related to Western 
countries including the US, the UK and some European nations. Thus, it could be meaningful, 
especially for comparative media policy studies, if the scope of examinations on convergence 
discourse can be expanded by examining another national case. Therefore, this thesis introduces 
Korean case on the convergence discourse, to generate more empirical evidence in the field of 
media policy studies.  
 Thirdly, most of studies on media convergence dealt with governance reform and converged 
regulator’s policy styles. However, there have been little researches on other important fields of 
media, such as media markets and actual policies and regulations. Particularly, it seems that there 
was no research done for the quantitative examinations of the impact of media convergence on 
media markets. Therefore, this thesis investigates the overall impact of media convergence on 
Korean broadcasting and telecommunication markets. Moreover, while some studies discussed the 
overall tendency of converged regulator, the actual legal and jurisdictional changes in media policy 
seems not been studied specifically. Therefore, the thesis tries to fill this gap by analysing the 
precise changes in media policies. In addition, as the examination of convergence discourse of this 
thesis does, the thesis contributes to the abundancy of empirical evidence by analysing South 
Korean media markets and policies regarding media convergence.  
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A Korean case study on media convergence  
As noted above, this thesis is a case study on media convergence in South Korea. Case study is 
“an empirical inquiry that closely examines a contemporary phenomenon (the case) within its real-
world context” (Yin, 2015:194). Case study aims for “analytic generalisation” of knowledge 
(ibid.,200). However, this is not about generalising a specific case (sample) to population. If 
knowledge from a case study can be generalised to population level, there needs lots of more cases. 
Instead, case study normally aims to “analytic generalization which consists of a substantive 
proposition or other principle or set of principles, derived from a case study’s findings and then 
claimed to be applicable to other situations.” (ibid.) In other words, the case study involves “the 
detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations 
that may be generalizable to other events” (George and Bennett, 2004:5). 
 Therefore, in general, this thesis aims to practically examine how and to what extend the 
media convergence happened in Korea. In so doing, this study tries to find a general tendency 
shown in the process of media convergence. Particularly, as said, this research focuses on the 
influence of media convergence on media markets and policies. Accordingly, it aims to draw a 
general principle that shows correlation between media convergence and media market and policy, 
putting more weight on media policy field. Thus, what is basically assumed in the thesis is that the 
study of Korean case could be worth examining for other countries that are considering media 
policy reform in reaction to the media convergence. Indeed, the following examinations of this 
study seems to reveal many useful points that are worth thinking about before the reform of media 
policy systems. Korea experienced some valuable trials and errors in the course of media policy 
system reform which was caused by media convergence development. Having said that, the 
findings of this research seems to be helpful for other post-war new democracies in Asia, such as 
Japan, Taiwan and Indonesia, as they share political and cultural similarities to Korea in modern 
politics and media system (Gilley, 2014). Moreover, when it comes to academic area, the findings 
of this thesis would be helpful in understanding how and to what extent a new technology can 
affect media markets and policies.  
 
1.2. Purpose, research question and methodology 
There are three purposes in this thesis. The first one is, as found above in the discussion of research 
gaps, the examination and the clarification of the concept of media convergence. Therefore, the 
thesis asks, ‘what were the definitions of media convergence in previous literatures, and how it 
can be more clarified?’ By answering this question, the thesis will examine the problems of the 
concept and will establish more clarified and practical definitions of media convergence. The 
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second purpose is to analyse the ideological aspects of media convergence and the meaning of 
discourses shown in policy discussions. Accordingly, the following research questions can be 
asked: ‘What was the ideological character of the concept of media convergence?’, and ‘what 
convergence discourses were there in the process of media convergence development in Korea?’ 
The third purpose is the investigation of actual influences of media convergence on the market, 
governance system, and policies. Thus, it can be asked, ‘to what extent the broadcasting and 
telecommunication markets and policy structures were changed due to the introduction of 
convergent media?’ and, ‘to what extent media convergence brought the changes in actual media 
policies?’ In so doing, the thesis will examine the practical influences of media convergence on 
media market and policy.  
 In terms of methodology, this thesis implements qualitative textual analysis as a main 
method. This is to investigate the meaning of concept and discourse of media convergence. 
Accordingly, a range of documents including white paper, media agencies’ reports and work plans, 
and previous literatures will be examined in the following chapters. Furthermore, to get more 
specific and informal information on each subject of the thesis, semi-structured face-to-face 
interview was conducted. By doing so, some informal and in-depth information regarding the issue 
could be learned. Furthermore, as the thesis aims to see the degree of influence, it used quantitative 
approaches too, by referring to media market reports published in recent years in Korea. More 
details will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
1.3. Results of research 
The results of this research can be presented under three categories, as set in the purposes of this 
research: Concept, discourse and influence. The followings will briefly show the summaries of 
findings from main chapters.  
 Firstly, the thesis found that the concept of media convergence had four problems, which 
were ambiguity, overlapping character, exaggerated presumption and paradoxical description. In 
examining those problems, the thesis suggested a framework of media value chain in 
understanding the concept. Furthermore, on the basis of the review of previous literatures and 
practical observations, the thesis clarified that the concept is relevant to the network and device 
levels, rather than whole media, as content and platform levels seemed not evident regarding media 
convergence, in terms of its definitions as well as practices. Thus, it can be said that this thesis 
would contribute to the understanding of the concept of media convergence by suggesting more 
clarified definitions based on practical examinations.  
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 Secondly, this thesis confirmed that the discourse of media convergence affected the policy 
discussion in Korea. As in other countries who adopted policy convergence, there was similar 
convergence discourses in the policymaking process of Korea. There were two kinds of 
convergence discourses. The first discourse was the social belief that the media convergence is 
expanding so quickly. And the second was that because of the rapid expansion of media 
convergence, there needs a policy system reform as well as more flexible regulations in media. 
Particularly, the second type of convergence discourse seemed to be related to liberal politico-
economic ideology, as it consequently made competition law to be at the centre of the media 
policies, while sector-specific principles were marginalised. However, in Korea, there was rather 
dramatic changes of discourse after a reorganisation of policy system and authorities. More details 
will be discussed in Chapter 5. Therefore, in terms of convergence discourse, this thesis would 
contribute to the abundancy of empirical evidence, by presenting Korean case. As the part is linked 
to what was found in some Western cases, such as the US, the UK, and some European countries, 
it can be said that the research has provided new knowledge in comparative media policy studies.  
 Thirdly, this research examined the degree of influence of media convergence on media 
markets, governance and actual policies, respectively in different chapters from Chapter 6 to 8. As 
noted earlier, despite of interests in the impact of media convergence, the actual impact of media 
convergence seems little examined in academia so far. But studying the practical impact of a 
phenomenon can significantly extend the scope and scale of knowledge on the phenomenon. This 
was why the thesis investigated the actual influence of media convergence on markets, governance 
and policies. 
 When it comes to the influence on media markets, the results showed that there were some 
significant convergent media such as IPTV, bundle service and smart phone, but in the perspective 
of whole broadcasting and telecommunication, the impacts were limited. This was true, especially 
when compared to what expected by the concept itself as well as the convergence discourse. The 
concept and discourse of media convergence presumed that the blurring between analogue media 
would be expanded very rapidly. However, it has been more than 30 years since the concept was 
first introduced, but there were no remarkable examples regarding the convergence in content and 
platform levels in media. But on the other hand, it was confirmed that in network and device levels, 
there were some practical models of media convergence. Chapter 6 will discuss it in more details 
by examining Korean broadcasting and telecommunication markets.   
 With regard to media governance, media convergence brought about the integration between 
broadcasting and telecommunication agencies. This was called as policy convergence. However, 
the process of policy convergence was not simple, and it provoked huge social conflicts between 
government, business and civil society. Particularly, it was confirmed that all of policy agencies 
wanted to expand their authorities and systems over media policies. This resulted in long-lasting 
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conflict between broadcasting and telecommunication sectors, which continued almost a decade. 
Even after the integration of those two organisations, the conflict was not reconciled. However, 
the telecommunication side grabbed the hegemony within the converged institution. Meanwhile, 
policy convergence caused the decrease of political independence in Korean PSBs. But civil 
societies including Korean PSB workers successfully managed to raise the issue of political 
independence to the political discussion and the public. This resulted in actual changes in media 
governance and policy. When it comes to the structure of media policy system, Korea tried to 
merge everything in a single institution as it adopted policy convergence, but they had to 
distinguish regulatory policies and promotional policies afterwards. Accordingly, it seems that the 
differences between the principles and the forms of media agencies are crucial, so that there can 
be a strong resistance while merging those two different media agencies. Chapter 7 discusses the 
governance issues in more details.  
 Lastly, this thesis examined the influence of media convergence on actual media policies. 
The result showed that the media convergence caused convergence as well as divergence in overall 
legal system and agencies’ authorities. Also, it was found that the converged agencies’ policies 
were highly influenced by media convergence particularly in its early days of establishment, but 
the influence diminished due to the organisational changes of the agency. In terms of sector-
specific regulations in Korean broadcasting, telecommunication and newspaper, those regulations 
were generally maintained in the last decade, despite of the apparent deregulation trends. In 
addition, it was found that broadcasting regulation has always been more restricted than that of 
newspapers and telecommunications. More details will be discussed in Chapter 8. Some practical 
recommendations for media policy, which are based on all of those examinations above, are 
presented in Conclusion chapters.  
 
1.4. Contribution of research 
With those examinations above, it is believed that the thesis contributes to the studies of media 
business, media governance and media regulation. At least three points can be presented. 
 Firstly, it clarified the concept of media convergence, and it contributes to the conceptual 
understandings of media convergence. Moreover, it also reminded the importance of clarification 
of a concept in media, for it can hugely affect media policy practice as well as the way of studying 
media phenomena.  
 Secondly, it generated new empirical evidence by examining South Korean case. It showed 
the recent changes in the markets and policies of Korean broadcasting and telecommunication, in 
relation to media convergence. For example, it presented some empirical evidences for the turf 
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war between media policy institutions, and the creation of iron cage (from capture theory) by 
showing the coalition between policy agencies and media industries. Furthermore, in examining 
the policy convergence in Korea, the thesis was able to spot that the elite theory and the theory of 
regulatory state can be applied to the case, as the power of government was generally maintained 
throughout the reform process. Moreover, it introduced the detailed media regulations of South 
Korea by examining its newspaper, telecommunication and broadcasting regulations. It seems rare 
to see a study which investigated sector-specific regulations of Korean media, with its overall 
trends in the last decade.  
 Thirdly, as will be discussed more specifically in Conclusion chapter, the thesis suggested 
some useful recommendations for better practice in media policy. For example, it emphasised the 
significance of media-related concepts, for this can affect many following results in media business 
and policies. Indeed, the clarification of concept cannot be over-emphasised, for when it is loosely 
examined and defined, it can be easily manipulated as a social discourse by politico-economic 
ideologies that are prevalent in that time. Furthermore, it was suggested that the promotional and 
regulatory policies are better to be divided into separated policy agencies, for these principles are 
incompatible. Therefore, it would be better to establish a dedicated regulator for media regulation, 
while allocating promotional authorities to government-related agencies. Korean case showed that 
the regulatory principles were better achieved by dedicated regulator, not by a converged one, 
while promotional policies can be best achieved by government department. Furthermore, it was 
recommended that PSB can better serve its role and public interest when it is specifically legislated 
in relevant Act. That is, as in the case of Korea, when PSB is not clearly defined in the law, its 
values and policy principles can be marginalised in the process of social discussion such as 
Convergence Committee. Therefore, if a society wants a desirable PSB system, it may need to 
establish a good legal foundation for the institution. The legislation could include which 
broadcasters are the PSBs, and what is their remits and responsibilities. Also, when it comes to the 
political independence of PSB, it would be helpful to make special measures to inspect the informal 
interruption from the government to PSB. This is because the informal aspects can be more crucial 
than formal aspects regarding the actual degree of political independence.  
 
1.5. Thesis overview  
This thesis consists of two parts and nine chapters. Part I discusses the theoretical backgrounds 
and methodologies used in the thesis. Accordingly, Chapter 2 reviews previous researches in media 
studies relevant to media convergence and policy. Most of the studies are related to the US, the 
UK and some European countries. In this chapter, the findings from these studies and academic 
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gaps are discussed. More specifically, the chapter reviews previous studies regarding media 
convergence’s concept, discourse and influence. Those three subjects make the explanatory 
framework of this thesis, so the rest of thesis will be examined by each subject of the framework. 
Chapter 3 discusses the methodology of this thesis. Before introducing this thesis’ methodologies, 
the chapter examines the methodologies of previous studies presented in Chapter 2, to find the best 
combination of methodologies for this thesis by reviewing theirs.  
 Part II discusses specific subjects by using the framework and methodologies established in 
Part I. Precisely, Part II consists of Chapter 4 to 9, including Conclusion as the last chapter of this 
thesis. Part II generally examines Korean cases regarding media convergence’s concept, discourse 
and influences. Particularly, Chapter 4 examines the concept of media convergence. By examining 
previous studies, reports, and other relevant documents in the UK, EU, the US and Korea, the 
chapter discusses the definition of concept and addresses some problems regarding the concept. 
Furthermore, on the basis of the discussion, it presents more specific and clarified definition of the 
concept. In Chapter 5, the discourses found in the process of policy convergence in Korea will be 
examined. The Convergence Committee’s white paper and KCC’s work plan will be analysed, to 
see whether similar discourses, which were found in other national cases, existed in Korea too. In 
addition to this, some peculiar points from Korean case will be presented as well.  
 From Chapter 6 to Chapter 8, the influence of media convergence on Korean media markets, 
governance and policy will be analysed, respectively. Chapter 6 investigates the changes in Korean 
broadcasting and telecommunication markets since convergent media were introduced. Thus, it 
presents the actual model of convergent media appeared in Korean markets and analyses its impact 
on the two markets by examining its revenues and other relevant figures. Moreover, it shows how 
traditional media and convergent media such as smart phones and tablets are used in Korea, by 
introducing statistics from relevant market reports. Chapter 7 examines the influence of media 
convergence on policy governance system. It shows the process of the convergence between the 
policy agencies in broadcasting and telecommunication sectors, and the patterns shown by main 
participants in the discussion. Furthermore, it discusses the political independence issue that was 
prompted by the integration of media agencies. As the matter of PSB’s political independence 
became a big social issue after the organisational convergence, the matter of pollical independence 
is discussed in the chapter as well. Also, the hegemony struggle between broadcasting and 
telecommunication agencies within the converged agency, KCC is examined. In Chapter 8, media 
convergence’s influences on legal system, jurisdiction of media agencies and actual media policy 
output are analysed. In so doing, the changes in media-related laws and agencies’ authorities on 
broadcasting and telecommunication policies are examined. Furthermore, KCC’s broadcasting and 
telecommunication policies in 2008-2017, and the sector-specific regulations in Korean newspaper, 
telecommunication and broadcasting are examined. More precisely, four categories of media 
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regulations including entry, ownership, competition and content regulations are examined, to see 
the influence of media convergence on those sector-specific regulations.  
 The next chapter reviews previous studies which examined the concept, discourse and 
influence of media convergence. As noted above, those studies are relevant to the US, the UK and 
other European cases in general.  
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2. Literature review 
This chapter reviews three groups of literatures that are relevant to media convergence. The three 
groups of literatures are categorised according to the three purposes of this thesis, as presented in 
the Introduction chapter. Therefore, firstly, it examines the studies on the concept of media 
convergence. Secondly, it reviews the discourses related to media convergence. Thirdly, it reads 
the studies relevant to actual influence of media convergence on media market, governance and 
regulation. In examining those group of literatures, this chapter provides the landscape of media 
convergence studies since 1970s. In so doing, the research gaps that this thesis is to fill in will be 
presented.  
 
2.1. Studies on the concept of media convergence 
With the developments of digital and transmission technologies in media, the concept of media 
convergence was firstly presented by De Sola Pool in 1983 (Jenkins, 2006). The concept was 
welcomed by media industries, policies and academic fields, and it became “the catchword of the 
1990s” (Vick, 2006:26). Indeed, there were many studies which dealt with media convergence, 
particularly between in the 1990s and 2000s (e.g. Blackman, 1998; Dwyer, 2010; European 
Commission, 1997; Fielden, 2012; Gibbons, 2005; House of Lords, 2013; Iosifidis, 2002; 2011; 
ITU, 1997; Jenkins, 2006; Latzer, 2009; Lunt and Livingstone, 2012; Michalis, 1999; Noll, 2003; 
OECD, 2004; 2013; 2016; Starks, 2014; Van Cuilenburg and McQuail, 2003; Vick, 2006; World 
Bank, 2007). Most of these studies are conducted in European background, and in many cases, 
these are relevant to the regulatory reforms including changes in media governance structures and 
content regulations. Particularly, in 2002, JMM (The International Journal of Media Management) 
published a special edition that is dedicated to the discussion of the future of media convergence. 
In this edition, the concept and impact of media convergence were discussed.  
 Most studies above presented the definition of media convergence on their own. But those 
definitions were quite different to each other, and it makes difficult to understand the term in 
comprehensive manner. And sometimes it overlaps with existing concepts, and sometimes it was 
presented in a paradoxical context. The term itself also contained ambiguity, for the term is quite 
relevant to a presumption of the future. Accordingly, there are four problems which makes it 
difficult in understanding the term comprehensively and clearly. In the following part, these 
problems will be briefly discussed, and Chapter 4 will discuss them further in detail.   
 The first is that the broadness of the concept, as the concept is too big to be a proper concept. 
In other words, when we include the term ‘media’ in a certain concept, then it is supposed to be a 
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general phenomenon in overall media sectors. But in most cases, sectional approaches were taken 
in the explanation of concept. That is, as many described the concept in regard to the different parts 
of media, the definition tended to be different from one to another. Precisely, the concept of media 
convergence was addressed as the blurring phenomenon which makes some lines between different 
media to be meaningless. But the problem is that there are so many different ‘lines’ within different 
‘levels’ of media value chain. However, as the concept describes that any lines in general media 
would be blurred because of media convergence, it becomes difficult to capture what it exactly 
describes. For example, if one defines the concept mainly in the perspective of media provider, 
s/he tends to focus on what happens in a provider’s side in the name of media convergence. On the 
contrary, if another describes the phenomenon in an audience’s perspective, the definition tends to 
be more related the convergence of media device and usage. In addition, as the term was used to 
describe convergences in various sectors in media, including technology, industry, market and 
policy sectors, it could be even harder to catch the clear meaning of the term. Indeed, the 
convergence happened in industry has to be different to one that happened in policy area. All these 
complexities in media attributes to the difficulties in understanding media convergence. Therefore, 
as Garnham (1996:106) argued, the use of a big terminology such as ‘multimedia’ or ‘media 
convergence’ can make it difficult to give necessary attention to the various results that would 
result from digital technology. In line with this, Blackman (1998) also mentioned that, although 
the use of big concept can make it easier to understand a certain media phenomenon, there can be 
disadvantages of using the shorthand concept such as ‘media convergence’, because the concept 
describes too many things at once.  
 The second problem of this concept is its overlapping character with other existing concepts. 
As the term illustrates the phenomena that shows a merging between different things in media, it 
can overlap with the existing terms that are used to demonstrate something that is merging with 
another. For example, the concept overlaps with vertical and horizontal integrations, as well as 
merger and acquisition (M&A) between media firms, when it is used in relation to the industrial 
sector within media. Furthermore, the concept has quite similar notion with that of telematics or 
mediamatics, as the term describes similar phenomenon that those concepts bring in. Thus, the 
lack of originality in its concept seems contributing to the difficulties in identifying the concept 
correctly. 
 The third problem is the ambiguousness attributes from the presumption which is a crucial 
part of the concept. Indeed, the concept of media convergence contains strong presumption that 
the blurring between existing media would develop further in the future. Although it does not 
specify on which part and to what extent the development would proceed, it seems quite clear for 
the concept that the blurring would proceed more and more. However, due to its strong 
characteristic of presumption, the concept could not have any tangible, or physical form that can 
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be clearly recognised by its readers. As will be examined later in Chapter 4 and 5, this character of 
the concept contributed to the emergence of certain social discourse.  
 Last but not least, the fourth problem of this concept is that the concept is frequently 
presented in paradoxical contexts. That is, the term is used in describing diverging trend as well as 
converging trend. For example, when a broadcasting network and a telecommunication network 
are converging into a single digital network, this can be called as convergence, for this 
demonstrates two different networks are being integrated into a single network. But in many cases, 
the term media convergence was also used to describe what is actually divergence, such as 
multiplatform, OSMU (One Source Multi Use) and contents spin-offs. For example, it is often 
exemplified that if a broadcaster offers online VoD (Video-on-Demand) service (which is an 
interactive data service) or newspaper-like articles on their website, then it can be called as an 
example of media convergence phenomena. However, these particular cases are showing 
something diversified rather than converged. That is, if something is converged, then it should 
mean that some separated things have been integrated and accordingly the number of relevant 
objects has to be reduced. When it comes to the broadcaster’s example above, their contents are 
provided in different platforms and styles due to the development of digital and transmission 
technologies. But in many cases, this diverging trend was also depicted as media convergence. 
This paradoxical presentation of the concept seems to obstruct clear understanding of the concept.  
 As briefly examined above, there have been some problems regarding the concept of media 
convergence, due to its broadness, overlapping character, presumption and paradoxical 
presentation. Yet, there has been little effort for the discussion on these problems in the concept of 
media convergence. But after almost twenty years of its popularity in media studies, now it might 
be able to establish more clarified version of it. The newly updated concept needs to be based on 
the examination of previous studies, as well as what has actually happened in media during last 
twenty years. In Chapter 4, the concept of media convergence will be investigated more thoroughly. 
The chapter will examine how the concept was presented in previous studies and relevant policy 
documents, and then it will present more clarified concept of media convergence. The chapter uses 
the framework of ‘media value chain’ to understand the concept more specifically and more 
comprehensively. The next part will examine studies that analysed social discourses that emerged 
in the process of policy discussions regarding media convergence.  
 
2.2. Studies on media convergence discourse 
Some studies captured how social discourses were formed in relation to media convergence. 
Discourse is ‘a class of text’ in which the meanings of various texts are entangled, and accepted 
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naturally in social relations (Chalaby, 1996). According to Deacon et al (2007:152), ‘discourse’ is 
“speech or writing seen from the point of view of the beliefs, values and categories which it 
embodies; these beliefs constitute a way of looking at the world, an organisation or representation 
of experience – ‘ideology’ in the neutral, non-pejorative sense.” Thus, there are two dimensions of 
discourse: “language in social life” and “relationship between language and social structure” (ibid. 
151). By examining these together, it enables us to understand what ‘ideological’ aspect is 
represented in a language form. Moreover, Deacon et al (2007:151) argued, “most significantly it 
enables us to focus not only on the actual uses of language as a form of social interaction in 
particular situations and contexts but also on forms of representation in which different social 
categories, practices and relations are constructed from and in the interest of particular point of 
view, a particular conception of social reality”.  
According to some studies focused on the discourse made within the context of media 
convergence, there can be two discourses. The first discourse was that media convergence is 
developing rapidly, and it will be expanded throughout the media. As examined above, the term 
itself is ambiguous, for it is not a concept which is based on what exactly happened in the name of 
media convergence. Rather, it focused on the possible changes in the future. In other words, the 
concept contains a strong characteristic of projection, which predicts what might happen in the 
future. But for some reasons, a social consensus has been formed that media convergence would 
only develop further and further and there might be no boundaries for its development. Some 
studies captured this point, arguing that this is not a scientific reasoning, so we need to be cautious 
about this discourse on media convergence.  
The second discourse is related to the first one, for it was made on the presumption of the 
first discourse. For it was thought that media convergence would happen fast and wide, another 
discourse followed that it is better to be prepared as soon as possible to maximise the opportunity 
caused by media convergence. That is, as the existing regulatory systems are becoming 
meaningless so quickly, it was believed that it is necessary to loosen or discard existing old 
regulatory systems, so that they can prepare for the radical changes coming to media sectors. 
However, the thing is that this discourse was mostly relevant to economic success of a media 
company as well as the economic success of the country where the media company located. In 
other words, this discourse was almost nothing to do with various values and principles regarding 
public interests, but it only stressed economic interests. Accordingly, the discourse was often 
appeared in the context which promotes a move towards deregulation, reform and competition. 
The convergence discourse was mostly based on an ambition to establish a successful global media 
companies that export media contents to all around the world. As a result, many thinkers concerned 
about the marginalisation of other values in existing policies and governance. In other words, they 
showed concern about the imbalance in media policy principles. More precisely, the following two 
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parts review these two types of convergence discourses that were appeared in previous studies on 
media convergence. 
 
2.2.1. Convergence discourse 1: A predetermined future? 
As Fagerjord and Storsul (2007:28) argued, “in policy documents and business plans, and to a 
large extent in academic writings, the convergent development has been seen as predetermined. 
The question of whether or not convergence will take place has not been posed, instead the 
conclusion that digitalisation will cause convergence on all the dimensions […] has been taken for 
granted”. For example, international organisations such as Office for Economic Co-operations and 
Development (OECD), International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and European 
Commission (EC), saw technological convergence as a rapidly-growing phenomenon that requires 
an urgent response. Those organisations were active players who disseminated ‘convergence 
discourse’. As noted above, convergence discourse means that ‘media convergence is bringing big 
and rapid changes in the media environment, and therefore we must actively respond to 
convergence quickly’.  
 In particular, the OECD is one of the most active international organisations that have 
emphasised the rapid ‘change’ caused by media convergence. They consistently stressed changes 
caused by digital convergence through their reports on media convergence in the last decade. 
Interestingly, they rarely mention continuity in existing media environments. It is understandable 
that they are more interested in business opportunities and industrial developments than the 
different values in media policies, because they are an organisation that was made to promote 
economic cooperation between some economically developed countries. It is clear, however, that 
they at least have a narrow ‘economy-oriented’ view on the media. And the problem was that these 
reports had a potential to influence on the decision makers in the member states. Particularly, 
OECD (2004) stressed the fast changes that are caused by digital technology in the report called 
‘The Implications of Convergence for Regulation of Electronic Communications.’ In this report, 
they said: “Digital technologies and the diffusion of new transmission technologies have increased 
the number of platforms capable of providing video transmission, and have also altered the 
traditional characteristics of broadcasting, such as lack of interactivity and the concept of 
broadcasting as a ‘one-to-many service’” (OECD, 2004:3). Examples similar to this can be easily 
found in one of their report published in 2013 as well: “The television and broadcasting sector has 
been undergoing significant technological and structural changes […] Convergence is changing 
the way in which consumers use communication services and consume content, as it is available 
on new platforms and on various wireless portable devices. […] The penetration of new 
technologies and the dynamic effects of convergence are changing the way that consumers access 
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and view audiovisual content. […] Convergence has added further uncertainty to business planning 
[…] Technological evolution and the emergence of new products and services have rendered media 
markets more competitive” (OECD, 2013:5-6).  
 However, as time passes, the attitude of OECD towards technological aspects of media 
convergence was changed to be more realistic than before. Rather than disseminating the ‘fast 
change in media’ discourse, they narrowed down their focus to the ‘network level’ of media 
convergence. In one of the most recent papers on media convergence, they specified that: “The 
primary purpose of this report is to examine the effects of network convergence and its policy 
implications” (OECD, 2016:5). Moreover, their definition of digital convergence has changed to 
be more explicitly than in the past: “Digital convergence in this report refers to ‘the shift towards 
IP-based networks, the diffusion of high-speed broadband access, and the availability of multi-
media communication and computing devices” (ibid.)  
 In the meantime, this type of ‘convergence discourse’ can be easily found in European 
Commission’s Green Papers as well. For example, in Convergence Green Paper published in 1997, 
they mentioned that: “Convergence is not just about technology. It is about services and about new 
ways of doing business and of interacting with society. The changes described in this Green Paper 
have the potential to substantially improve the quality of life for Europe’s citizens; to better 
integrate Europe’s regions into the heart of the European economy, and to make businesses more 
effective and competitive on global and national markets” (European Commission, 1997:ii). Later, 
they published another Green Paper, which was named as ‘Preparing for a Fully Converged 
Audiovisual World (2013)’. In the Green Paper they said: “Lines are blurring quickly between the 
familiar twentieth-century consumption patterns of linear broadcasting received by TV sets versus 
on-demand services delivered to computers. Moreover, with every smartphone enabling converged 
production as well as consumption, there might be a future shift from ‘lean-back’ consumption to 
active participation […] As convergence will become gradually more tangible over the next decade, 
it may have an impact on future legal instruments including Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
(AVMSD)” (European Commission, 2013:4). Therefore, it can be said that OECD and EC were 
institutions that promoted the recognition of a fast-changing media environment that is caused by 
media convergence.  
 Therefore, as Hesmondhalgh (2013:156) argued: “International policy bodies are pushing 
the global cultural industry landscape in the direction of conglomeration and commodification, 
with convergence increasingly accepted as technologically-driven fact rather than a product of 
policy in itself […] Convergence functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy: policy change is both 
brought about by perceived convergence and, at the same time, is likely to accelerate it.” Indeed, 
they commonly saw that the progress of media convergence was so fast, and this will change media 
environment quite quickly. However, as Roger Silverstone (1995) argued that, “yet we know that 
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the future of media and information technology, both in general and in specific areas, is neither 
certain nor predictable. We also know that technological change is neither determined in its 
development nor determining in its use [...] We know that human beings, social beings, have the 
capacity to engage with the products and services of electronic media and information technology 
in multiple ways: rejecting, accepting, transforming, moderating both the meaning of objects and 
supposedly objective meanings according to need, resource and circumstance” (Silverstone, 
1995:11). In line with this, Noll (2003) also argued that it had been hard to judge whether the 
prediction is worth accepting. He said: “We were urged to join in the high-tech multimedia-mania, 
or risk being left behind in a cloud of semiconductor dust as the broadband wagon rushed down 
the communication superhighway. Yet all the hype was confusing and separating the sense from 
the nonsense was a mighty struggle” (Noll, 2003:12). 
 
Convergence Hype Cycle 
In addition, Lind (2004, cited in KISDI, 2008) studied the stages of socio-cultural development of 
the concept of media convergence. He argued that the socio-cultural development stage of 
convergence is divided into four stages. He examined lots of articles related to media convergence 
from Reuters and Dow Jones magazines between 1990 and 2003. Based on the number of articles 
related to media convergence, he found that the popularity of media convergence has dramatically 
changed as time passes. According to him, the first stage can be called as ‘technology introduction 
period’ (1970-1991). In this period, people are interested in new technologies and try to understand 
what the technology is. The second stage refers to the ‘excessive expectation’ period. It is the 
period when the boom is first made with great expectation and imagination (1992-1995). In this 
period, governments and corporations have a fantasy about convergence and actively promote the 
convergence between media. The third stage is called as ‘overcoming fantasy’ (1996-1997) period. 
It is a time of disappointment and scepticism because the previously elevated illusion is not realised 
in practice. The fourth stage is ‘productivity improvement’ period (1998-2003). This is due to the 
emergence of the Internet, which leads to a second convergence development but to a more gradual 
and sustained growth than in the first boom.  
Based on this examination, Lind (2004) presented the ‘Convergence Hype Cycle,’ which 
he says is very similar to the pattern of Gartner's Hype Cycle. The Gartner’s Hype Cycle shows 
that the development of new technology forms a sloping L-type graph, rather than an S-shaped 
curve which is formed in general commodities. In summary, Lind (2004) presented that new 
technological terms such as media convergence can evolve through different stages (KISDI 
2008:33-34). The following graph shows how the term media convergence populated from 1990 
to 2003. 
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Figure 1 Convergence Hype Cycle 
 
Source: Lind (2004:11, cited in KISDI (2008:34)) 
 
2.2.2. Convergence discourse 2: Deregulate, reform and compete 
As examined above, media convergence was seen as a predetermined future. Therefore, media 
convergence became one of the key themes in media business, media policy and the media studies 
between the 1990s and the 2000s, (see George, 2010; Vick, 2006; see also Marsden and Verhulst, 
1999; Levy, 1999). Yet, at the same time, a group of liberal ideologies was emerged as another key 
themes in media too. They were a group of liberal thoughts, namely, neoliberalism, marketisation, 
privatisation, etc. Media convergence was in the middle of those politico-economic ideologies 
which emerged in 1980s and 1990s. In this environment, media convergence was frequently 
quoted within the context of liberal ideology. Thus, as Fagerjord and Storsul (2007:28) argued, 
"strong economic and political interests" brought media convergence into an important position in 
media policy decision-making. More precisely, media convergence was often presented as a fairly 
good reason to liberalise media market and to remove old traditional regulations in media.  
 
Neoliberalism, information society and media convergence 
David Hesmondhalgh (2013) investigated ‘neoliberalism’ emerged in cultural policy since the 
1980s. According to him, a long economic recession in globe throughout the 1970s was a trigger 
for the change in cultural policy, as it made capitalist states abandon state intervention which had 
prevailed in post-war period. Instead, marketisation and neo-liberalism were emerged as prevailing 
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ideologies in cultural policy. Marketisation, according to Hesmondhalgh (2013:127), refers to “the 
permeation of market exchange as a social principle”. And neo-liberalism can be defined as “the 
view that human needs are best served by an unregulated free market” (ibid. 99). Therefore, 
marketisation and neoliberalism have similar goal, which is to adopt free market principle into 
media policy. As both marketisation and neo-liberalism pursues vibrant market and unfettered 
competition, it highlights ‘privatisation’ and ‘de- or re-regulation’ of media. Privatisation means 
the transfer from public company/institution to private company/institution. Deregulation means 
the removal or reduction of existing rules. Re-regulation has almost same meaning with 
deregulation, but it highlights “the introduction of new legislation and regulation which favoured 
the interests of large, private corporations” (ibid. 127).  
 Meanwhile, David Harvey (2005) argued that neo-liberalism and the information society 
were closely related. ‘Information society’ discourse was emerged since the 1970s. Many countries 
tried to establish an information network society, because it was believed that the ‘information’ 
would be the next currency within global network infrastructure. This prediction formed ‘the vision 
of information society’ and affected cultural policymaking, despite of the ambiguity of its concept 
(Webster, 2014). Meanwhile, he argued that the success of neo-liberalism depends on 
‘information’, for sufficient information is essential in maintaining competitive market. He said, 
“neoliberalism requires technologies of information creation and capacities to accumulate, store, 
transfer, analyse, and use massive databases to guide decisions in the global marketplace” (Harvey, 
2005:3). Furthermore, according to him, followers of information society also wanted neo-
liberalistic free market approach in media policy, as they worried about that regulations could be 
the barriers for the development of information society. On the basis of this relationship between 
neo-liberalism and information society, Harvey (2005) argued that this is why most of policies 
relevant to information society resulted in deregulation and marketisation of media, while 
promoting the growth of IT companies.  
 Meanwhile, ‘media convergence’ was thought as a significant factor that affects the way 
information is consumed. For the vision of information society was to establish a network system 
where information and knowledge can freely flow, media convergence technology was welcomed 
as they would help distributing substantial information, anywhere, any time (Castells, 1996). The 
strong link between information society and media convergence can be found in European 
Commissions’ Convergence Green Paper as well. Examining the paper, Iosifidis (2002:32) noted: 
“The overall objective of the Green Paper was to support, rather than stifle the process of change 
and innovation. It was viewed by the EC as a mean to achieve the European Information Society. 
Faith on convergence to create the information society appears very strong, and regulatory reform 
is viewed as a precondition to encourage convergence”. 
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Media convergence and cross-ownership deregulation 
Furthermore, the tight relationship between media convergence and deregulation was frequently 
addressed in relevant studies. Precisely, it was argued that there was convergence discourse that 
promoted deregulation in cross-media ownership. In other words, they saw media convergence 
was used as a rhetoric for market consolidation. So, they argued that there was convergence 
discourse in media policymaking process, and the discourse encouraged vertical integrations 
between media companies and the overall concentration in media markets. Furthermore, some 
theorists argued that there was a social discourse that justified the consolidation in media markets. 
According to Silverstone (1995), “technological convergence, it is presumed and argued, requires 
industrial convergence and without the coming together of telephony, video and computing no 
economically successful future can be guaranteed” (Silverstone, 1995:11). Furthermore, Dwyer 
(2010) argued that the process of media convergence has a correlation with the consolidation in 
the media industry. He said: “the process of media convergence is inevitably tied to relentless 
industry consolidation and sectoral cross-ownership, and to the prevailing ideological and policy 
framings that underwrite it. There is abundant evidence that convergence discourses are continuing 
to play a strongly legitimating role in relation to media industry consolidation as much at the level 
of common-sense ideologies as in policy-making contexts”. In a similar vein, Blackman (1998) 
also argued that “convergence is promoting a trend towards vertically integrated companies and 
alliances.” Furthermore, Tim Dwyer (2010) also argued that there is a tight relationship between 
media convergence and consolidated ownership: 
 
“Convergence is a new media ideology too: that is, a way of thinking that facilitates the 
operation of neoliberal global markets. Media owners in the twenty-first century strive to 
continuously expand their output across media platforms. In this sense, the economic and 
ideological dimensions of media convergence work together in the interests of a further 
consolidated ownership base (Dwyer, 2010:2-3)”. 
 
 In addition, Noll (2003:13) also mentioned that “companies have merged and acquired one 
another in the name of convergence and the supposed synergies that would result.” However, he 
showed the case of M&A between America Online (AOL) (a telecommunication firm), and Time 
Warner (a broadcasting and film conglomerate), and he argued that such an industrial convergence 
was not always successful as expected. 
 
A rhetoric for reform 
Meanwhile, some studies captured that the convergence discourse promoted media policy system 
reform (see Collins and Murroni, 1996; D’Arma, 2009; EU, 1997; Fagerjord and Storsul, 2007; 
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Iosifidis, 2002; ITU, 1997; Latzer, 2009; OECD, 2004, 2013, 2016; Van Cuilenburg and McQuail, 
2003; Vick, 2006). Particularly, Fagerjord and Storsul (2007) argued that the term media 
convergence was used as a rhetoric by people who wanted to change media policy system. They 
said:  
 
“In order to inform people, politicians, and practitioners about the relevance and impact of 
media change, it is useful to have metaphors and pictures that are easy to communicate. 
Convergence has served as such a simplifying metaphor […] convergence is used as a 
rhetorical tool in order to facilitate reform. The concept communicates a media landscape 
undergoing significant change. This has been instrumental in convincing politicians, 
regulators, investors and other market players that their strategies need to adapt” (Fagerjord 
and Storsul, 2007:28).  
 
Therefore, it seems that convergence discourse propelled the advent of policy convergence and 
systematic reforms in media policy. Accordingly, it can be said that policy convergence was not 
the natural result that was caused by market convergence, but it could have been the result of the 
convergence discourse. However, as Garcia-Murillo and MacInnes (2002:58) argued, “it is 
important to clarify that agency and regulatory convergence are not a precondition for taking 
advantage of the opportunities provided by convergence.” In this context, Van Cuilenburg and 
McQuail (2003:202) also argued that, “there are reasons for redrawing boundaries, but no necessity 
to have only one regime for different kinds of service”. Bearing these in mind, Chapter 5 will 
examine whether the convergence discourse was formed in the process of policy convergence in 
Korea.  
 
Rise of competition law  
Meanwhile, as a result of the prevalence of liberal ideology, competition was regarded as the most 
important policy goal in convergence era. In other words, it was often argued that sector-specific 
regulations need to be replaced by competition rules. For example, World Bank (2007:3) argued: 
“It will be essential in the era of convergence, even more than it is now, to ensure that policy and 
regulation enables free and fair competition and supports the full play of market forces.” However, 
there has been many criticisms on such a competition-centred perspective. Many studies argued 
that the existing sector-specific regulations are still valid despite the changes caused by media 
convergence (see Feintuck and Varney, 2006; Gibbons, 2005; Iosifidis, 2002; Just, 2009; Lunt and 
Livingstone, 2012; Michalis, 1999; Vick, 2006). Those studies all together showed the concerns 
about losing sector-specific regulations which have served various public interests such as content 
diversity and protection of minorities in society. However, not many studies investigated to what 
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extent the competition law actually replaced existing sector-specific law afterwards. Therefore, it 
can be said that there is an academic gap between those concerns and the examination of actual 
results. Thus, to fill the gap, the thesis will examine the actual changes in media policy system and 
policies, in Chapter 8.  
 
2.2.3. Conclusion  
This part examined literatures relevant to convergence discourse. From this, it was possible to 
expand the understandings on media convergence. The thesis categorised convergence discourses 
into two groups. The first convergence discourse was formed because of high expectation that 
media convergence will progress fast. And the second convergence discourse was related to 
deregulation and market concentration. Moreover, it was shown that the discourse was affected by 
the predominant politico-economic ideology in that period, which was neoliberalism. Some studies 
found the strong link between liberal ideas and media convergence. That is, in many cases it was 
found that the concept of media convergence was used to promote neoliberalism and deregulation. 
And some argued that it was due to the prevalence of neoliberalism ideology in the period of time, 
particularly in 1980s and 90s. Indeed, neoliberalism was so powerful in that time in some 
developed Western countries. Therefore, it is agreeable that media convergence formed a 
‘convergence discourse' in conjunction with some politico-economic ideologies such as 
marketisation, privatisation, and neo-liberalism that significantly affected the world of media since 
the 1980s. However, as Weiss (2012) argued, it would be difficult to make a desirable analysis of 
what is specifically happening in society, when adopting grand theories such as neoliberalism. Of 
course, it is true that grand theories such as neoliberalism and globalisation are good theoretical 
tools to facilitate the interpretation of social phenomena on a broad and long-term basis. However, 
in order to understand the social phenomenon related to media convergence more specifically, it is 
necessary to pay attention not only to the grand theories but also to the ‘small but important’ 
changes and continuities that actually happens in the media market and policy area. Therefore, the 
thesis has put its focus on both grand theory and small details of the phenomenon as well.  
Moreover, those relevant studies often missed the conceptual aspect of the term ‘media 
convergence’ itself and fell into the ‘neoliberalism reductionist approach’. However, this thesis 
sees the conceptual weakness of media convergence was a significant reason why it was affected 
by external factors such as ideologies. Therefore, it can be argued that the strong attachment 
between liberal thoughts and media convergence was rightly captured, but the ambiguity of the 
concept was also responsible for the attachment between media convergence and neoliberalism. 
To put more specifically, it can be addressed that if a concept is not clearly defined, it can be 
manipulated by any dominant ideology in that period of time. Or, in a different point of view, it 
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could be guessed that a concept could be ‘emerged’ when it has a good link to the predominant 
ideology. That is, because the concept could support the prevalent ideology in some social 
dimensions, it could be widely acknowledged in that time. But no matter which point of view is 
correct, it can be argued that the clear definition of a media concept is quite important, so that the 
concept is not misled in the society.  
The discussion of convergence discourse has given a good framework for the analyses in 
this thesis. This increased the scope of analysis in this thesis. Accordingly, in Chapter 5, the thesis 
analyses what kinds of convergence discourses were shaped in Korea, and how they can be 
compared to the cases examined above. 
 
2.3. Studies on the influence of media convergence 
Some studies examined how media convergence influenced on different levels of media. There has 
been a good consensus among studies about the process of development of media convergence. 
According to them, media convergence develops through four steps (see Iosifidis, 2002; ITU, 1997; 
Jenkins, 2006; Latzer, 2009; Michalis, 1999; van Cuilenburg and McQuail, 2003; Singh and Raja, 
2010). These four steps are technology convergence, industrial convergence, market convergence, 
and policy convergence. These steps are usually developed from technology to policy convergence, 
like a chain reaction. That is, technological convergence leads to industrial convergence, and then 
industrial convergence brings about market convergence, and then market convergence causes 
policy convergence. Therefore, it could be said that policy convergence can be regarded as the 
most advanced level in the process of media convergence development. In this part, we will 
examine some actual examples of media convergence in these four levels of development.  
 
2.3.1. Technological convergence  
Firstly, there is technological convergence that sets an initial stage in the process of convergence. 
As noted in De Sola Pool’s definition of media convergence, technological convergence is enabled 
by the digitalisation and the development of transmission technology. For example, a cable TV 
company can provide telephone as well as TV service using a single digital network. Also, a 
converged device enables the audiences to watch various digital contents using a single digital 
device. For instance, a media user with personal computer or smart device such as smartphone and 
tablet PC can get literally all media contents on these devices.  
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2.3.2. Industrial convergence  
Secondly, as technological convergence proceeds, industrial convergence is occurred. Industrial 
convergence can be understood in following two categories: Vertical integration and horizontal 
integration. Due to the emergence of digital technology, the way of production, storage and 
distribution of media content has been simplified, compared to the analogue era. Digitalisation has 
enabled the production, storage and distribution to be done in a single digital mode. Therefore, 
now a media company or even an individual who has a capacity to make and distribute digital 
contents, he can technically run various media businesses which were quite difficult to manage 
together in the analogue era. In other words, in a digitalised world, a media company can easily 
manage different media businesses than before, and this makes them more converged than the past.  
Meanwhile, vertical integration means the integration between different media firms that 
operate within a media value chain. Vertical integration is a frequently used strategy to reduce 
transaction cost in a media value chain and obtain know-hows from an existing company (Albarran 
2013). For instance, a media company that produces audio-visual content may want to reduce 
transaction cost and increase their control on how their contents are shown to the audience. As a 
result, they may want to buy an existing distribution industry by merger and acquisition (M&A). 
Perhaps, they may want to just establish an additional distribution company by and for themselves, 
but it would cost them a lot more, compared to M&A. Likewise, a distribution company may want 
to have a production company, for they want to reduce cost and to have right contents their 
customers want to watch. If they establish an affiliated production company or do an M&A with a 
production company, they will find it much easier to secure audio-visual contents they want to 
distribute. Furthermore, vertical integration is relevant to ‘economies of scope’, as the expansion 
of the company’s scope over multiple industries brings economic advantage in such as production, 
distribution, marketing and branding (Picard 2011b:78).  
On the other hand, industrial convergence can be also relevant to the horizontal 
integration between media companies. Horizontal integration means the integration between media 
companies in the same level within a value chain. For example, network company and another 
network company may want to be merged, so that they can increase their dominance in the market. 
This is a natural process in media, as ‘economies of scale’ is a key for success in the industry. More 
precisely, in media business, the production cost for an original copy is much higher than the cost 
of reproduction. In other words, while the production cost for the first copy is very high, its 
reproduction cost is almost zero (especially when it is copied in a digital format). Thus, it is 
important for media companies to sell as many copies as possible, to maximise profit. Therefore, 
media companies are highly likely to put its effort to secure as many audiences as possible. In this 
process, horizontal integration happens between similar companies. This leads to the increase of 
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consolidation in a media market (Picard, 2011b:79). Like vertical integration, the horizontal 
integration has been a common practice in media markets.  
 
2.3.3. Market convergence  
Thirdly, market convergence is occurred, as industrial convergence makes the boundaries between 
existing markets blurred. A typical example of market convergence is bundle service market. For 
example, telecommunication companies can provide broadcasting as well as telecom services to 
customers by combining such as landline telephone, mobile phone, internet broadband, and 
broadcasting services. This is called ‘Quadruple Play Service (QPS)’, as it combines four different 
media and communication services. And if three different services are combined, it is called ‘Triple 
Play Service (TPS)’. And if two different services are integrated into a single service product, it is 
called ‘Double Play Service (DPS)’. For example, a Pay TV broadcasting company such as a cable 
television can provide TPS service, by offering telecommunication services such as the Internet 
broadband and VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) telephone service in addition to their existing 
broadcasting service. Therefore, a combined telecom-broadcasting market can be made, as there 
is virtually no difference between those services. In other words, the barriers between existing two 
markets have been disappeared, as a result of industrial convergence. Therefore, market 
convergence can be understood as the immediate result of industrial convergence. Therefore, two 
media that operated in two separated markets now should compete in the same market, and it can 
be called as market convergence.  
  
2.3.4. Policy convergence  
Finally, the changes in market prompts policy convergence. In general, policy convergence stands 
for the organisational integration of traditionally different media policy agencies (Garcia-Murillo 
and MacInnes, 2002:58). This could be exemplified as the integration between a government 
ministry and an independent media regulator. The most typical policy convergence occurs between 
broadcasting and telecom agencies. Furthermore, broadly speaking, policy convergence can also 
include the integration of traditionally different media-related laws (e.g. broadcasting law and 
telecommunication law) (ibid.).  
 
Clarification of terms: Policy convergence and regulatory convergence 
It seems necessary to clarify some definitions regarding policy convergence before we examine 
studies that dealt with policy and regulatory convergence examples given in this part. Basically, 
there are two different kind of policies in media policy: Promotional policy and regulatory policy. 
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Promotional policy includes such as the research and development (R&D), the education for media 
workers, and the financial support for media companies, etc. More precisely, promotional policy 
includes conducting government-supported researches on specific media technologies and services. 
Furthermore, it can also include supporting the penetration of newly adopted media devices and 
services such as digital TV and 4K TV, and the export of media contents, and so on. As these 
examples show, promotional policy aims for the development of a whole, or a specific part of the 
media industry. Those activities are usually supported by government spending. Therefore, this 
policy activities are led by a government agency which is relevant to media industries.  
 On the other hand, regulatory policy includes permissions and impositions of the rules, such 
as the limitation of the consolidation level regarding media ownership. In other words, regulatory 
policy is aimed at restricting excessive expansion of private interests and promoting public 
interests (Napoli, 2001). Thus, it can be said that regulation generally means mainly imposing 
specific restrictions on operators. Typically, there are four regulations in media. Those are entry 
regulation, ownership regulation, competition regulation and content regulation. First, the entry 
regulation allows entry only to operators with the ability and responsibility by setting the 
conditions for entry into the media market. Second, ownership regulation is used to limit the 
excessive market concentration by setting ownership limits. In other words, it is a tool to secure 
sufficient diversity such as the diversity of public opinions in the market. In addition, ownership 
regulation sets regional boundaries in which a company can operate or, it sets the upper limit of 
revenue share or rating share in a certain media market. Third, competition regulation is applied 
to ensure fair competition among business operators by imposing rules that restricts anti-
competitive behaviour. Lastly, Content regulation is a policy to secure diversity of contents and to 
prevent distribution of socially undesirable or harmful contents. For example, public service 
broadcasting is a medium where the strictest content regulation is imposed. For instance, the limit 
of times on a specific TV genre that a channel can air is predetermined every year. This is to prevent 
an excessive provision of a popular genre such as drama and entertainment, as well as to meet the 
remit the channel is given (Hanretty, 2012).  
 Due to the difference between policy and regulation, policy convergence and regulatory 
convergence are used differently in this thesis. That is, if a policy convergence involves both 
promotional and regulatory policy agencies, then it could be called as ‘policy convergence’. 
However, if a convergence is only relevant to regulatory level, it could be called just as ‘regulatory 
convergence’. Therefore, policy convergence can be understood as a broader concept than 
regulatory convergence. Thus, for example, if a government department and an independent 
regulatory agency are merged to manage not only promotional but also regulatory policies, it 
would be more appropriate to express them as policy convergence rather than regulatory 
convergence. It can be more clarified by presenting some examples. When it comes to Ofcom in 
  38 
the UK, it only involves the convergence between regulatory agencies, as its government makes 
promotional policies. Therefore, the cases like Ofcom can be more specifically called as 
‘regulatory convergence.’ Most of cases in European countries that adopted media convergence in 
policy level are relevant to regulatory convergence. The reason is that the integration between 
broadcasting and telecommunication often involves regulatory organisations only. Therefore, in 
many cases, relevant European studies use the term ‘regulatory convergence’, instead of ‘policy 
convergence’ (see Latzer, 2009). Indeed, in some European countries, regulatory convergence is a 
more common case than policy convergence. Therefore, most European studies related to this 
policy convergence category have been approached from the perspective of regulatory 
convergence rather than policy convergence (see Iosifidis, 2011; Vick, 2006; Latzer, 2009). Thus, 
in European background, the word 'regulatory convergence' may be more familiar than 'policy 
convergence'.  
 However, there are many cases that can be more adequately categorised as ‘policy 
convergence’. For example, Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in USA and Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) in Japan are media agencies that oversee both 
promotional policy and regulatory policy (World Bank, 2007). As its name hints, Korean KCC is 
quite similar to American FCC. KCC was a policy convergence case, as it was set to conduct both 
promotional function and regulatory function. However, Interestingly, both policy convergence 
and regulatory convergence can be observed in Korean case, as the country changed the areas of 
responsibility of old KCC, by reducing the authorities that was given to the KCC when it was first 
established in 2008. The first KCC was a policy convergence case that integrated the promotional 
and regulatory policies of the broadcasting and telecommunications sector. It literally had all 
responsibilities and authorities in media. However, since 2013, KCC has been reformed to be an 
organisation that controls only the regulatory domain of broadcasting and telecommunications. 
Therefore, now KCC can be understood as an example of regulatory convergence, rather than 
policy convergence. More details of how this happened in Korea will be examined in Chapter 7.  
 
How policy convergence is made 
As the market convergence proceeds, policy duplication occurs. For example, cable TV only 
operated in TV market in the past. They were overseen by broadcasting agency only. But as cable 
TV service goes beyond the boundary of broadcasting, it becomes difficult to decide who should 
control cable TV’s non-broadcasting services. As a result, the need for an integrated agency is 
addressed, to oversee both sectors. As mentioned above, a typical example of policy convergence 
is the integration between broadcasting and telecommunication agencies. The following table 
summarises the media regulations that have been applied differently over the traditional media. 
However, it was predicted that the difference between these media regulations will gradually 
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disappear because of media convergence. Therefore, it was argued that an integrated media 
regulator would be needed in preparation of media convergence era (World Bank, 2007).  
 
Table 1 Regulatory Asymmetry across the Communications Industry 
 
Source: The World Bank (2007:37) * QoS: Quality of Service  
 
 Furthermore, with the advent of digital media, a new kind of service can emerge. This causes 
policy vacuum, as there is no specific rule for the new service. For example, the internet 
broadcasting provided by newspaper company does not fit existing media regulation framework. 
Accordingly, the need for a more comprehensive media regulator is addressed, so that a new 
service can be regulated. In conclusion, the main purpose of policy convergence is to overcome 
policy duplication and policy vacuum.  
 However, as the above table shows, there have been different styles in telecommunication 
and broadcasting regulations. For example, in terms of content regulation, it is ‘typically absent’ 
in telecommunication wireless and wireline telephony services. But when it comes to broadcasting 
services, content regulation is mostly strict. This is different because the purpose of each medium 
is different. The content of telecommunication is the voice message from the communicators who 
are connected via telephone service. This is supposed to be secured message, for this is regarded 
as a private conversation between the communicators. However, broadcasting content is 
disseminated to the public, so it is supposed to be seen by mass audience. Therefore, a much 
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tougher regulation has been imposed to broadcasting content regulations, to protect the audience 
from harmful and undesirable contents. Thus, the difference in regulations in different media 
attributes to the different contents the media transmit. Therefore, if the basic characteristics of 
those services are not changed in spite of media convergence, there is no need to bring changes in 
the regulatory styles. Therefore, it would be worth giving a fair attention to this difference when 
policy convergence occurs. Chapter 8 examines how media policy and regulation were influenced 
by media convergence, with special interest in the change and continuity of the style of existing 
sector-specific regulations.  
 
Trends in regulatory convergence  
Latzer (2009) reviewed many regulatory convergence cases in EU countries and the United States. 
He presented five most common trends showed in policy convergence. The first is the integration 
between broadcasting and communication promotional agencies. In many cases, there was the 
convergence of institutions that are responsible for promotional policies, such as research and 
development (R&D), media education, and financial support for media companies. The second is 
the integration of broadcasting and communication regulatory agencies. It is to integrate the 
regulatory bodies that were previously in charge of the regulation of carriage (network) or contents 
into a single regulatory agency. The third is the separation of network and content regulation within 
these integrated institutions. This means that despite the integration, its internal structure was 
separated to deal with the regulations on the network and on the content more specifically. This 
creates a 'horizontal regulatory approach' or a 'technology-neutral regulatory system'. The 
horizontal regulatory approach is an integrated way of regulation that deals with both broadcast 
and telecom network on a horizontal level. When it comes to contents regulation, the horizontal 
regulation approach deals with the contents from both broadcasting and telecom companies. This 
approach can be also called as a technology-neutral approach because regulations that were 
previously separated by technological differences in broadcasting and telecommunications are 
now regulated by a single framework. Fourth is the integration of the legal systems. It means 
broadcasting and telecommunications laws formed a more integrated legal system than the past. 
Fifth, the weakening of government’s power in media regulation and the transition to self- and co-
regulation system. Self-regulation refers to that a media operator generally regulates themselves 
without much interference from government. As a result, regulation has more and more relied on 
the litigation and court's decision. On the other hand, co-regulation refers to the cooperative 
regulation between media operator and government agency.  
 Meanwhile, in spite of this general tendency, it can be seen that regulatory convergence is 
differently developed in most cases, having quite different systems to each other (World Bank, 
2007:22). Singh and Raja (2010) saw that the difference in policy convergence patterns in these 
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countries reflects the differences between the political, economic, and socio-cultural 
characteristics of each country. According to them, Australia, India, Singapore, and Canada all 
applied different types of policy convergence. In Australia, the Australian Communications and 
Media Authority (ACMA) is responsible for all regulations and carriage (network), spectrum and 
content of telecom and broadcasting. In India, many different institutions such as TRAI, DoT, 
WPC do different functions in telecom and broadcasting regulations. In Singapore, the 
broadcasting and telecom regulatory agencies were maintained to be separated. In Canada, the 
broadcasting and telecom regulatory agencies were integrated, but government departments who 
manages promotional policies were separate. Nonetheless, agencies in these four countries 
cooperated for the introduction of new convergent media and succeeded in introducing mobile 
television or Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), even though the process was not easy. Therefore, 
Singh and Raja (2010) noted that an inter-organisational cooperation can be more efficient and 
effective than policy convergence. In line with this, World Bank (2010:19) also said that “it is 
possible that convergence issues can be dealt with by separate institutions or by on converged 
institution.”  
 
Power issues 
In the meantime, there were voices that concerned about the excessive concentration of power in 
converged authorities. According to Van Cuilenburg and McQuail (2003:202-203), “It is important 
in the interests of freedom not to concentrate too much power over communication in any single 
body and there must always be exceptions and alternative routes to follow.” In this context, Latzer 
(2009:420) added: “Institutional precautionary measures such as transparency obligations can be 
put into place to counter the danger of a too great concentration of power in the hands of one 
convergence regulator.” Furthermore, on the basis of the regulatory convergence debates in the 
UK, Richard Collins (1996:8) said, “while there is disagreement on the relationship of regulators 
to the courts, there is none on that of the regulators to government. All contributors agree – media 
and communication regulation should be independent of government.”  
 Meanwhile, in the process of policy convergence, it was found that media policy 
organisations tried to expand their power when they faced with policy convergence (Hills and 
Michalis, 2000; Smith, 2006). Hills and Michalis (2000) reviewed the turf war between DG XIII 
(telecommunications) and DG X (broadcasting) within the European Commission. According to 
them, the telecommunication department tried to increase their power through a theoretical 
reconstruction of the market. They made an alliance with internet service providers (ISPs) in 
pursuit of more power. Thus, they showed that the ‘capture theory’ of Stigler (1971) can be still 
relevant. Furthermore, according to Smith (2006), in the process of establishing Ofcom in the UK, 
there was a struggle for power between Independent Television Commission (ITC) from 
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broadcasting side and Oftel (Office of Telecommunication) from telecommunication side. They 
made efforts to broaden their jurisdictions within the newly converged regulator (Ofcom). 
Moreover, it was addressed that internal conflicts between previously separated organisations can 
occur even after policy convergence (Hills and Michalis, 2000). However, this imbalance does not 
simply mean the failure in the organisation, but it can also bring imbalance of regulatory principles 
in a longer-term basis. Therefore, the organisational conflict needs to be seriously considered, so 
that it does not result in a deterioration of policy diversity (Michalis, 1999). Therefore, the matter 
of power concentration and power struggle in the process of policy convergence was one of 
significant issues in policy convergence. This is an important subject of this thesis. Chapter 7 will 
discuss the matter of power by examining the process of governance system changes caused by 
policy convergence in Korea. In the following part, other national cases including the US, the UK 
and Italy will be examined in more detail.  
 
National Cases  
Hallin and Mancini (2004) provided a framework for understanding policy convergence in relation 
to comparative media systems. According to them, there exists three models in terms of media 
systems: The ‘liberal model’ of North America and Britain, the ‘democratic corporatist model’ in 
Nordic countries, and the ‘polarized pluralist model’ in southern Europe. These characteristics of 
the media system were also revealed in the process of policy convergence. Liberal nations, such 
as the United States and the United Kingdom, have also introduced policy convergence, and the 
policy convergence organisations have reflected their liberal policy style. On the other hand, in the 
case of countries with a high level of politicization such as Italy, the policy convergence occurred 
by political purposes rather than by media policy itself. Korea has some in common with these 
policy convergence cases. Thus, it could be said that a policy convergence case reflects the political 
and economic characteristics of the country and, therefore, the styles of policy convergence varies 
from country to country (Singh and Raja 2010). 
 According to the World Bank (2007:21), as media convergence has become more influential, 
more policy convergence cases have been made. However, still more than 20 of the 30 OECD 
countries had the separated media policy system in 2007, without adopting policy convergence in 
their media governance system. Thus, it could be said that the policy convergence was still an 
exceptional phenomenon at that time in the globe. Countries that introduced regulatory 
convergence include the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Finland, Australia, Canada, 
Iceland, and Japan. Here we will look at the policy convergence cases in three countries, the United 
States, Britain and Italy, which have a relatively high similarity with Korea than other cases.  
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FCC in the USA 
First, in the United States, the policy convergence organisation, Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) was established under the Communications Act 1934. It is the oldest example 
of media policy convergence. It oversees both broadcasting and telecom policies, being in charge 
of both promotional and regulatory policy. More specifically, FCC is responsible for television, 
radio, satellite, frequency, cable broadcasting, and so on. Thus, FCC is a case of ‘policy’ 
convergence. In terms of its administrative position, it is established as an independent government 
agency to be overseen by Congress. And in terms of its policy style, the FCC has adopted a market-
oriented, business-friendly policy while pursuing a neoliberal stance (Freedman, 2008, Iosifidis, 
2011, Napoli 2001). 
 Meanwhile, the US has historically developed a broadcasting system where private 
broadcasting companies are key players. The national public broadcaster, Public Broadcasting 
Service (PBS) has played a complementary role in the broadcasting system, with no significant 
influence (Napoli, 2001). This was mainly due to the historical characteristics in the development 
of broadcasting system. That is, when the broadcasting industry was first formed in the US, the 
country pursued a system that has private companies at the centre of it (Picard, 2011a). The 
characteristics of this continued in the United States (ibid.). As a result of this, the US became a 
country with a high degree of media concentration (Herman and McChesney, 1997). For example, 
a small number of media conglomerates, such as National Broadcasting Company (NBC), 
American Broadcasting Company (ABC), Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), FOX, Time 
Warner, Disney, and News Corporation have had a dominant influence in the media market. For 
this reason, for a long time there have been concerns about the diversity of information in the 
United States (see Curran et al. 2009).  
 In conclusion, the US has pursued private-oriented and market-driven media policies, and 
FCC was a well-matched policy institution for the country. But there has been a concern on the 
oligopolistic power of media conglomerates in the market. Meanwhile, those US media 
conglomerates had a great influence around the world at a time, so the problem of cultural 
imperialism was addressed (see Schiller, 1969; Tunstall 2007). However, despite its commercial 
success, critics argued that the American media policy model was not successful in the normative 
domain of media policies (Herman and McChesney, 1997). 
 
Ofcom in the UK  
In the UK, Office of Communication (Ofcom) was established through the Office of 
Communication Act 2002 and is a regulatory convergence case. It is in charge of the regulations 
of broadcasting and telecommunication in the UK under the Communication Act 2003. In the past, 
five broadcasting and telecommunications regulatory agencies were established separately to 
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regulate the sectors. The five regulatory organisations were the Office of Telecommunications 
(Oftel), the Radiocommunications Agency, the Independent Television Commission (ITC), the 
Broadcasting Standards Commission (BSC), and the Radio Authority (RA). In the UK, there have 
been many debates on the organisational structure as well as the remits of the converged regulator. 
In Converging Media? Converging Regulation? (1996), contributors including members from 
House of Lords, Independent Television Commission (ITC), Office of Telecommunication (Oftel), 
and Press Complaints Commission (PCC) discussed what regulatory model would be appropriate 
for the convergence era.  
 In general, each stakeholder argued to expand or maintain their power and style through the 
regulatory reform. In other words, they preferred making a regulatory environment that is familiar 
to them. This reflects that there are different approaches or principles to media policies. For 
example, telecommunication sector emphasised ‘competition’ and ‘consumer interest,’ while 
broadcasting sector stressed ‘content regulation’ and ‘citizen interest’, and press sector emphasised 
‘freedom of speech’ and ‘self-regulation’ as the most important principles in the debate.  
 When it comes to the governance structure for the new environment, members from press 
and broadcasting sector preferred a separated regulatory scheme. And based on that, they preferred 
co-operation or collaboration between existing regulators, rather than the establishment of new 
converged regulator (See McGougan 1999). But telecommunication sector preferred an integrated 
model which oversees most sectors in media.  
 In the meantime, in terms of the power of media policy institutions, some argued that 
keeping various regulatory bodies would prevent the concentration of power in media regulation. 
So, it was argued that, if a unitary regulator should be established, the regulator must be transparent 
and accountable. Throughout the debate on regulatory convergence, political independence of 
regulator, regardless of that it is converged or not, were generally perceived as core principles in 
broadcasting regulation. Although the discussions did not suggest any synthetic view on regulatory 
convergence, it is at least confirmed that there were persisting gaps in principles of existing media 
regulators.  
 In the meantime, as PSBs have been crucial players in the UK media, many focused on 
possible influence of policy convergence on PSBs, such as BBC. Born and Prosser (2001) 
conducted an analysis on British government’s White Paper, A New Future for Communications 
(2000). Having a special concern on public service broadcasting (PSB) in relation to regulatory 
convergence, they found that the White Paper subordinated social and cultural principles to 
competition principle in general. In line with this, they concerned the marginalisation of PSB’s 
values such as citizen interest, universality, and high-quality programming. They mentioned, “we 
are not persuaded that Ofcom will be in a position adequately to promote the values of PSB rather 
than those of competition regulation, especially if current suggestions that it will have a 
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predominantly competition-based remit are correct” (2001:64). Therefore, they argued that BBC’s 
definition and remit should be explicitly legislated, to promote and keep BBC’s public remit. 
Accordingly, they suggested three core principles that could be considered in the legislation of 
PSB regulation: Citizenship, universality and quality. In this study, policy convergence was seen 
as a threat to PSB. This is because ‘competition law' was at the centre of discussion in the process 
of adopting policy convergence, marginalising PSB values.  
 Meanwhile, Gibbons (2005), Freedman (2008), Iosifidis (2011), and Lunt and Livingstone 
(2012) confirmed that their concern has been realised. They examined Ofcom’s regulatory style, 
especially on the approach of Ofcom on PSB regulation. According to Gibbons (2005:42), “Ofcom 
adopts a utilitarian approach in itself, but also reflects a desire to narrow the scope of it remit”. In 
a similar vein, Freedman (2008:169) argued that “it sees the BBC not as an autonomous proponent 
of public service values but as an organisation that is part of an increasingly competitive, 
marketized environment and needs regulating according to that logic.” Iosifidis (2011:195) also 
mentioned that “almost a decade after publication of the Communications Bill the danger that one 
regulatory tradition (telecommunications) would dominate the other (broadcasting), which was 
then painted by many commentators, has become a reality”. Furthermore, Smith (2006:937) argued 
that the prevalence of competition law as a result of policy convergence is caused by a political 
reason. He mentioned, “Ofcom should be seen as the institutional embodiment of New Labour’s 
‘competition policy plus’ approach to UK television regulation, rather than as merely the product 
of regulatory ‘tidy up’ prompted by technological change”.  
 In the meantime, Lunt and Livingstone (2012) examined Ofcom’s political independence. 
Comparing Ofcom’s the first and the second PSB reviews, they argued that “in the second review 
[Ofcom] acted more as a means of gathering evidence and opinion on behalf of government […] 
It’s difficult to determine how far the hand of government was evident in Ofcom’s reviews of 
public service broadcasting, though it would be naïve to imagine no political influence on the 
conclusions reached and the options set out” (113-115). Therefore, it could be said that the 
influence of government has been increased in Ofcom since when it was first established. 
Furthermore, they argued that “Ofcom’s reviews have been impressive in the depth and quality of 
their market analysis, the numbers and quality of participants in the consultation process, and the 
production of original audience research. […] Ofcom is not, however, a neutral player. Both 
reviews attracted considerable criticism for their focus on economic matters at the expense of 
social and cultural policy, as was evident in the use of economic concepts and metaphors to explain 
social and cultural aspects of policy even in the domain of public service broadcasting” (113). 
 In conclusion, Ofcom was established as a converged regulator in the UK. In the process of 
regulatory convergence, however, it was found that different stakeholders in media had quite 
different opinions about how to do regulatory reform. Meanwhile, it was concerned that Ofcom 
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may have an economic- or competition-centred regulatory style, marginalising other regulatory 
principles. And since its establishment, it has been addressed that the concern has become a reality. 
In line with this, it was argued that their interest in public broadcasting has decreased. Therefore, 
since the early 2000s, the influence of BBC over broadcasting sector has been decreased (Lunt, 
Livingstone and Brevini, 2012). In that process, Ofcom tended to regard the BBC as a player in 
the market, not as an important social institution for the citizens. In the meantime, it was also noted 
that Ofcom’s political independence to the UK government was declined gradually. Moreover, 
since 2017, Ofcom has become the first external overseer for BBC, as the BBC Royal Charter was 
revised. This meant that Ofcom's power over broadcasting sector would be even more increased. 
At the same time, BBC has made to be more accountable to more various stakeholder. According 
to Gibbons (2017), this change could mean the threats to BBC in terms of its independence and its 
public interest remits.  
 
AGcom in Italy  
The case of Italy shows how policy convergence can be used for political purposes. The Italian 
left-wing has pursued regulatory reform to achieve its political goals, and as a result, Authority for 
Communications Guarantees (AGcom) was established in 1997. In 1997, European Commission 
(EC) published Convergence Green Paper in suggesting the member countries to adopt 
convergence-proof system in media regulation. However, the effect of regulatory convergence 
recommended by the EC was not actually fulfilled (D’Arma, 2009).  
 According to Psychogiopoulou, Casarosa and Kandyla (2013), there had been no 
independent media regulator until the 1990s in Italy. But in 1997 in the process of introducing an 
'independent media regulator' for the first time, they established AGcom as a 'converged regulator'. 
Thus, Italy adopted both independent regulatory body and regulatory convergence at the same time. 
AGcom was established to oversee the regulations of such as radio, broadcasting, and 
telecommunication. In 1997, the EU revised the Television Without Frontiers Directive. The main 
objective of the directive is the creation of a single market in broadcasting services (D’Arma 2009). 
The Convergence Green Paper was also published in the same year. And the Green Paper affected 
much on the establishment of AGcom. Furthermore, Italy was the first country to introduce 
convergence regulations in 1997 in European Union. It was to respond to the challenge of 
technological media convergence (ibid., 2009:772).  
 However, the introduction of AGcom was possible because of the political interests of the 
middle-left party. The leftist party came into power in 1996, and they wanted to have a single 
converged regulator for some political reasons. At that time, EC (1997) recommended to establish 
a converged regulator. There are two reasons why the central leftist party has proposed regulatory 
convergence. First, the establishment of a new regulatory system would make it easier to privatise 
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state-owned telecom companies. The privatisation of telecom was one of their election pledges. 
Second, more importantly, they wanted to hold Berlusconi’s political power by separate 
broadcasting from politics. Berlusconi is a political figure who owns media conglomerates in Italy. 
Because it was seen that Berlusconi uses his power in media to get political power, the new leftist 
party wanted to decrease the influence of broadcasting on politics, by setting up an ‘independent’ 
broadcasting regulator. And just in time, EC (1997) promoted the need of regulatory convergence. 
Therefore, the centre-left party took this as an opportunity for regulatory reform, and the reform 
was carried out immediately after the regime change. D’Arma (2009:774) said: “Regulatory 
convergence agenda […] fitted neatly with the overall strategies of the centre-left government, and 
was a ‘resource’ which the government used to build consensus around the initiative and legitimize 
reform.”  
 But these reforms did not reflect the convergence paradigm originally suggested by 
European Commission. There was little interest in building an integrated regulatory system, and it 
was still the government who actually controlled the ‘independent’ regulator. Moreover, the 
government reinforced sector-specific regulations. This is quite different to Ofcom's case, where 
sector-specific regulations were marginalised while competition law prevailed. But the reason for 
reinforcement of sector-specific regulations in AGcom was nothing but politics. Moreover, the 
middle-left government attempted to impose even stronger media ownership regulation, in order 
to reduce Berlusconi's economic and political influences (D'Arma, 2009:775). 
 As a result, the introduction of regulatory convergence in Italy has resulted in more intense 
politicisation in media. Traditionally, Italy had a media system that is very close to the government 
and parliament, rather than the market. And this tradition was strengthened by the introduction of 
AGcom. Furthermore, media policy authorities were not adequately transferred to AGcom. That 
is, the authorities regarding media policies remained in the governmental departments and 
parliamentary committees. Consequently, the actual power of AGcom on media policy was very 
little. Psychogiopoulou, Casarosa and Kandyla (2013:226) noted: “Such a wide competence is not 
exclusively exercised, as many other bodies hold related competences, in particular the 
Department of Communications within the Ministry of Economic Development." In addition, the 
Chairman of AGcom was appointed by the government’s political interest. The lack of political 
independence of AGcom deepened the politicisation of media policy. Moreover, as the institution 
has become a single institution, it has become easier for governance to intervene in the media 
policymaking (ibid.) 
 In conclusion, Italy's regulatory convergence case shows how a country with a high level of 
politicisation intensifies the politicisation of media policy through regulatory reform. Interestingly, 
in spite of regulatory convergence, the expected effect was not achieved, and the sector-specific 
regulations were maintained.   
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2.3.5. Conclusion 
In this part, four different steps in the development of media convergence were presented: They 
were technology, industry, market and policy convergences. To some extent, the development 
progress seemed natural. However, some studies argued that the progress could have been 
propelled by convergence discourse, as we have seen in the previous part on convergence discourse. 
Indeed, some argued that convergence discourse has made the development of media convergence 
go fast and further from technology to policy level. However, it must be a very difficult task to 
adequately prove the actual impact of the convergence discourse to the real world. This is because 
it must be so hard to find the logical relationship between a reason (discourse) and a result (reality). 
Therefore, proving the extent of the influence on actual development of media convergence is not 
something that this thesis focuses on. But still this thesis has much interest in the existence of 
convergence discourse in the process of media policymaking. Therefore, this thesis will try to 
investigate what convergence discourse was there, as well as the context where convergence 
discourse appeared in the process of media policymaking.  
 
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter examined some research gaps by examining previous studies on media convergence. 
Three categories were presented according to the main subjects of thesis; concept, discourse and 
influence. Firstly, the concept of media convergence showed some problems, but this was not 
properly analysed. Many media studies tried to define the term, but the definitions were slightly 
different from one to another, and it sometimes caused confusion in understanding the concept. 
Several problems were presented above: Its broadness, overlapping character, presumption and 
paradox. Chapter 4 will analyse the problems of the concept and provide more comprehensive and 
clarified understanding of media convergence.  
 Secondly, there were some studies on the discourse that was relevant to media convergence. 
However, it was heavily influenced by the grand theory of neoliberalism, as it was emerged 
coincidentally with the politico-economic concept which prevailed in 1980s. Furthermore, the 
discussion of convergence discourse was mainly relevant only to Western cases, including 
American and European countries. However, media convergence was also effective in other 
nations, such as South Korea. Indeed, media convergence issue was the most significant media 
policy issues in Korea in 2000s. This was because the challenge of media convergence was 
regarded as very urgent and disruptive factor in media. Accordingly, there were many policy 
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discussions in Korea, and it was followed by some significant changes in the sector. However, this 
has not been thoroughly examined so far in media studies. Therefore, it could be an academic 
achievement if South Korean case can be analysed. Chapter 5 will examine the ‘media 
convergence discourses’ found in the process of policy debate and in the documentations of media 
policy institution in South Korea.  
 Thirdly, there were studies which analysed the influence of media convergence. This gives 
a good explanatory framework for the remaining chapters of this thesis, as it enables the thesis to 
analyse media convergence in a clear structure. Particularly, media convergences that happen in 
market and policy levels are the subjects of the rest of thesis. Those relevant chapters form the 
trilogy of ‘influence’ chapters in the thesis, as they examine the influence of media convergence 
on market, governance and policy. Chapter 6 analyses the influence of media convergence on 
Korean broadcasting and telecommunication markets. Chapter 7 discusses the governance 
transformations in media policy sector, which was brought by media convergence. Chapter 8 
examines what changes were made in media policy due to media convergence in Korea. The next 
chapter will discuss the methodologies used in those relevant studies as well as in this thesis.  
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3. Methodology 
This chapter discusses the methodology of this thesis. It can be divided into two parts. In the first 
part, it examines the methodologies used in the previous studies. In so doing, this chapter discusses 
the advantages and disadvantages of the methodologies used in the researches relevant to media 
convergence. This is to find the best practices that this study can refer to. In the second part of this 
chapter, the methodologies used in this thesis and the reason for using them will be discussed.  
 
3.1. Methods used in previous studies 
In this part, the methods used in previous studies will be examined. It would be helpful to examine 
the methodologies used in relevant researches, for it could give the researcher good insights for 
methodology on the similar subject. Indeed, the methodology of this thesis was established through 
examining the methodologies from relevant studies introduced in the Chapter 2. In so doing, it was 
found that there were particular methods which were frequently used in the studies that 
investigated media convergence and media policy. These popular methods were qualitative text 
analysis and interview. The first method, which was the most frequently used one, was qualitative 
text analysis.  
 
3.1.1. Qualitative text analysis  
According to Bryman (2012:341), qualitative research is “a research strategy that usually 
emphasises words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data”. Most studies 
that are relevant to media convergence also focused on the meanings of text, rather than the 
numbers that can be generated from the text. In other words, those studies were more relevant to 
qualitative analysis rather than quantitative analysis. Thus, in many cases, the purpose of research 
was to find the meaning and general tendency of this specific social phenomena – media 
convergence, while it was not to obtain the numbers and the extent of it. Therefore, in many cases, 
the result of analysis was more likely to be words, rather than numbers, so most of relevant studies 
were done by qualitative text analysis, rather than quantitative text analysis. 
 Meanwhile, as Deacon et al. (2007:15) mentioned, the ‘text’ is not limited to the written 
words that are normally shown in the form of book or paper. The text could include recorded 
sounds and videos, as well as any texts that are shown on the internet website. Accordingly, it is 
not necessary to set any restriction on the form of text when we do text analysis. However, not 
many studies which mainly dealt with media convergence issues analysed those various forms of 
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text. These studies tended to give their main interest in the official documents from government 
and relevant policy agencies in political sector. Therefore, in most cases, the information on media 
policymaking was approached by examining the written texts that are published by political 
institutions. Thus, texts in the form of book or report, which were literally the written words, were 
the main target of examination in many relevant studies.  
 
Pros and cons of qualitative text analysis as a methodology 
As Deacon et al. (2007) said, text analysis is a good method when a researcher does historical 
studies, as well as when the researcher needs vast amount of information that the researcher cannot 
obtain by himself. Firstly, textual analysis is a good method to analyse historical issues or event, 
because the written texts are likely to be the only information we can get on the historical topic. 
For example, if we need to examine the early days of BBC in the 1920s, then we might need to 
rely heavily on written documents on early BBC rather than asking people or doing a questionnaire 
to people who may have some memory on the broadcaster. Secondly, text analysis is good when it 
is hard for a researcher to make primary sources on a topic. In this case, the researcher may have 
to rely on the secondary sources which are made and published by relevant institutions or other 
researchers. When it comes to policy studies, it would be far more efficient for a researcher to 
analyse official documents rather than gathering and analysing the information by himself. For 
example, a researcher might be able to attend and watch committee meetings in a media regulator 
to generate the record of the meetings. However, when the meeting minutes are regularly published 
on the agency’s website a few days after the meetings, then it would be more efficient for the 
researcher to wait and download those records. 
 The disadvantage of using qualitative approach to written text can be that the subjectivity 
or the personal perspective of researcher might be applied to the interpretation. Meanwhile, there 
has been a notion that quantitative approach is a better way to secure more objectivity than 
qualitative approach. Indeed, the result of the quantitative analysis could be seen as being more 
objective than the one from qualitative analysis. However, the matter of pure objectivity is not 
something that can be applied to qualitative research only. This might be also applied to a 
quantitative research as well, for the framework of the counting in quantitative analysis could be 
also affected by the subjectivity of researcher too (Deacons et al. 2007:138). Therefore, the matter 
of subjectivity needs to be considered when using both approaches. The next part will examine 
some sample studies that used qualitative text analysis as their core methodology.  
 
Studies used qualitative text analysis  
In this part, some examples of studies that used qualitative textual analysis as core methodology 
will be introduced. In the UK, Born and Prosser (2001) was one of the early studies that examined 
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the policy convergence. In their research, they did textual analysis by examining many UK policy 
papers from government departments such as Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) 
as well as Parliament’s select committees such as the Culture, Media and Sport Committee. For 
example, they thoroughly analysed the government’s Communications White Paper, where the 
plan for establishment of Ofcom was presented. In so doing, they captured that the establishment 
of a converged media regulator was being justified in the name of media convergence, and at the 
same time, they found that competition law was being more welcomed than existing public interest 
principles (Born and Prosser, 2001).  
 Furthermore, Feintuck and Varney (2006)’s work is another good example which used 
qualitative textual analysis as their main methodology, too. As academic lawyers, they offered in-
depth analysis on European and UK media policy, by examining various media-related laws (e.g. 
EU’s competition law, the UK’s Communication Act 2003 and BBC’s Royal Charter) and previous 
research committee papers (e.g. Puttnam Committee and Hutton Report). In so doing, the study 
examined public interest principles in EU and UK media regulation and discussed Ofcom’s remit 
and their tendency towards PSB regulation.  
 In addition, Fagerjord and Storsul (2007) was a research that investigated more various 
documentations such as policy documents, business plans and academic writings related to media 
convergence. In doing the textual analysis on various publications on media convergence, they 
argued that ‘convergence discourse’ was actually effective in many cases. They argued, “in policy 
documents and business plans, and to a large extent in academic writings, the convergent 
development has been seen as predetermined” (Fagerjord and Storsul, 2007:28).  
 As examined so far, qualitative textual analysis was mostly done by examining policy papers 
from core political institutions that are related to media regulation. More precisely, publications 
from both international and national institutions such as EU and the UK government were 
examined. This was to capture the overall tendency of those institutions and to analyse the context 
in which media convergence was put in. Meanwhile, some studies implemented interview as their 
methodology. The following part will examine the interview as one of methodologies used in 
relevant studies.  
 
3.1.2. Interview 
Interview is “a conversation between a researcher (someone who wishes to gain information about 
a subject) and an informant (someone who presumably has information of interest on the subject)” 
(Berger, 2000:111). There can be four different types of interviews. These are informal, 
unstructured, semi-structured, and structured interviews. First, the informal interview can be 
understood as a general conversation. The main purpose of doing informal interview is to “gain 
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the confidence of his or her informant” (ibid., 112). Second, in unstructured interview, the 
researcher has particular aim of the conversation, but s/he does not try to control the flow of 
conversation” (ibid.). Third, in semi-structured interview, the researcher has a list of questions to 
ask, but tries to “maintain the casual quality” in the conversation (ibid.). In other words, in semi-
structured interview, “the interviewer controls the discussion by referring to an interview guide, 
which sets out issues to be covered during the exchange” (Deacon et al., 2007:67). Furthermore, 
focus group interview can be regarded as an example of semi-structured interview. In a focus group 
interview, a group of people are given some topics to discuss about, and a moderator can engage 
into the flow of the conversations. Fourth, in structured interview, the researcher has “a specific 
set of instructions that guide those who ask respondents for answers” (ibid.). Questionnaires can 
be involved in this type of interview, as the questions are fixed no matter who the respondent is, 
and the way of asking and answering is standardised.  
 
Pros and cons of interview as a methodology 
The advantage of interview is that it is more likely to get more cooperation from the interviewee 
and it is more likely to be expanded to in-depth conversation than other methods such as self-
completion questionnaire. The interview can be done in different forms. It can be categorised into 
two modes; personal interviews or remote interviews. The essence which makes the difference 
between them is whether the interviewer and interviewee are personally met or not. For example, 
personal interview is a live conversation which is done by two people who met in the same space 
and time. However, telephone or email interview could be the examples of remote interview, as 
the interviewer and interviewee do not meet in person. But both interviews can be occurred on the 
basis of the consent between those two parties. Therefore, as Deacon et al. (2007:70) noted, the 
advantage of interview as methodology is a higher possibility for getting consent and cooperation. 
They said, “all questioning in research depends on winning and maintaining consent. […] They 
have to persuade people to cooperate by convincing them of the value of their contribution and of 
the research as a whole. […] In this respect, self-completion questionnaires are disadvantaged. The 
absence of personal contact limits the opportunities to persuade people to participate (it is easier 
to ignore an envelope or an invitation to a web address than a person), and for this reason self-
completion questionnaire surveys generally attract lower response rates than personal interview 
surveys”.  
 Furthermore, Berger (2000) presented the advantages of interviews by the comparison with 
an observation. He said, “observation does give us a sense of context, which often helps explain 
what people do. But it doesn’t help us get inside people to understand why they do things, what 
motivates them, and what anxieties they have” (Berger, 2000:113). So, doing an interview can be 
a good strategy for capturing what was ‘inside’ of a person who engaged in the event of interest.  
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Moreover, the possibility of recording and further analysis could be other advantages of doing an 
interview, as Berger (2000:113) said, “one advantage of interview is that one can generally record 
interview and thus have a written record that can be analysed in detail”.  
 However, it would be better to bear in mind that there are disadvantageous points in 
interview too. According to Berger (2000:113), “people tend to justify their actions to themselves 
and others, so you have to be careful about accepting anyone’s point of view as being accurate, 
correct, and unbiased. […] People don’t always tell the truth. […] People don’t always remember 
things accurately. […] People don’t always have useful information. […] People sometimes tell 
you what they think you want to hear. People use language in different ways”. Therefore, it might 
be desirable to consider what circumstances the interviewee is surrounded by, because the 
consideration could give the researcher a better understanding of what is heard from the 
interviewee. The interviewee might not want to disclose what s/he really thinks on the specific 
subject because of her/his social position, e.g. as a public agent who works for the government. Or, 
as said, the interviewee might not just remember what happened in the past accurately. In the 
following part, some examples of study which used interview as a methodology will be examined.   
 
Studies used interview as a methodology  
Interview seems to be one of popular methodologies which have been used to produce primary 
source for media policy research. But, at the same time, it seems that there are little studies which 
used interview as the single core methodology for media convergence research. As noted above, 
qualitative textual analysis is more eligible to be the core methodology for media policy studies 
like this thesis, for in many cases the policy events are recorded and published in the form of 
written papers. This means that the researcher who studies on media policy can obtain crucial 
sources for analysis through those official documents. In the meantime, it would require too much 
time, money and labour for a researcher to produce those sources as primary sources by himself. 
Or, in many cases, it might be simply impossible to obtain the vast amount of policy information 
as an individual researcher. Therefore, it would be far more efficient for the researcher to use the 
official documents, which is secondary source for the analysis of media policy. And this could be 
the reason why qualitative text analysis on official papers has been the most popular methodology 
in media policy studies.  
 However, there were some studies that used interview as a supplement to qualitative textual 
analysis. For example, Freedman (2008) implemented interview as a significant methodology in 
making the primary source of his study. He conducted interviews with about forty people who are 
related to media policymaking process, such as politicians, lobbyists, broadcasters and journalists. 
As he put his interest in formal as well as informal aspects of the process of policymaking, his 
interviews effectively revealed the informal atmosphere of the policymaking. In addition, Lunt and 
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Livingstone (2012) was another study that used the combination of qualitative text analysis and 
interview as their methodology. More precisely, they conducted a case study on the converged 
regulator, Ofcom in the UK, by conducting these methods. More precisely, in the beginning part 
of the study, they examined the overall trend in recent regulation by reviewing relevant literatures 
in media policy studies. And then, the study investigated the process of Ofcom’s establishment, 
the organisation’s key purposes, statutory duties and regulatory structures and operating principles 
by examining relevant texts. For example, the study examined official documents such as, green 
paper (e.g. Regulating Communications (DTI/DCMS, 1998), white paper (e.g. A New Future for 
Communications (DTI/DCMS, 2000), and media law such as Communications Act 2003. In the 
latter part of the study, it implemented both qualitative text analysis and personal interview in the 
analysis of Ofcom. In addition of the text analysis, they collected more specific and informal 
information by conducting personal interviews with various stakeholders in media, including such 
as public agents in Ofcom and civil society activists. Using the combination of these 
methodologies, they analysed Ofcom’s public service broadcasting (PSB) reviews, as well as 
Ofcom’s policies and attitudes on media literacy, children protection and community radio. In so 
doing, they examined Ofcom’s official documents such as Competition for Quality (Ofcom, 2005b) 
and The Digital Opportunity (Ofcom, 2008b). At the same time, the study sourced the 
conversations that were obtained by personal interviews. By doing so, they could enhance the 
depth of analysis, as the sources from interview supplemented what the study found in textual 
analysis.  
 This part examined interview as the methodology used in some relevant studies. Those 
studies used interview as supplement source to their textual analysis. In those studies, the main 
methodology in those studies was qualitative text analysis, but interview helped researcher to 
obtain primary source for the analysis. This mixture of methodology enhanced the scope of 
analysis, as the study could analyse personal conversation as well as official documents. 
Furthermore, the use of formal as well as informal sources increased the depth and credibility of 
the analysis. Consequently, the examination of methodologies used in relevant studies helped the 
researcher finding a good combination of methodologies. The next part will introduce the 
methodologies used in this thesis.  
 
3.2. Methods used in this thesis 
In this part, the methods used in this thesis will be discussed. Before examining the specific 
methods used in this study, it would be helpful to remind the thesis’ three purposes that is to be 
achieved by using the methods. The first purpose of this thesis was to analyse the concept of media 
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convergence. This is to clarify the meaning of the term itself, as the term has not been clearly 
defined since it was introduced almost three decades ago. The second purpose of this thesis is to 
investigate what discourses were established in the process of media debates and policymaking in 
regard to media convergence. Therefore, to achieve the goal, it needs to analyse the meaning of 
the context where media convergence was placed. And it is notable that these two purposes are 
closely related to the ‘meaning and context’ of the subject of this thesis, media convergence. The 
third purpose of this thesis is to examine the influence of media convergence on media markets 
and policies. Therefore, firstly, it needs to see ‘what’ changes were made in media markets and 
regulations. And then, secondly, it needs to figure out ‘how much’ the existing markets and 
regulations were changed due to the advent of media convergence.  
 As those three purposes are about the interpretation and analysis of texts, they can be mostly 
achieved by qualitative approaches. In other words, those three purposes are mostly related to the 
analysis of meaning and context rather than numbers and degrees. Therefore, to achieve these 
purposes, it is crucial to interpret and analyse ‘the words’ in written documents that are relevant to 
media convergence. Therefore, qualitative textual analysis must be the first methodology of this 
thesis.  
 However, there can be more information which cannot be found by textual analysis alone. 
Informal and unofficial factors exist in the process of media business and media policymaking. 
Furthermore, it seems crucial to produce primary sources in the investigation of the subject, so that 
the researcher can improve the originality of the study. Thus, taking other supplementary 
methodologies seem necessary for this thesis. Therefore, the thesis chose to conduct semi-
structured interview as its second methodology. In so doing, it was hoped that the researcher could 
get informal information as well as the confirmation on what the researcher found by textual 
analysis. Plus, by combining two different qualitative approaches, it was also expected that the 
researcher could have comprehensive understandings on media convergence.  
 In the meantime, the third purpose of this research includes ‘the extent’ of impact of media 
convergence on media market. This meant that there needs quantitative approach, as the purpose 
was to see the actual degree of influence of media convergence. Therefore, in Chapter 6, the thesis 
uses quantitative approach by examining the changes in revenue of convergent media in Korea. 
The thesis used revenue as the index of influence, because the revenue is the data the researcher 
could get rather easily from market reports, and also it is useful when comparing different media 
by revenue. Also, revenue of media is one of the significant factors that is generally used in 
calculating market share, so the degree of dominance and influence of certain medium can be 
drawn from the revenue. Moreover, the revenue could imply the degree of employability of the 
certain medium, which in turn can show the influence of media on the society.  
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 In the following part of this chapter, these three methodologies will be examined 
respectively in detail. Firstly, it will examine the ‘qualitative text analysis’ as the core methodology 
of this thesis. Secondly, ‘semi-structured interview’ will be presented as the supplementary 
qualitative methodology for this thesis. Last but not least, the third quantitative methodology will 
be examined. As noted, this method is used only in Chapter 6, but the implement of quantitative 
approach improves the originality and comprehensiveness of this thesis.   
 
3.2.1. Qualitative text analysis (critical discourse analysis) 
The first method used in the study is qualitative text (discourse) analysis. As noted above, the 
thesis’ first two purposes were to analyse the concept and discourse of media convergence. 
Therefore, this is crucial to analyse the meanings, contexts and discourses related to media 
convergence. As in previous studies, this can be well achieved by conducting textual analysis on 
official policy documents. The official documents are usually opened to the public, so the 
researcher could get access to the text rather easily. Fortunately, there are many open publications 
regarding media policies (usually published from government or parliament). This is because the 
relevant public institutions such as government and media agencies have the responsibility to let 
the public know how policy debates are going on, and how media industries are changing. To put 
it more concretely, the documents such as government’s green/white papers, parliament’s select 
(small) committee’s special report can show the concept and discourse of media convergence. 
Furthermore, there are many publications such as annual market reports that show what changes 
happened in media markets. It enables the researcher to see the development of media convergence.  
 Text analysis is the core methodology this study implemented. As noted above, this thesis 
aims to ‘re-examine’ the concepts, discourses and impacts of media convergence. Thus, the 
previous publications, such as policy papers and statistics from government agencies are to be 
analysed in this thesis in a new framework. This is called as “secondary analysis” (Deacons et al., 
2007:17). Therefore, the official documents that are related to media convergence are the most 
important sources for the analysis of this thesis. Furthermore, as Deacons et al. (2007:16) 
mentioned, text analysis is the most appropriate when analysing social phenomena that happened 
in many years ago. That is, if this study relied mostly on other qualitative methods such as survey, 
focus group and interview, it would mean that the study would depend too much on the memories 
of the respondents. Therefore, as this thesis adopted textual analysis as the main method, it was 
hoped that it would help the researcher obtaining as many fact-based sources as possible.  
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Critical discourse analysis  
Furthermore, as this study is to see what discourses were made in the process of media convergence, 
it would be worth taking a look at the methodology called critical discourse analysis as well. 
Critical discourse analysis can be understood as one of many approaches that can be included in 
the large category of qualitative textual analysis. This is because critical discourse analysis is based 
on textual examination, basically. However, discourse analysis is more about capturing a social 
discourse which forms a general belief in a certain society or an institution. The more specific 
definition and the methodology of critical discourse analysis are well explained in Philips and 
Hardy (2002:3, cited in Bryman, 2012:536). They said, “we define a discourse as an interrelated 
set of texts, and the practices of their production, dissemination, and reception, that brings an object 
into being […] in other words, social reality is produced and made real through discourses, and 
social interactions cannot be fully understood without reference to the discourses that give them 
meaning. As discourse analysts, then our task is to explore the relationship between discourse and 
reality”. Moreover, critical discourse analysis can be a good approach when we want to see why 
some values get stronger while others get weakened. Bryman (2012:538) said: “Critical discourse 
analysis thus involves exploring why some meanings become privileged or taken for granted and 
others become marginalised. In other words, discourse does not just provide an account of what 
goes on in society; it is also a process whereby meaning is created”. Consequently, the critical 
discourse analysis is quite relevant to this thesis, for one of the purposes of this research is to 
examine what values were privileged in the discussion of media convergence. In the following 
section, specific documents used for the textual analysis will be introduced. The table below shows 
five types of documentations which were examined in this research.  
 
Table 2 Categories of Text for Analysis 
Number Category Example 
1 
Market 
report 
Publications from Korean government and other private or 
public thinktank  
e.g. ‘Broadcasting Market Report 2017’ published by KCC  
2 Policy paper 
Publications from government departments and small 
committee in the congress of Korea 
e.g. KCC annual report 
  59 
3 
Committee 
report 
Publications from committee that was established to 
discuss the way to react media convergence 
e.g. Convergence Committee’s final report 2007 
4 Media law 
Media related laws such as Broadcasting Act, 
Telecommunication Development Act, etc., and this 
includes the Enforcement Decrees which is a supplement 
laws to the main Acts. The Enforcement Decrees are also 
important, because they are useful to understand the 
intention or tendency of government.  
5 
Previous 
literature 
Studies which examined media convergence.  
 
 As the above table shows, the texts used for the analysis can be divided into five categories. 
The first kind of text is market reports which are regularly published by government or other 
relevant institutions. For instance, this thesis examined market reports from Korea Press 
Foundations (KPF), Korea Communications Commission (KCC), Ministry of Science and ICT 
Future Planning (MSIP), and Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT), etc. The second category is 
policy papers published by media policy authorities. For example, KCC’s annual work plan paper, 
annual report, and their meeting records (minutes) that contains the dialogues between KCC 
commissioners. The third category is final reports published by specially established bodies (i.e. 
Convergence Committee’s final report 2007). This type of publications is quite important for this 
thesis, for it shows the discourses that prevailed in the discussion of media convergence. Therefore, 
the Convergence Committee’s 2007 report is frequently quoted in this thesis, because the final 
report contains abundant information on various stakeholders who participated in the debate on 
media convergence. The fourth category is media-related Acts, such as Fair-Trade Act, Newspaper 
Act, Telecom Business Act, and Broadcasting Act. The author examined the change and continuity 
of around 30 media-related Acts covering the time span of 1980-2017. Moreover, as a government 
law, there is Enforcement Decree, which supplements details of a certain Act. Therefore, it could 
be understood that Enforcement Decree is a subordinate law to an Act. In an Act, it is normal to 
assign government to set detailed rules to fulfil the purpose of an Act. Meanwhile, a specific reason 
should be noted when an Act or an Enforcement Decree have been made or revised. These texts 
were particularly important sources for analysing the main intention of change in media policy. 
The fifth category is previous research literatures, including those shown in the previous literature 
review chapter. In Korea, there were some literatures which investigated the media convergence 
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phenomenon, but most of these focused on the media governance system and political 
independence matter. This is because the reform caused by media convergence prompted the 
independence matter of public service broadcasters (PSB). The matter of political independence 
of Korean PSB was always one of the most popular subjects in Korean media academia, because 
the country suffered a lot from the dictatorship and the intervention of government to PSBs since 
the 1970s-80s. The next section will examine the second qualitative method used in this research 
– semi-structured interview.  
 
3.2.2. Semi-structured interview 
The second methodology used in this thesis is semi-structured face-to-face interview. As examined 
above, semi-structured interview is good at obtaining unexpected information due to the flexibility 
it offers. The semi-structured interview has a moderate format among other interview formats. 
That is, semi-structured interview is more flexible than structured interview. Structured interview 
uses fixed questions, and the way a researcher asks and a respondent answers is standardised. 
Meanwhile, semi-structured interview has more strict form compared to unstructured one. In 
unstructured interview, the interview is conducted just as usual conversation, which means there 
are no certain questions that are predetermined to ask. But in semi-structured interview, there are 
some fixed questions to ask, while having some flexibility and discretion for the interviewer. Thus, 
an interviewer can ask additional and unexpected questions according to each situation. This 
discretion of interviewer gives chances to obtain further information from the interviewee. Thus, 
the advantage of a semi-structured interview is that it provides flexibility in conversation while 
maintaining consistency in questions and answers (Bryman, 2012:212). This is the main reason 
why this study chose to conduct semi-structured interview. The researcher expected to know as 
much as possible by having conversations with the people who knows policy and business. Thanks 
to the flexible approach, the researcher could ask what the researcher wanted to know more at that 
time, in addition to the fixed questions.  
 Furthermore, this thesis selected personal interview as a methodology to see what informal 
factors were engaged in the process of media policymaking. Many media policy cases can be better 
understood by knowing informal or unofficial factors which interrupts in the media policymaking 
process. This is because the media policy cases are affected by political and economic power 
(Freedman, 2008). However, this political (ideological) and economic influences are not reflected 
well in the formal documents published to the public. Rather, it is more likely that everything 
written on the official paper seems quite rational, justified and ideologically-neutral. Therefore, it 
is worth noting that there should be political and economic forces that wants to affect every policy 
decision process. Having said that, if a researcher heavily relies on official documents, there is a 
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probability that s/he gets politically biased information, and this can result in a biased analysis. 
Therefore, this is another reason why the study chose to conduct personal interviews to know 
something that cannot be not read in the formal documents.  
 Moreover, by conducting personal interview, it was hoped that the researcher could know 
people’s attitudes on the subject, in the conversations with interviewees. In most cases, as the list 
of questions below shows, the researcher asked their thoughts on media convergence first, but in 
some cases the researcher also asked them to tell what others might think about the subject. As a 
result, the researcher could get their thoughts and attitudes as well as the atmosphere on the subject. 
This was particularly useful to check what social discourse was formed regarding media 
convergence. In most cases, it was confirmed that the convergence discourse captured by textual 
analysis was influential to people who engaged in the media industry and policy. This will be 
examined in more detail in Chapter 5, as the Chapter is to examine what convergence discourses 
were made in Korea and how it affected the policymaking process.  
 As in previous literatures, interview was used mostly to supplement what was found in the 
textual analysis. More precisely, it was expected that an interviewee could confirm what was 
analysed by the researcher. At the same time, it was also expected that the interviewee could 
present different perspectives for analysis. Indeed, the use of personal interview helped the 
researcher obtaining new perspectives on the subject. For example, an interviewee presented a 
different point of view that the researcher did not think, particularly on the PSB governance reform 
in Korea. This is to be reflected in Chapter 7, where media governance reform in Korea was 
examined in detail. Therefore, it is believed that the researcher could have more balanced and 
comprehensive perspectives thanks to the conversations with the interviewees.  
 
The Interviewees  
The researcher could meet and have interviews with various stakeholders who had involved in 
various media sectors. Those includes the employees of media companies such as public and 
private broadcasters and telecommunication companies, as well as government agents who work 
for broadcasting and telecommunication department such as KCC and MSIP. Also, the researcher 
could meet civil society members and lobbyist group members too. In addition, the researcher also 
met media scholar who is professor in media studies. It was helpful to get academic understandings 
based on the long-term examinations on Korean media policy and governance. Thankfully, the 
researcher could have interviews with fifteen key stakeholders in media policy and industries. 
Among them, thirteen interviews were done in face-to-face. Two interviews were done by 
telephone. In case of face-to-face interview, the researcher visited interviewees’ workplace or 
somewhere they preferred to meet. Each interview took around one hour per session. All the 
interview itself was an exciting and valuable experience to the researcher. It was good to enter and 
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look around the government departments where media policy is studied, discussed and made. Also, 
it was a great joy to visit Korea’s main public broadcasters such as KBS and MBC. All the people 
I met in the interview was generally kind and helpful to the researcher. Sometimes the researcher 
asked them to introduce the other person for interview, and some introduced the researcher to their 
colleagues. All these Interviews were conducted from November 2014 to January 2015. 
 
Table 3 List of Interviewees 
Interview 
number 
Date Name Job/Position/Experience 
1 
24 Nov 
2015  
Son, 
Chang-
yong 
Deputy director in Ministry of Science 
and ICT Future Planning 
Former deputy director in Korea 
Communications Commission (KCC) 
and Cable TV Committee  
2 
24 Nov 
2015  
B 
Deputy director in Ministry of Science 
and ICT Future Planning  
Former deputy director in KCC  
3 
25 Nov 
2015  
Park, Jae-
bok 
Head of department, Overseas Sales 
Department, Munhwa Broadacasting 
Company (MBC)  
4 
25 Nov 
2015 
Lee, Geun-
haeng 
Producer, Culture and Education 
Department 
Former head of MBC Labour Union 
5 
26 Nov 
2015 
J 
Deputy director in Terrestrial 
Broadcasting Policy department, KCC 
Former deputy director in Korea 
Broadcasting Commission (KBC) 
6 1 Dec 2015  C 
Team manager, in Korea 
Communications Standards 
Commission (KCSC) 
Former employee in KBC  
7 1 Dec 2015 
Lee, Bong-
hyun 
Vice chief in Media Strategy 
department, Hankyoreh (Daily 
Newspaper) 
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8 2 Dec 2015 
Choi, Sun-
wook 
Researcher, in KBS Broadcasting 
Culture Research Lab.  
Former participant in making of Digital 
Broadcasting Transition Law 
Committee 
9 3 Dec 2015 K 
Chief manager in Broadcasting Policy 
Planning department (in charge of PSB 
policy)  
Former Deputy director in KBC 
10 7 Dec 2015  H Chief director, Cable TV Association 
11 7 Dec 2015  A 
Deputy head of department, Korea 
Radio Promotion Association 
12 
10 Dec 
2015 
Bae, Gi-
hyung 
Chief manager in Overseas Sales 
department, KBS 
13 
12 Dec 
2015 
Lee, Jinro 
Professor in Media Communication, 
Youngsan University 
14 
11 Jan 
2016 
(Telephone 
interview) 
Jung, 
Hyun-sook 
Head of department, International 
Cooperation department, Korea 
Educational Broadcasting System 
(EBS) 
15 
12 Jan 
2016  
(Telephone 
interview) 
Kim, Han-
joong 
Producer, in News department, EBS 
Former producer in documentary 
department, EBS 
 
Interview questions 
As presented, this thesis adopts semi-structured interview. This is a moderate form of interview 
among other forms of interviewing. In semi-structured interview, there are some fixed questions, 
having some flexibility to ask other questions. Accordingly, the researcher asked all of the basic 
questions to the interviewees in similar manner, but randomly asked other related questions 
according to the respondent's job, position, expertise, and conversation flow. As a result, more 
information could be obtained than originally intended, which was useful in understanding various 
aspects regarding media convergence. The following is the list of fixed questions that were 
basically given to each interviewee at the time of the interview.  
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Table 4 List of Interview Questions 
Number Question 
1 
To get basic information about you, I would appreciate if you briefly 
explain the job you have been working on. 
2 
At the time of the establishment of the Korea Communications 
Commission (KCC), what was your recognition on media convergence 
phenomenon? At the time, what expectations or concerns did you have 
regarding media convergence? How did the situation develop compared to 
your outlook at that time? 
3 
What do you think of the process of social discussion on the establishment 
of KCC?  
4 What do you think of KCC’s policy since 2008? 
5 
What do you think of the organisational integration between KBC and 
MIC? 
6 
What do you think of the process of appointment for the directors and CEOs 
of KBS, MBC, and EBS?  
7 
Please tell if you have any recommendations for the better media policy 
and regulation.  
 
Research ethics  
In addition, the researcher tried to thoroughly examine and follow what the school’s Research 
Ethics Committee required for this research. One of the critical points suggested by the committee 
was the anonymity of the interviewee. It was required for me to ask the interviewee whether their 
conversations wanted to be recorded before the researcher start to record the conversation. Also, it 
was required to ask them whether it is fine for them to open their names in this thesis, or they want 
to be anonymous. Therefore, these questions were asked every time the researcher took interviews. 
Most of interviewees who work for non-governmental institutions said that they are fine with the 
disclosure of their personal information. Thus, they allowed the researcher to reveal their names 
and other personal information. However, most of civil servants who work for governments and 
quasi-government agencies did not want to reveal any of their personal information. They 
concerned the case that their personal opinion is presented as the general opinion or tendency of 
their institution. But it seemed that they did not want their colleagues know what they really think 
about media policy and related institution. Some of them wanted to have conversation in a secret 
place such as empty meeting room, where nobody can hear the conversation. But some of them 
seemed speaking their thoughts very frankly, even though he did not want to disclose his personal 
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information. Accordingly, in most cases, civil servants' names are presented with the initials of 
their names.  
 
3.2.3. Quantitative approach  
In the meantime, this research used quantitative approach as well, to see the extent of influence of 
media convergence in the media markets. As noted in introduction chapter, it was the third purpose 
of this research; to see the practical results of media convergence. And it was noted that there has 
been very little research which figured out what actually happened in media market in the name of 
media convergence. And this was why this research aimed to statistically look what actually 
happened as ‘media convergence phenomena’. More specifically, the quantitative approach was 
used in Chapter 6, and this is done by analysing the changes occurred by the emergence of 
convergent media. In so doing, the revenues and market share of convergent media were extracted 
from official market reports on Korean broadcasting and telecommunication, and the data was re-
categorised and re-analysed in the frame of media convergence. In so doing, the chapter checked 
the changes of market share of convergent media in broadcasting and telecommunication markets 
by tracking their revenue and market share in a recent decade. Annual market reports published by 
Office of Statistics in Korea, KCC and other relevant media agencies were examined. As a result, 
the influence of media convergence on Korean media market was measured, by calculating the 
revenue and market share of new services that were enabled by media convergence.  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
As examined so far, this research used qualitative approach as the main method, adding 
quantitative approach to fulfil the three purposes of this research comprehensively. Deacon et al. 
(2007:117) mentioned that “different methods may be appropriate to the different stages and 
focuses of your research, while the use of more than one analytical method has the advantage that 
the weaknesses of any single method, qualitative or quantitative, are balanced by the strengths of 
other methods”. McQuail (1992:98) also noted that the use of combined qualitative and 
quantitative methodology can contribute to in-depth analysis on media events. This is the reason 
why this research implemented different methodologies together. Indeed, the mixture of both 
qualitative and quantitative methods was helpful in understanding the various aspects of media 
convergence phenomena. That is, qualitative approach is useful when we are to capture the essence 
or insights from the provided texts. Meanwhile, quantitative approach is useful in examining the 
exact amount of changes that happened in media sectors.  
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 This is the end of Part I. This first part examined the overall purposes, frameworks and 
methodologies for this research. More specifically, it presented the research gaps in media 
convergence research, and established three purposes of this thesis. And then it conducted literature 
review, setting up the framework for Korean case study in Part II. And then it examined the 
methodologies used in previous literatures as well as in this thesis.  
 In Part II, Korean cases will be examined in the next five chapters, from Chapter 4 to 8. 
Chapter 4 examines how the ‘concept’ of media convergence was made in Korea and clarifies the 
definition of media convergence. Chapter 5 analyses what ‘discourses’ were emerged in the 
process of development of media convergence. Chapter 6 deals with the influence of media 
convergence on media market. In other words, it deals with the degree of ‘market convergence’. 
This chapter investigates the extent of influence of media convergence on the markets of Korean 
broadcasting and telecommunication. Chapter 7 deals with ‘policy convergence’. It examines 
media governance reform in Korea, which was caused by the development of media convergence. 
The process and the results of policy convergence will be examined, and some practical lessons 
from this will be presented as well. Chapter 8 investigates the policy changes in broadcasting, 
telecommunication and newspaper sectors. This is to see the actual impact of media convergence 
on the existing policies and regulations of those media. Chapter 9 summarises and discusses the 
findings of the whole thesis.  
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Part II 
 
4. The concept of media convergence and its problems 
In this chapter, the concept of media convergence will be examined. To this end, the technological 
foundations of media convergence and the earliest definition of the concept will be examined first. 
And then it will move to examine some problems found in definitions previously made on the 
concept. 
 
4.1. Development of digital and transmission technologies   
The technological possibilities of media convergence were addressed for the first time in the late 
1970s by some thinkers related to computer sciences and media studies (Fagerjord and Storsul, 
2007:19; Meikle and Young, 2012). At that time, computing system and digital technologies were 
emerged for the first time in media history. On the other hand, networking technology, which 
connects many computers in telecommunication networks was emerged too. As a result, 
computing system and telecommunication technology were technologically integrated for the first 
time in the late 1970s, and accordingly, the very first model of media convergence appeared. In 
other words, there was the birth of connected-computer for the first time in media history, which 
eventually formed a network with many other computers through telecommunications 
infrastructure. Before then, computer was not a medium that forms a connected network with other 
computers. However, with the development of digital and networking technologies, media contents 
started to be digitalised by computing system, and at the same time, the digitalised content started 
to be shared in a broad telecommunication network.  
 Digitalisation means that any analogue (or physical) contents can be transformed into binary 
signals that consists of 0 and 1. For example, newspaper, voice, motion pictures and any other 
forms of media contents can be transformed to a set of digital codes, and it means that a computing 
system can understand and manipulate the signals. This is possible because the digital signals are 
the language of computer. Therefore, digitalisation means that word, image (still or moving), and 
sound can be created, transmitted, received and stored by computing systems. Therefore, for 
example, if a newspaper is digitalised, it can be seen on a computer. Likewise, any other traditional 
media contents such as film, radio and TV contents can be transformed, created, and delivered in 
digital and they can be manipulated by a computing system.  
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 In the meantime, the development of data transmission technology enabled those digital 
signals to move in various networks. This was enabled by data compression technology and more 
advanced transmission materials such as copper coaxial cable and fibre optics (Singh and Raja, 
2010:10). For example, when a TV programme is digitised, it can be transmitted through copper 
coaxial cable of a cable TV company, or through fibre optics of a telecommunication company. 
On the other hand, it also became possible to transmit (traditionally different) contents in a single 
network. This was enabled because both copper coaxial cable and fibre optics could transmit both 
audiovisual contents and voice. This meant that a telecommunication company can send voice as 
well as audiovisual contents, while a cable TV company can send audiovisual contents as well as 
voice in their own single network.  
 When it comes to media device, a digitised content including audiovisual contents and voice 
could be transmitted on any ‘digital and networked’ devices. Today we call such ‘digital and 
network-connected’ devices by putting the prefix ‘smart’ to existing media devices. For example, 
a ‘smart TV’ means a network-connected digital television that runs on a computing system. Plus, 
a ‘smartphone’ is basically a small connected-computer that also has a telephone function. By 
using such smart devices, media contents can be watched and created in digital formats and 
transmitted in telecommunication networks.  
 
4.2. The earliest concept of media convergence 
In this technological background, the very first concept of media convergence was presented in 
early 1980s. In the book Technologies of Freedom (1983), Ithiel de Sola Pool addressed the 
possible changes in media, which could be brought by digitalisation of media (Jenkins, 2006:10). 
In his book, De Sola Pool (1983:23) presented the concept of media convergence as follows: 
 
“A process called the ‘convergence of modes’ is blurring the lines between media, even 
between point-to-point communications, such as the post, telephone and telegraph, and 
mass communications, such as the press, radio, and television. A single physical means 
– be it wires, cables or airwaves – may carry services that in the past were provided in 
separated ways. Conversely, a service that was provided in the past by any one medium 
– be it broadcasting, the press, or telephony – can now be provided in several different 
physical ways so the one-to-one relationship that used to exist between a medium and 
its use is eroding”  
 
  69 
 As De Sola Pool’s definition showed, the foundation of the media convergence concept was 
the previous status in media transmission. This can be addressed as ‘one-to-one’ relationship of 
media. For example, in the past, TV contents had to be transmitted through antenna which sends 
radio spectrum to TV receiver. This can be described as the picture below, which shows the 
traditional one-to-one delivery modes in the creation, distribution and consumption of each 
medium.  
 
Figure 2 Traditional One-to-One Communication 
 
Source: De Sola Pool (1983) 
 
 However, as described in the first part of De Sola Pool’s definition on media convergence, 
various media contents can be transmitted using a single digital network. This means that there is 
an additional network, which can transmit technically every digital signal through it. And this is 
enabled by the development of digitalisation and transmission technologies. On the other hand, as 
the second part of his definition showed, a single content can be transmitted in various networks. 
Therefore, it can be said that there is an additional network that can transmit digitalised content. 
Consequently, De Sola Pool’s description of media convergence can be presented in the picture as 
below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  70 
Figure 3 De Sola Pool's Description of Media Convergence 
 
Source: De Sola Pool (1983) 
 
 As shown above, the concept of media convergence given by De Sola Pool can be 
understood in two different parts. The first part of this description tells about the development of 
transmission technology. In other words, it is mostly about the advent of new digital network that 
can convey traditionally different media contents. The new digital network could be a wire, cable 
or airwaves, as he exemplified. Therefore, in this first part of definition, media convergence can 
be described as a technological development that enables various digital media services to be 
delivered in a single digital network. For example, if a telecommunication company provided only 
telecommunication services such as landline and mobile telephone services using their wired and 
wireless telecommunication networks, it has become possible to use the same network to offer 
broadcasting service such as IPTV (Internet Protocol Television) in addition to their existing 
telecommunication services. When it comes to cable TV provider, it only offered TV programme 
services in the past, but now it provides telecommunication services such as telephone and 
broadband services on top of their cable TV service, thanks to the digitalisation and the 
development of transmission technology. 
The rest part of De Sola Pool’s definition seems describing a separated phenomenon, but 
it is rather like the result of the first part where new transmission method was introduced. That is, 
as a new transmission method was introduced, a provider could transmit their contents via 
additional method. Therefore, as De Sola Pool said, a service that had been delivered using only 
one single method, was started to be delivered using at least more than one method. For example, 
with the advent of an additional digital network, a TV service provider has been able to offer TV 
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contents via radio spectrum as well as the new digital network. More specifically, a TV drama 
series could be delivered through cable TV or IPTV services in addition to traditional free-to-air 
service that uses transmitter, radio spectrums and TV receiver antenna. When it comes to 
telecommunication service, landline and mobile telephone services can be offered via broadcasting 
network as well as the existing telecommunication networks.  
 However, one can ask whether this is truly relevant to the concept of ‘media convergence’, 
as the second part of description seems more like, paradoxically, a divergence trend in content 
delivery. That is, in the past, one medium could send just one type of content. However, as the 
description said, with the advent of the new digital delivery mode, a content can be transmitted 
using additional methods. Therefore, the rest part of De Sola Pool’s description on media 
convergence was about the ‘divergence’, rather than ‘convergence’ of delivery methods which can 
happen in a digitalised world. And as it is known, there is another concept that describes this 
phenomenon, such as multimedia and multiplatform.  
 In conclusion, De Sola Pool’s definition on media convergence can be divided into two parts, 
and it was mostly about the changes in delivery modes that was caused by digitalisation. As 
examined above, the first part was more related to the concept of convergence, as it mentioned the 
newly developed digital network, which was a converged network that can convey various contents 
in a single delivery mode. This can be an example of media convergence, for several traditional 
media networks can be ‘merged’ into a single network. More specifically, the new digital network 
could mean the merging between broadcasting and telecommunication networks, which had been 
separated in the past. However, the second part of his description was mostly about the divergence 
of delivery modes, for it described that a single content can be delivered in different network. 
Therefore, it could be said that his early examination on media convergence was mainly about the 
birth of ‘converged network’, which was caused by the development of digitalisation and 
transmission technologies.  
 
4.3. Four problems of the concept 
Although the concept has been used in many occasions in business, policy debate and academia, 
the concept has not been clearly defined so far. Indeed, it has been described differently, so it is a 
difficult job to understand the term comprehensively. This part examines various definitions after 
De Sola Pool and discusses the problems of the concept of media convergence, which led to 
ambiguity and confusion over the concept. Four problems are addressed; its broadness, 
overlapping character, exaggerated presumption and paradoxical demonstrations.  
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4.3.1. Broadness  
The first problem of the concept attributes from the big word ‘media’. That is, in many cases the 
descriptions on media convergence were about certain parts within media, where different levels 
of value chain exist. However, it has been normally presented as ‘media’ convergence, not being 
limited to the convergence in certain parts of media value chain. Accordingly, even though there 
were many literatures that dealt with the concept of media convergence, it is difficult to find the 
same definition on the concept. This is because those literatures addressed different media 
convergences which happens in different part of media value chain. Thus, if someone is to get a 
comprehensive understanding on the concept, an effort is needed to gather and combine all those 
different and sectional definitions which are relevant to different parts of media. For example, 
when a study defines the term in the perspective of content provider, it focuses on media 
convergence phenomena that are relevant to content provider. On the other hand, if it approaches 
the concept in audiences’ perspective, it stresses the changes in devices and audience’s usage that 
are caused by media convergence. These different descriptions on media convergence leads to a 
confusion in understanding the concept in comprehensive way. So, one might ask, what is media 
convergence phenomena as a whole? To answer this question, it is needed to analyse many 
different existing definitions first and then present a more comprehensive, structured and clarified 
concept on media convergence on the basis of the analysis.  
 
Media convergence in value chain 
As mentioned above, the concept of media convergence has been presented in different parts of 
media value chain. In other words, there are different versions of ‘media convergences’ within 
media value chain, which consists of content, platform, network and device. Thus, it can be a good 
way to understand the concept in a comprehensive manner by depicting those concepts in different 
levels of media value chain. In doing so, it will be able to see which parts of value chain were 
frequently mentioned as media convergence, and which parts were not.  
 
Content convergence 
Firstly, when a media convergence occurs in content level, it could be called as content 
convergence. However, it is difficult to find a study that presented this type of convergence with 
appropriate examples. Maybe, this is because film, television and radio broadcasting contents are 
generally similar to what it was in twenty years ago. However, with the advent of new digital 
technology and transmission technology development, some imagined that there would be quite 
different types of contents available to the audience. For example, even in some policy papers that 
were published by Korean government, it was predicted that audiences of a certain TV sports 
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programme such as baseball and football would change their view points from here to there in the 
stadium while they are watching the sports events. This was one of many interactive services that 
seemed technically possible in the future. However, it seems clear that this type of TV service is 
not popular by now. Moreover, it was also presumed that an audience would engage in the plot of 
a drama or a film so that they could choose their own preferred story while they watch the drama 
and film. This particular example shows possible convergence between traditional audiovisual 
contents and video games. But the thing is that this is still not quite popular in practice, and people 
still tend to watch TV and film in traditional ways. Due to the technological advances such as 
wireless data transmission and digital storage, now people can watch any contents anytime, 
anywhere they want to watch the contents. But it seems that the content itself has not changed a 
lot. The TV drama and film contents are still more likely to be quite linear and fixed ones, and the 
audience enjoys an audiovisual content as it was created, and it seems that they tend not to engage 
in what they are watching. 
 
Platform convergence 
Meanwhile, conceptually, media convergence could be discovered at the level of ‘platform’ in 
media value chain. However, as in the case of media content, this was not the popular case which 
can be seen in the discussion of media convergence in last twenty years. Platform could be 
understood as an operation system which presents media contents that its provider wants to show. 
For example, a platform could be an installed software programme in cable TV’s or IPTV’s devices 
that transmits audiovisual contents to content receiver, such as a television or a monitor. So, this 
could be an operation programme in the devices provided by BT, Sky and Virgin, or it could be 
Youview, which is offered as a pre-installed EPG (Electric Programme Guide) in most recent 
digital televisions. Due to the development of digital and transmission technology, now the 
audience can enjoy digital TV as well as digital radio programmes on a digital TV. This can be 
seen, to some extent, as an example of platform convergence, because TV platform is converged 
with radio platform. However, what seems more significant in terms of digital platform in these 
days is not the technical convergence between traditionally different platforms. More significant 
phenomenon is the rise of totally new digital platform, which runs on a broadband network that is 
not owned by the platform company. For example, Netflix and Amazon Prime Video are newly 
emerged platforms that offers TV programmes and films via the customer’s broadband network. 
As the digital TV penetration rate increases and data transmission speed increases, this type of 
platform services could have been very successful in delivering high quality audiovisual contents 
to many customers around the world. But this seems more adequate to describe the platform as a 
totally new platform, rather than putting it as a converged one. Accordingly, in most cases, platform 
convergence has not been the centre of the discussion that are relevant to media convergence.  
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Network convergence 
The third model of media convergence, which is the convergence of ‘networks’ was the most 
frequently mentioned model presented in previous studies (see European Commission, 1997; 
Blackman, 1998; Iosifidis, 2002; Van Cuilenburg and McQuail, 2003). This has been the most 
frequently addressed case of media convergence, from the earliest definition given by De Sola 
Pool in 1983. Since then, the new digital network that technically converges every other network 
has been at the centre of the concept of media convergence. It lasted for following twenty years, 
as network convergence was seen as the most appropriate version in describing media convergence. 
In other words, in many cases, media convergence meant network convergence. To put differently, 
what frequently presented was practically ‘network convergence’ rather than ‘media convergence’. 
Network convergence means a merging of networks that previously delivered different contents in 
the past. As mentioned earlier, the development of copper coaxial cable and fibre optics enabled 
such networks can be used for phone call as well as delivery of audiovisual media contents at the 
same time. This enabled a broadcasting company and a telecommunication company to offer 
technically same services to their customers. For example, a cable broadcaster can offer wired and 
even wireless telephone service, which is called as VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol), in addition 
to their TV subscription service. On the other hand, a telecommunication company can offer both 
IPTV (Internet Protocol Television) service and their existing landline/mobile telephone services. 
But what is often missed in the discussion of network convergence is that the previous modes of 
transmission are still there. That is, still the radio spectrum is used as an important network source 
for broadcasters, such as PSBs in the UK. Furthermore, there are still many cases that telephone 
landline is exclusively used for only telephone service, as in the past. Therefore, it would not be 
appropriate to say that all the networks are converged, or it is going to be all converged someday 
soon. To put it in different way, there are co-existence and co-evolution of old and new networks 
(Dwyer, 2010). Accordingly, in a broader perspective, it would be more adequate to say that there 
has been ‘diversification’ in delivery modes, by the advent of converged network. In other words, 
the network convergence has brought the divergence, in terms of total media networks. This is 
fairly interesting point that this study sheds light on. This will be examined further in following 
parts of this thesis, particularly in Chapter 6, where the practical development of network 
convergence was investigated.  
 
Device convergence 
Last but not least, there is device convergence. It was also a popular form discussed in relevant 
documents. Device convergence means the integration between different media devices. So, if a 
device can present more than one traditional content, it could be called as a converged device. 
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Smart devices such as smartphones and smart tablet and any other network-connected computer 
can be understood as the examples of device convergence. Smart device means a network-
connected computer, so this is basically the same with a computer device that is connected to a 
network. They are run by computer systems, and they are connected to the internet via wired or 
wireless broadband networks. But, as we have just seen above in network convergence, this does 
not mean that the existing devices are being totally replaced by smart devices. Those traditional 
and new smart devices are too, in co-existence status, as in the network’s case. Therefore, again, 
the advent of device convergence also brings the divergence in media device as a whole. This will 
be examined more specifically with a case study on Korean media market in Chapter 6.  
 
Conclusion 
As examined above, most definitions on media convergence were relevant to network and device 
levels in media value chain. In other words, media convergence was not quite relevant to content 
and platform levels. Without this notion, it would be hard to capture what media convergence has 
practically meant. Also, it was addressed that because of the advent of newly converged models, 
particularly in network and device sectors, the degree of divergence was increased within each 
sector, ironically. Therefore, depending on which point of view is taken, the same phenomenon 
could be seen differently. More precisely, when it is seen in a micro level, as seen in technological 
perspective, it could mean convergence, but when it is seen in a broader perspective, as seen in 
industrial perspective, it could mean divergence. This happens because a converged one does not 
totally replace the existing ones. In other words, the co-existence of old and new media 
technologies brought about the diversification in overall media sectors, even though there is a 
possibility of that new media technologies gradually replace the old ones.  
 
4.3.2. Overlaps 
The second problem of the concept is that it overlaps with existing terms that are used to describe 
merging trends in media. The merging can include the integration of different modes or standards 
of data transmission technologies, and also it can include the merging between existing media 
companies, industries and markets. For example, media convergence is quite similar to the concept 
of ‘telematics’. Telematics is a compound word between telecommunication and informatics 
(informatics means information science). As noted in the earlier part of this chapter, the two core 
premises of media convergence are digitalisation and the development of data transmission 
technology (network technology). On the other hand, telematics is also enabled by the integration 
between digital computing system and telecommunication technology. The concept of telematics 
seems like more technological term than media convergence, but both concepts share very 
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significant principles together. Indeed, as showed in the earliest concept of media convergence by 
De Sola Pool (1983), the initial model of media convergence is almost the same with something 
called ‘telematics’. That is, the basic model of media convergence can be exemplified as a 
‘connected computer’, which can be used for the production, delivery and consumption of media 
contents. Meanwhile, telematics also means a technology which can be used for production, 
delivery and consumption of information. But the information is not limited to simple letters or 
numbers on a computer screen, so technically the information could also mean media contents. 
Therefore, it can be said that the concepts of media convergence and telematics share very core 
components that consist of those concepts. This is why Latzer (2009) introduced a term, 
‘mediamatics’ as a synonym of media convergence.  
 In the meantime, media convergence could also be seen as a similar concept to the existing 
concept of vertical and horizontal integrations. Vertical integration means the merging between 
different media companies that are positioned in different level of media value chain. For example, 
if a platform company buys a content making company, then it can be called as vertical integration. 
Horizontal integration means the integration between media companies that are set in the same 
level within a media value chain. If a network company does M&A with another network company, 
this means horizontal integration. At the first glance, vertical and horizontal integration seems like 
more relevant to industrial events, while media convergence is more about technological event. 
However, the problem is that media convergence is not limited to technological explanation. That 
is, the concept can be used in the context of the merger and acquisition between media companies, 
when it is used in the industrial or market levels within media. Indeed, this similarity and logical 
correlation between media convergence and vertical/horizontal integration was captured in some 
studies (see Dywer, 2010; Noll, 2002; Iosifidis, 2002). Those studies warned that the concept of 
media convergence can be used as a justification for even greater consolidation in media markets, 
and this can be done in favour of large dominant media companies.  
 Therefore, media convergence could be confused with other existing terms such as 
telematics and vertical or horizontal integrations. Because the concept demonstrates phenomena 
of merging between different technologies or different companies, it can be overlapped with other 
concepts which describe similar merging trend. This duplication can be attributed from the word 
‘convergence’, as it can be relevant to all types of merging. Therefore, it can be said that the 
problems of the concept of media convergence lies in its greatness. In other words, the term can 
be ambiguous because it tries to explain too many things with the single term. Thus, as the previous 
section pointed out the problem of ‘too much broadness’ by using ‘media’ in the concept, in this 
section, it was also presented that, ‘convergence’ is also too general. Consequently, the use of too 
much broad and general terms in a single concept can bring about high ambiguity and duplication, 
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as in the case of media convergence. The next part will discuss the problem of presumption which 
was at the centre of the concept.  
 
4.3.3. Presumption  
It is true that the concept of media convergence was based on an actual examination on 
technological changes that was brought about by the development of digital and transmission 
technologies. However, at the same time, the term has strong sense of prediction, as the concept 
presumes that it will be expanded over media. In other words, the concept was often regarded as a 
revolutionary phenomenon that will impact the overall media, culture and society. For example, 
European Commission’s Convergence Green Paper (1997) which initiated the discussion of media 
convergence in Europe, showed that media convergence is strongly linked to the vision of 
Information Society. In the paper, it was noted that “convergence is not just about technology. It is 
about services and about new ways of doing business and of interacting with society. […] The 
emergence of new services and the development of existing services are expected to expand the 
overall information market […]” (European Commission, 1997:ii). Furthermore, Jenkins (2001:93) 
also saw that “media convergence is sparking a range of social, political, economic and legal 
disputes because of conflicting goals of consumers, producers and gatekeepers […] the digital 
renaissance will be the best of times and the worst of times, but a new cultural order will emerge 
from it”. Accordingly, Dwyer (2010:8) said, “convergence is never just a technological process 
but is implicated in, and expressed as, profound and ongoing social, cultural and economic change”. 
In line with this, Vick (2006:27) rightly captured that the concept of media convergence was being 
inflated in the UK. He said, “it did not take long for ‘convergence’ to take on broader meanings. 
The term acquired a near-utopian resonance for some, who prophesied that the physical 
characteristics and functions of different media fora would become indistinguishable, the variety 
of available programming and content unbounded, and special regulation of communications 
industries unnecessary”. Therefore, it can be said that in many cases, the concept of media 
convergence has been used in the context of imagination and presumption about the future of 
media and society. And it seems that this is partially attributed from the concept’s broadness and 
ambiguity, as examined above. That is, because the concept was not a specific demonstration of a 
phenomenon, it could be easily manipulated to be an inflated concept.  
In the meantime, the concept is more problematic because the concept does not make any 
room for the possibility that media convergence trend could be ceased or reversed at some points 
in the future. In line with this, Michalis (1999) noted that the convergence of media is a process 
and it is difficult to predict how the future will develop. As she rightly captured, it is better to be 
cautious when we use a concept that has a strong characteristic of prediction. Future is more likely 
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to be unknown in many cases. This is why Noll (2003:12) strongly argued that media convergence 
could be nothing but an illusion of the future. He said, “the very term ‘convergence’ is so all 
encompassing of a large number of concepts that by attempting to be everything, convergence is 
nothing more than an over-hyped illusion. The future can be no more certain than that which is 
being examined, and thus the undefined and illusionary nature of convergence means that its future 
is equally undefined and illusionary.”  
 Therefore, unlike other relevant concepts such as digitalisation, which is a specific 
description of what happens in technology, media convergence was something more than 
technological description. In other words, the concept contained both the actual changes and 
presumptions. That is, the concept was often used in the context where its rapid expansion was 
stressed. Therefore, due to its strong character of presumption, the concept could have provoked 
many different imaginations in its readers’ minds, and accordingly, it could have caused ambiguity 
and arbitrariness. In short, because the concept of media convergence has been mostly about ‘the 
ongoing and furthering trend of blurring demarcations between media in the future', this concept 
has been inescapably ambiguous and intangible.  
 
4.3.4. Paradox 
Furthermore, in some cases, the concept was presented in paradoxical way. That is, although the 
term is describing a phenomenon that shows something merged, it was often used to describe a 
diverging phenomenon together. In other words, despite the term stands for converging trends in 
media, it also used to describe multimedia or multiplatform trends in media. Therefore, this 
paradoxical description of the concept might have caused a confusion in understanding it clearly. 
For example, Fielden (2012) described media convergence as follows:  
 
“Newspapers are not just printed but online and carry video packages with the look and feel 
of traditional TV; broadcasters publish websites including text-based articles similar to online 
print offerings; scheduled programmes are broadcast but also available on-demand, both on 
digital channels and a variety of websites; user-generated material vies for online audiences 
alongside professionally produced content; professional and amateur bloggers share the same 
debates” (Fielden, 2012:2).  
 
 And this approach for the definition of media convergence was adopted by the UK 
Parliament as the best description of the concept. In a House of Lords’ select committee report on 
media convergence, it was noted:  
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“Media previously made distinct by their technology of distribution have converged. 
Newspapers are no longer just printed on large sheets of thin paper; they also have websites 
with up to the minute information, including videos which remind you more of the printed 
page. Broadcasters do not just beam signals to your TV aerial or satellite dish; they have 
websites with articles published on them which might remind you more of the printed page” 
(House of Lords, 2013:5).  
 
 However, this definition seems better named as multiplatform or multimedia, not 
convergence, as it does not exemplify what is merging, but it only shows what is diverging. When 
it comes to audience’s perspective, they highlighted the diversifying trend of media use, too: “The 
easiest way to think about media convergence is as a technological phenomenon whereby the 
digitisation of content and its distribution have given audiences the ability to access content on 
multiple platforms or devices. Media previously made distinct by their technology of distribution 
have converged” (House of Lords, 2013:7). This can also lead to paradoxical understanding of 
media convergence, as when the term itself was about convergence, the given examples were not 
convergence, but divergence. When we look at the descriptions above, and if we are taking the 
audience’s perspective, can we really say that something is converged? It would be much more 
reasonable to say that the audience’s use of media is diversified than before due to digitalisation 
of media contents. 
 Although it is more frequent to see this kind of paradoxical descriptions on the concept of 
media convergence, some took right direction in describing the concept. For example, Michael 
Starks (2014:125) said that “distribution systems for broadcasting, press and internet are 
converging; the same infrastructure can deliver all three historically separate services. Reception 
devices mirror this; the Connected TV, the tablet and the smart phone overlap in their functionality”.  
 
4.4. Conclusion  
The concept of media convergence has not been clarified since it was first introduced in early 
1980s. Indeed, in most times since its first introduction, the concept has been loosely understood 
because of its broadness, overlapping character, and its strong relationship with presumption, and 
many paradoxical descriptions on it. But as time goes by, it was able to find that the concept has 
gradually developed as more specific one than in the past. The development can be seen in two 
different reports of OECD published respectively in 2004 and 2016. In their earlier report on media 
convergence in 2004, they described the concept almost the same with digitalisation, and strong 
presumption of the pervasive expansion of media convergence was frequently addressed. However, 
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more than a decade later, in 2016, they started to define the term more specifically, as they divided 
the different level of convergence in media value chain. Therefore, they started to recognise that 
media convergence is mostly about the convergence between digital networks, maybe because this 
was what they actually found in practice. Accordingly, this difference seems to show the 
disadvantages of using too broad terms, such as media and convergence, when make a concept. 
When a concept leads people to logical leap or hasty generalisation, then the concept cannot be 
regarded as useful one in ordinary occasions, and particularly in academic circle, where specific 
investigation is needed. Therefore, it can be said that the concept of media convergence is highly 
relevant to the merging of digital network and digital device that were separated in analogue modes. 
In other words, the concept of media convergence could have been replaced with ‘the convergence 
of digital networks and devices’ in many occasions.  
 Meanwhile, it is notable that these problematic aspects of media convergence were, 
surprisingly, pointed out in its very early stage of emergence. In the late 1990s, Blackman (1998) 
argued:  
 
“Convergence is a term which has gained widespread currency in recent years and which has 
been applied in a variety of contexts. It is used as a convenient shorthand to describe what are 
perceived as several changing trends in technology, services, industry structures and 
government policies affecting the telecommunications and audio-visual sectors. Shorthand, 
of course, can be imprecise and, in my view, has led to some erroneous assumptions about 
the way in which regulation should be approached” (Blackman, 1998:164).  
 
 This shows that another shorthand concept, for example, ‘the fourth industrial revolution’, 
can contain a danger of similar problems that media convergence showed in its history. Also, it 
can be noted that if we are careful enough when we use and promote a newly emerging concept, it 
might be possible to avoid confusions by using an ambiguous concept. Therefore, a concept which 
is based on a long-term investigation is more likely to contribute to the accurate observation of a 
social phenomenon. A good concept is made with highly specific and exclusive words that can 
clearly describe a phenomenon.  
 The next part will examine the discourses related to media convergence. As can be assumed 
here, the development of discourse on media convergence is relevant to the looseness of the 
concept itself. That is, the problem of concept was reflected in the development of media 
convergence discourse. Bearing this in mind, the next chapter will look into what discourses were 
developed, and how these discourses were made in the media policymaking process in Korea.  
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5. The emergence of convergence discourse 
In this chapter, the discourse on media convergence will be examined. To this end, Convergence 
Committee’s White Paper and Korean Communications Commission (KCC)’s work plans in 2008-
2017 will be analysed as the main texts. Convergence Committee’s White Paper is an important 
source for the examination of the various stakeholders’ view on policy convergence, and 
accordingly, the discourses that were emerged in the course of discussion. Furthermore, the 
converged policy institution, KCC, which was established according to the Convergence 
Committee’s white paper, will be analysed to see how it was relevant to convergence discourse. 
On the basis of the analysis of Convergence Committee and KCC, the chapter will discuss some 
useful findings for media policy practice and media policy studies.  
 
5.1. Policy convergence debate in Korea 
The debate on policy convergence between broadcasting and telecommunication in Korea was a 
long-standing issue that lasted a decade. In 1998, the Broadcasting Reform Committee (Reform 
Committee) first addressed the matter of policy convergence. But as there were several separated 
broadcasting policy institutions at that time, Reform Committee suggested the government to 
establish an integrated broadcasting commission first, and then to establish a more integrated 
broadcasting-telecommunication policymaker-regulator later in 2001. Accordingly, several 
broadcasting policymakers and regulators were integrated, and was named as Korean Broadcasting 
Commission (KBC). And as said, the fully integrated communication policy institution which 
oversees both broadcasting and telecommunication was not established then, and it was postponed 
to 2001. But in 2001, despite many efforts to establish a converged broadcasting-
telecommunication agency, it was not fulfilled. Therefore, in 2002, the convergence between 
broadcasting and telecommunication agencies became a new government’s pledge. However, the 
government could not deliver it, as KBC and the telecommunication department, Ministry of 
Information and Communication (MIC), had quite different views on the way and the necessity of 
policy convergence. More specifically, KBC saw that policy convergence should be adopted right 
away, while MIC did not think that it was quite necessary. From 2003, KBC and MIC occasionally 
made joint consultation teams to discuss how to introduce new services such as satellite TV, digital 
broadcasting and interactive TV services such as Data PP (interactive programme provider, which 
means contents production firms and their interactive service channels). However, it was always 
difficult to make a good consensus between the two institutions.  
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 Moreover, in 2005, those two parties had a conflict in defining the IPTV service. KBC 
argued that it is a broadcasting service, while MIC argued that this is a quite new interactive service 
and therefore it is closer to telecommunication service rather than broadcasting service. Then the 
government arbitrated in the dispute and suggested to conduct a trial service of IPTV first and then 
discuss its definition later. But their views on IPTV were not changed and the introduction of 
service was delayed. The National Assembly also tried to arbitrate in the conflict between them, 
but it was not successful, because Small Committees of broadcasting and telecommunication also 
maintained different opinions for the definition of IPTV service. More precisely, the Small 
Committee for broadcasting had a similar opinion to that of KBC, while the Small Committee for 
telecommunication had almost same opinion with that of MIC. Consequently, as of 2006, no 
consensus was made for IPTV, despite a decade of debate between broadcasting and 
telecommunication sectors and many efforts from relevant institutions including government and 
National Assembly.  
 
5.2. Convergence Committee’s white paper 
In 2006, Roh, Moo-hyun government established Convergence Committee to fulfil its pledge and 
settle the long-lasting conflict between broadcasting and telecommunication sectors. The 
Convergence Committee was an advisory body to prime minister who was the chief officer of the 
government. For one and half year, government ministries and other stakeholders discussed the 
way of adopting policy convergence in the Convergence Committee. The committee’s core 
purpose was to discuss the best media policy system for the era of media convergence. Kim, Sung 
and Jung (2008) saw that the Convergence Committee performed well as a good third party that 
arbitrated in the dispute between broadcasting and telecommunication. Indeed, the committee can 
be regarded as the most inclusive place for discussion on the subject, as the voices of various 
stakeholders could be heard in the committee.  
 Convergence Committee’s white paper consists of 423 pages and it presents the whole 
process of discussion in detail. Based on the results of these discussions, Convergence Committee 
submitted bills regarding the establishment of IPTV Act and KCC. These bills were reviewed and 
passed in the National Assembly, but as the Roh government was finished in 2008, the bill was 
actually applied when Lee, Myung-bak government was in power, which was the next government 
to Roh government. The bills of Convergence Committee were almost accepted as it was submitted, 
without critical corrections. Therefore, the Convergence Committee’s White Paper can be regarded 
as not only the best way to look at the process of policy convergence in Korea, but it was also an 
influential material that actually resulted in the establishment of convergence-related Acts. 
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Therefore, by analysing the white paper, it is possible to see the prevalent discourses and arguments 
that emerged in the process of policy convergence between broadcasting and telecommunication 
agencies. The following part of this chapter examines some discourses that were prevalent in 
Convergence Committee. And then, KCC’s policy style and the discourses that were presented in 
their 2008-2017 work plans will be analysed.  
 
5.2.1. Recognition of differences between broadcasting and 
telecommunication  
Basically, the Convergence Committee White Paper recognised that broadcasting and 
telecommunications have different functions and that they are subject to different policy principles. 
For example, the Chairman of Convergence Committee, An, Moon-seok said, "broadcasting is 
based on policy frameworks that emphasise the value of the public good. On the other hand, 
telecommunication has been developed as a value system that protects the privacy and the 
promotion of industry. It is a difficult task to reconcile the conflict between the different value 
systems" (Convergence Committee, 2008: Introduction). More specifically, the white paper stated 
that broadcasting is regulated through differentiated entry, ownership, competition, and content 
regulations, etc., based on different public interest for the purpose of securing the public interest. 
Meanwhile, it was also recognised that telecommunication is regulated mostly by competition law 
for the economic efficiency and active competition in the market.  
 Moreover, the different characteristics between government department and independent 
institution were also recognised in the white paper. This is relevant to the discussion of governance 
system of broadcasting and telecommunication. In the past, telecommunication sector was mostly 
overseen by government department, and broadcasting sector was regulated by non- or quasi-
government institution. This was to prevent the political interruption from government to 
broadcasting, for the interruption can damage diversity of opinions in the society. In this 
background, it was also addressed that promotional policies in media can be best achieved by a 
government department, because it can effectively support promotion with government’s budget. 
And also, they contended that it is a government department that can promptly respond to the rapid 
change in the market, as it has more simplified hierarchical decision-making structure than a 
commission. However, they saw a commission model can be more suitable for media regulation, 
such as broadcasting regulation, because the commission model can ensure more transparency and 
impartiality in policymaking as well as regulation process. They noted that this would make the 
institution more accountable to the citizen (ibid., 76).  
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5.2.2. Convergence discourse 1: Technology changes everything? 
Despite these perceptions in differences, Convergence Committee’s white paper more emphasised 
that these distinctions between broadcasting and communication were being rapidly blurred, 
because it was thought that media convergence phenomenon at the time was accelerating very 
quickly. The recognition of ‘rapid blurring between traditional media’ was one of the most 
important elements in the concept of media convergence itself, as examined in Chapter 4. In the 
chapter, the problems of the concept of media convergence were addressed, and one of them was 
that the concept has strong sense of presumption which can bring about ambiguity and arbitrariness. 
In other words, the term can lead people to make their own predictions that are not based on 
thorough observations on the media convergence phenomenon. Therefore, the concept has strong 
sense of prediction made by exaggerating the pace of development of media convergence. In 
addition to this, it was also examined in the chapter that this type of convergence discourse was 
made in some Western countries’ cases too. Similar to these cases, the Convergence Committee’s 
white paper was filled with tons of assumptions that those differences between broadcasting and 
telecommunication would become totally meaningless very soon in the future. And all these claims 
were formed as a 'discourse' that appears most prominently throughout the white paper. For 
example, Han, Deok-soo, then the prime minister who was responsible for the commission, said 
that:  
 
“The convergence of broadcasting and telecommunication, which rapidly breaks the 
boundaries between broadcasting and communication, is accelerating with the development 
of digital technology. [...] Based on this, the government can no longer postpone policy 
responses to the convergence of broadcasting and telecommunication” (Convergence 
Committee, 2008: Introduction).  
 
In line with this, the white paper also stressed the developments of digitalisation and transmission 
technology. It said: “The distinction between broadcasting and telecommunication is blurred by 
technology and market development. As the analogue broadcasting has been digitised, it has 
become interactive, which is a characteristic of telecommunication, and telecommunication now 
can transmit a large amount of contents such as a broadcasting program to a large number of 
subscribers” (Convergence Committee, 2008:3). In other words, it was said that the boundaries 
between broadcasting and telecommunication will be blurred because they now share some 
similarities in traditional functions. But this argument can be seen as a logical leap, as it is arguing 
that a new ‘partially’ emerged similarity between the two sectors will result in the blurring of the 
most boundaries between those two sectors. In other words, it can be dangerous to assume that a 
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fragmentary phenomenon is going to be fully expanded to the entire level. However, this kind of 
‘convergence discourse’ was very prevalent in the overall discussion.  
 In addition, the white paper argued that even political and socio-cultural roles of 
broadcasting and telecommunication were also changing. However, there was no specific reason 
supporting the argument. It was said, “the industrial characteristics of a service or media-specific 
network are changing structurally due to the technological developments, and the political, socio-
cultural influence of the media is also constantly changing. As the distinction between broadcasting 
and telecom markets becomes increasingly irrelevant, the actualisation of new regulatory 
frameworks is urgently needed for convergence environments” (Convergence Committee, 
2007:56). Through these comments, it can be confirmed that the convergence discourse was 
justifying the reform of media policy system, and the discourse exaggerated the speed of media 
convergence development. Moreover, the it was argued that the political and socio-cultural 
influences of broadcasting and telecommunication were changing too, but there was no specific 
explanation on how such influence has been changed by the technological development. Thus, it 
can be seen as a logical leap, for it contends the partial change in media will definitely bring overall 
characteristic changes in media. Therefore, it seems that the convergence committee did not give 
much attention to other sectors in media, such as industrial, political, economic, social, cultural 
and historical aspects that consists of whole media. Meanwhile, as examined in Chapter 2, the 
prevalence of convergence discourse and its justification of media reform were also found, as in 
the studies such as Fagerjord and Storsul (2007), which examined some European cases on policy 
convergence. Therefore, it can be said that the first type of convergence discourse was effective in 
both some European countries and Korea.  
 
5.2.3. Convergence discourse 2: Deregulate, reform and compete  
This part will examine the economic opportunities relevant to media convergence first, and how 
the second type of convergence discourse discussed in Chapter 2 appeared in Convergence 
Committee’s white paper.  
 
The economics of media convergence 
Digitalisation of media meant that the media creation, transmission, reception and storage could 
be much economical than in the analogue era. In a digital environment, the cost of production, 
storage, transmission and reception can be significantly reduced, because physical equipment and 
its maintenance costs can be reduced. At the same time, the speed and capacity of processing could 
be enormously advanced by using computers in the process of media creation and distribution. All 
of these advantages of digitalisation meant new business opportunities for media companies 
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(Hesmondhalgh, 2013:311). In addition to this, the development of transmission technology 
offered another economic opportunity for media firms too. More specifically, digital technologies 
and data compression technologies have created spare bandwidth capacity in existing networks, 
and operators have been able to provide additional services. For example, telecommunication 
companies now can provide high-quality broadcasting services through their networks, while cable 
TV broadcasters can provide telephone services such as VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) on top 
of their existing TV service through their cable TV network.  
 The development of digital and transmission technologies has been greatly welcomed by 
both telecommunication and broadcasting companies because of following three reasons (World 
Bank, 2007:34-35). First, the development of the transmission network, especially the introduction 
of Internet Protocol (IP) based packet switching data transmission, has enabled far more efficient 
network operation. And it means that the maintenance costs of those operators are reduced. Second, 
based on this development, providers could secure additional revenue sources by doing additional 
business. For example, as two digitalised media can interact with each other by sending and 
receiving digital signals at the same time, it consequently enables audiences to get interactive 
experience. In the past, for example, TV audiences had to just sit back in the couch and watch a 
content that is aired by the broadcasters. However, as the TV has been transformed from a mere 
receiver to a receiver/sender, the audience now can enjoy interactive services such as ‘video on 
demand’ or ‘data broadcasting’. By using those interactive services, audiences became able to 
choose a preferred TV show and enjoy additional interactive services. This enabled the service 
provider to make additional profits from their business. Third, as the providers can offer several 
services as a bundle, they could find opportunities for increasing their market share in overall 
communications market. The bundled service can be offered in relatively inexpensive price than 
when several services are purchased separately, so the customers tends to switch to bundle services 
that consists of several services that were traditionally provided by different provider. For example, 
the bundle service could be the combined service of landline telephone, internet broadband and 
television services, which is often called 'triple play service (TPS)'. Moreover, when landline 
telephone, mobile telephone, internet broadband and television services are bundled, it is called as 
‘quadruple play service (QPS)’. This QPS bundle model could be understood as the most advanced 
one among different bundle models. Consequently, it can be noted that the developments of 
digitalisation and transmission technology are closely related to the increase of profit of media 
companies. Accordingly, the profitability of media company and the new opportunities brought 
about by media convergence was something that Convergence Committee could not ignore.  
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For global media conglomerate  
A significant feature shown in the Convergence Committee’s white paper was that the committee 
was very conscious of the developed countries as potential competitors in the global media market. 
Specifically, a discourse was formed that, since developed countries adopted the integrated policy 
system, South Korea should also reorganise its media policy system by integrating policy 
institutions. In line with this, it was also insisted that the Korean media market should be 
deregulated in order to remove the barriers that could potentially hinder the growth of Korean 
media companies. In other words, there were strong discourse in the white paper that Korean media 
companies should be well supported by providing similar environments with other global media 
companies, as to compete with them. A statement of the prime minister, shows well how the 
discourse was made:  
 
“In response to the convergence of broadcasting and telecommunications, major developed 
countries are pursuing the regulatory reform of broadcasting and telecommunications, and 
the restructuring of administrative organisations. We are trying to integrate the administrative 
structure and the regulatory system of broadcasting and telecommunication, to allow cross-
entry between broadcasting and telecommunication, and to promote competition and the 
market [...] The broadcasting and telecommunication convergence is a field of advanced 
digital technology in which the development of technology and market is fast […] and it is a 
winner-takes-all market. It is because the companies can dominate the market through 
standardization of technology. It is impossible for us to keep ahead in the competition with 
the developed countries by separating the administration and the legal system of broadcasting 
and telecommunication like this” (Convergence Committee, 2008: Introduction).  
 
 The following table presented in the white paper shows how some advanced countries 
adopted policy convergence. The white paper stressed that those developed Western and European 
countries have already adopted policy convergence, and Korea needed to move faster in order to 
compete with them.  
 
Table 5 Policy Convergence Cases 
Type Nation Media 
Promotional 
Policy 
Regulatory 
Policy 
Fully 
Integrated 
USA 
Broadcasting 
FCC 
Telecom 
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Japan 
Broadcasting 
MIC 
Telecom 
Separated 
Australia 
Broadcasting 
DCITA ACMA 
Telecom 
Italy 
Broadcasting 
MOC AGcom 
Telecom 
UK 
Broadcasting 
DCMS OFCOM 
Telecom 
Canada 
Broadcasting 
Canadian 
Heritage 
CRTC 
Telecom 
Industry 
Canada 
Source: Convergence Committee (2008) 
 
 As shown in the table above, the white paper emphasised that six developed countries, 
namely the USA, Japan, Australia, Italy, UK, and Canada, have already fully or partially 
introduced policy convergence or regulatory convergence. It seems that the white paper intended 
to legitimate media system reform by presenting some advanced countries’ application of policy 
convergence. And this reform was aimed to make the best condition for the growth of national 
media companies, who should compete in overseas markets (Convergence Committee, 2008:50). 
Consequently, it seems that the second type of discourse, which emphasises the deregulation, 
policy system reform and competition was evident in white paper.   
  
5.3.4. Marginalisation of public interest and PSB 
However, Convergence Committee did not pay much attention to public interest and public 
broadcasting. Their understanding of the public interest was somewhat limited. They presented 
public interest goals in media as universal service, protection of consumers' interests and audience 
participation (ibid., 44). However, these public interest provisions were traditionally more related 
to the telecommunications sector. In the broadcasting area, there have been more public interest 
aims such as contents diversity and protection of national culture and social minorities. But in the 
committee, these other important values were not regarded as something significant.   
 Meanwhile, public broadcasting was recognised as a medium that plays some public roles 
in the society. That is, it was mentioned that the intensification of competition and the 
commercialisation of broadcasting made it clear that it is important to strengthen public service 
obligations and guarantee independence of public broadcasting. Therefore, they argued that the 
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regulation system of public broadcasting and private broadcasting should be differentiated. 
Nevertheless, discussion on public broadcasting was never at the centre of the discussion. That is, 
the subject of PSB remained highly marginalised in the actual process of discussion. Furthermore, 
Public Service Publisher (PSP) model, which was once suggested and abandoned in the UK, was 
suggested as an ideal system for the Korean PSB (ibid., 46). This can be interpreted as an attempt 
to introduce competition principles in Korean public broadcasters too. 
 In the meantime, some suggested to establish a new specific regulator for PSB, which was 
called as 'Public Broadcasting Commission'. However, this subject could not be discussed well in 
the committee, because “the concept of public broadcasting is unclear as to whether it includes 
KBS or MBC, and the public broadcasting issue can be discussed separately after the 
reorganisation” (ibid, 76). In other words, for the legal concept of public broadcasting was unclear, 
PSB could not be considered as a serious agenda in the social debate. Thus, it can be said that a 
clear definition of public broadcasters is necessary, if a proper discussion could be done in the 
social debate. In other words, a clear definition of PSB is the precondition of a productive policy 
discussion.  
 In the interview taken with the PSB worker Lee, Geun-haeng (25 Nov 2015), he also agreed 
to that economic discourse was prevalent at that time. He also said that the integration between 
broadcasting and telecommunication policy institutions were regarded as something Korea had to 
adopt as soon as possible. He said, he was aware of the different characters between broadcasting 
and telecommunication policies, but the discourse on the reform was strong, and the discourse was 
mostly promoted by media academics in Korea who studied in the US. As a TV producer who 
made factual TV programmes in MBC for more than 20 years, he said that he was discouraged at 
that time, for the discourse was all about the profitability of media company. Thus, he said that he 
was confused with his role as a producer in public television company, because he thought there 
were different public values other than profits he had to pursue, but at that time, those public 
interests were ignored in the process of discussion on policy convergence. Thus, it can be argued 
that the prevalence of convergence discourse caused a confusion to public media worker’s 
motivation for their work, and it discouraged their efforts to achieve public interest through their 
broadcasting programmes.  
 
5.3. Convergence discourse and KCC  
As a result of Convergence Committee, a bill for the establishment of a converged media policy 
institution was made and submitted. Accordingly, KCC was established in 2008, when 
conservative party and Lee government came to power. In this part, KCC will be analysed, as to 
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see whether the discourses examined above were relevant to KCC, and how the discourses were 
changed in last 10 years. In this period, Korea experienced some dramatic changes in broadcasting 
and telecommunication policies, and it happened simultaneously with the change of governments. 
In other words, the discourse and policy style of KCC was changed as the focus of government 
was changed. But it is notable that between 2008 and 2017, the same conservative party succeeded 
in keeping their power. Precisely, conservative party, which name was Saenuri party, won two 
presidential elections respectively in 2008 and 2013, so the same political party was in the 
government for two consecutive presidential terms in 2008-2017. Therefore, the political ideology 
itself seems not critical factor for the change. More details will be discussed below. For the analysis 
of the discourses in KCC’s official documents, qualitative text analysis is conducted on KCC's 
annual reports, work plans, and the commissioners’ meeting records. In addition, the interviews 
conducted by the researcher will be used for the analysis too.  
 
5.3.1. KCC in 2008-2013: A follower of convergence discourse 
KCC’s policies from 2008 to 2013 cover a very comprehensive range. At this time, KCC managed 
both promotional and regulatory policies. At this period of time, KCC actively accepted and 
applied the ‘convergence discourse’ in their policymaking. Basically, KCC thought that the 
convergence of media convergence was expanding very fast. Therefore, in order to take advantage 
of these new opportunities, they thought it was important to create a 'global media corporation' 
through deregulation of cross-media ownership rules. Indeed, in KCC's annual report, the impact 
of ‘convergence discourse’ can be found in many occasions. For example, Choi, Si-joong, the first 
appointed chairman of KCC, made the following remarks in their annual reports:  
 
“Digital convergence is rapidly emerging as the rapid development of digital technology and 
the advancement of networks are leading to the breakdown of the boundaries between 
broadcasting and telecommunication media. […] Media Big Bang has happened in the last 
two years. […] Smart phones, which has appeared like comets, are turning voice phones, cell 
phones, and even high-speed broadband and the Internet into something of a laggard to the 
new trend. […] It's difficult to communicate with the world if you do not concentrate on new 
IT services and contents” (KCC, 2009; 2010; 2011).  
 
 As shown above, the statement of the first chairman of KCC was full of exaggerating 
expressions such as rapid development, breakdown of the boundaries between broadcasting and 
telecommunication, Media Big Bang, smartphones like comets, and so on. Furthermore, KCC 
presented ambiguous predictions regarding the development of media convergence. For example, 
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‘Smart environment is leading to a multi-platform environment and breaking down the barriers 
between operators’ (KCC 2013a:162). This was, as examined earlier in this chapter, the first type 
of convergence discourse that could be found in Convergence Committee’s white paper as well as 
other European cases examined in Chapter 2 (see European Commission, 1997; OECD, 2013; 
2016; Silverstone, 1995; Noll, 2003).  
 However, as examined, the concept of media convergence is relevant to network and device 
levels of broadcasting and telecommunication value chains, and it happened slowly and partially 
in last few decades since the concept and the earliest model of media convergence was first 
introduced in 1983. Nevertheless, in KCC’s annual reports in 2008-2013, there were a lot of 
exaggerated expressions such as that the barrier between broadcasting and communication was 
'collapsed' due to media convergence. Moreover, in terms of sector-specific regulations, KCC 
insisted that the paradigm of those regulations was changed due to media convergence. The table 
below shows the paradigm shift proposed by KCC (2009:13). 
 
Table 6 Regulatory Paradigm Shift in Broadcasting and Telecommunication 
 
Analog Era Digital Era 
Broadcasting Telecommunication 
Broadcasting and 
Telecommunication 
Main 
service 
Terrestrial 
(Audiovisual 
information) 
Landline telephone 
(Voice information) 
Convergent service 
such as IPTV 
(Audiovisual, Voice, 
Data) 
Main 
character 
Linear 
Simple telephony 
exchange 
User-driven choice 
and interactivity 
Regulation 
Socio-cultural 
anti-monopoly 
regulation 
Economic anti-
monopoly 
regulation 
Fair competition and 
user protection 
Regulator 
Korea 
Broadcasting 
Commission 
Ministry of 
Information and 
Communication 
Korea 
Communications 
Commission 
Source: KCC (2009:13)  
 
 As shown in the table above, KCC believed that there had been a socio-cultural regulation 
principle in broadcasting of the old analogue era, while there was a principle of economic 
regulation for telecommunication. However, as they moved to the digital age, KCC argued that the 
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principle of socio-cultural regulation of broadcasting can be replaced with the principle of ‘fair 
competition and user protection’. This was quite similar to the discourse that was examined in 
Convergence Committee (2008). In the white paper, the value of old principle was addressed, but 
the socio-cultural value was not significantly recognised. In addition, the emergence of new 
convergent media and the possibility of user-led content were cited as the cause of the transition. 
However, KCC did not give a proper reason why socio-cultural regulatory principles can be 
replaced with competition and user protection principles. KCC just continued to insist that the 
regulation of broadcasting in the digital age needs to be more simplified like competition 
regulation, so as to make it equal to the regulation of telecommunication sector (ibid.). 
 And KCC explicitly showed their narrow view on the principles of broadcasting regulation. 
They even argued that broadcasting is no longer a public service provider or a media for public 
interest. They argued for the introduction of the logic of private industry, while marginalising the 
public interest mission of broadcasting. In their 2009 annual report, KCC said, “Broadcasting has 
been recognised only as a public service for us, and public interest has been the most important 
standard in the policy making process. [...] However, this perspective of public interest is 
undergoing many changes. In the digital media age, as the convergence of broadcasting and 
telecommunication is accelerated, the competition principle is introduced into the broadcasting 
market, and the need to consider not only the public interest but also the industrial and economic 
aspects is increasing” (KCC 2009:15-16). 
 However, it is notable that this claim is in fact totally contrary to what is specified in 
Broadcasting Act. The reason why the broadcasting sector was regulated on the basis of public 
interest was the public interest remits stipulated in the Broadcasting Act. Therefore, it can be said 
that KCC intentionally ignored the important part of the Broadcasting Act. And this is quite 
problematic because they were established to be the institution that performs according to the 
Broadcasting Act.  
 Notwithstanding those points, KCC only stressed deregulation and competition in Korean 
media market. It stressed that developed countries are pursuing and fostering competition through 
deregulation in line with the convergence of broadcasting and telecommunications. For example, 
they said, “in developed countries, it is a trend to make a global media conglomerate through M&A” 
(KCC 2008a:12). Furthermore, it was said that “in response to convergence, advanced countries’ 
governments have set deregulation and revitalisation of competition as the main policy goals” 
(KCC 2009:14). In a later part of the report, they repeated, “in order to strengthen the 
competitiveness of broadcasting industry as a whole and to establish the foundation of global 
media companies, KCC made a plan for the deregulation of cross-ownership rules” (KCC, 
2012:156).  
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 This view of KCC seemed to be permeated to the member of KCC too. In an interview taken 
with a senior official of KCC, B (24 Nov 2015) also insisted that KCC should pursue a policy that 
gives autonomy to companies in accordance with the converging market environment. He also 
suggested that KCC has to maximize industrial development while minimizing regulations. He 
also contended that broadcasting and telecommunication companies should be allowed for more 
M&As, so as to harness economies of scale and economies of scope through it.  
 In conclusion, KCC’s focus on media policy was ‘to make global media companies by 
vibrant competitions and M&A in the market'. In other words, KCC tried to see broadcasting and 
telecommunication mostly as businesses, rather than the social institutions that have socio-cultural 
remits. In KCC’s documents published particularly in 2008-2013, it can be seen that the 
convergence discourse played a very important role in making KCC’s approach on media policy. 
They saw convergence was happening so fast, and they thought that they needed to take the 
opportunity by deregulation and competition, so that a global media company can be nurtured. 
Therefore, it seems that both the first and the second types of convergence discourses were at the 
heart of KCC’s policy papers.  
 
5.3.2. KCC in 2013-2017: Emergence of public interest discourse 
2012 was a big year for Korean PSBs. Main PSBs including MBC, KBS and YTN conducted 
massive and longest strikes in the year. The strike was due to the interruption from government to 
PSBs. Since 2008, when Lee, Myung-bak government became into power, the government 
cancelled some TV programmes that criticised government’s policy. Thus, PSB journalists and 
producers argued that the executives of PSBs are interrupting their programme because they are 
controlled by government. Briefly speaking, as policy convergence was made by establishment of 
KCC in 2008, it became easier for government to interrupt public broadcasting, because KCC was 
connected to the government and the institution was given too much power over media sectors. 
The changes in PSB governance and the close relationship between the government, KCC and 
PSB executives will be examined in detail in Chapter 7. As said above, the 2012 strike was 
unprecedently big in its scale, and it lasted almost half a year, from January to July. During the 
strike period, many broadcasting producers were forced to be transferred to different department 
of the broadcasting company which is remote from programme making. Furthermore, some had to 
be suspended and fired, and many other had to get reduced wages because they participated in the 
strike. However, they successfully managed the strike to be known by the public, as they brilliantly 
used social media. They opened Youtube channels and Facebook pages to let the public know the 
reasons of their strike and what they want for the political independence of journalism in Korea. 
Their contents were quite amusing and funny, so it seems that the public enjoyed the contents and 
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understood the strike more easily. Even though the public could not watch their favourite TV shows 
such as MBC’s ‘Indefinite Challenge’, many people showed their support for the PSB strike. 
Consequently, PSB worker’s relentless efforts made the political independence issue to become a 
significant agenda in presidential election period in 2012. Therefore, most of strong presidential 
candidates declared that the political independence of PSB was one of their important pledges 
made to the public. Accordingly, when Park, Geun-hye was elected as the president in 2013, her 
government and conservative party had to make some efforts to secure the independence of KCC 
and PSB.  
 In the meantime, the reorganisation of government in 2013 also contributed to the overall 
changes in KCC. When newly elected Park government came in, one of their significant pledge 
was to grow Creative Industries sector. Accordingly, they reshuffled overall structure of 
government departments, and established a department that is in charge of all private media and 
media business. In so doing, they lifted some promotional remits of KCC and let them only conduct 
regulations on broadcasting and telecommunication. Therefore, KCC lost its authority to create 
and conduct promotional policy in broadcasting and telecommunication. Those promotional 
authorities were move to the newly established department, Ministry of Science, ICT and Future 
Planning (MSIP). More specifically, the newly established MSIP was given the authorities of 
promotional policymaking for cable TV, satellite TV, IPTV, general PP and telecommunications. 
In other words, the newly established institution became in charge of all private media sectors in 
Korea. On the other hand, KCC was only able to keep the regulations of terrestrial broadcasting, 
all-genre PP, news PP and telecommunication regulations. With regard to broadcasting, they are in 
charge of regulating broadcasters which have journalistic functions. Those broadcasters include 
PSBs and other news channels. And in regard to telecommunications, they maintained regulations 
such as fair competition and dispute settlement. In short, KCC was changed from a comprehensive 
media policy institution to a converged regulator. Furthermore, when it comes to political aspect 
of the reshuffle, it seems that Park government thought that they need to distinguish private media 
and other media that has journalism function. That is, if the government keep trying to interrupt 
these media, then it could be problematised again as experienced in 2012 PSB strike. In other 
words, it seems that the government saw the public media and journalism media are too sensitive 
to manage, and they did not want to obtain political burden by engaging with them, as Lee 
government did.  
 As a result, KCC became a regulatory body, and the discourses shown in their annual reports 
and other documents were changed. Accordingly, KCC’s policy style was changed drastically too. 
As examined above, in most of KCC’s documents published in 2008-2013, competition and 
industry-centred attitudes were prevalent. But since 2013, KCC started to show their interest in 
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sector-specific values such as political independence of public broadcasters. These changes can be 
found in various sources published by KCC between 2013 and 2017. 
 
Table 7 KCC's Work Plans in 2013-2017 
Year Policy goals 
2013 
1. Establishing PSB identity, public interest of broadcasting, media 
diversity   
2. Support creative economy  
3. Making consumer convenience 
2014 
1. Creative economy 
2. PSB reliability, licence fee, universal service  
3. Cyber security, internet culture 
2015 
1. Ensuring public accountability of broadcasting, Increase of PSB 
licence fee and media diversity  
2. Setting up regulations for broadcasting ads, contents, smart media  
3. Ensuring fair trade  
2016 
1. Public accountability of broadcasting, media diversity 
2. Ensuring fair trade, consumer protection 
3. Competitiveness of broadcasting contents 
4. Making legal framework for convergence environment (OTT, 
VOD) 
2017 
1. Securing public interest of broadcasting  
2. Desirable broadcasting contents, Introduction of UHD transmission 
3. Fair trade in media markets 
4. Increase of media literacy  
Source: KCC  
 
 As the above table shows, since 2013, KCC has made PSB and public interest the most 
important policy goals. In particular, in 2013, they recognised the need for a reorganisation of the 
public broadcaster governance structure. As noted above, this seems to be caused by the huge 
strikes of PSB in 2012. Therefore, there were efforts to reflect various voices and strengthen 
transparency in the process of appointing the directors and the CEO of the public broadcasters. 
Specifically, they conducted research on overseas cases to support the debate on revision of the 
Broadcasting Act in the National Assembly. As a result of the discussions at the National Assembly, 
the clauses for disqualification of the appointment of KCC’s Chairman was made. More 
  96 
specifically, Broadcasting Act was amended to prohibit a person who worked in a presidential 
election camp or in the same political party of president from becoming the Chairman of KCC. 
Meanwhile, they began to pay special attention to broadcast content, such as language and 
sensationalism. In order to properly monitor the diversity of public opinion, they studied ways to 
investigate more realistic audience ratings. In particular, KCC developed a diversity tool to 
measure the audience ratings of various media including TV, radio, newspapers, and the Internet. 
Their interest in the internal diversity of broadcasting was increased. But it is notable that the 
internal diversity was a term that was scarce in KCC’s documents published before 2013.  
However, in this period, the public interest discourse was one that most frequently found in their 
documents. In 2014, the word ‘media convergence’ was totally disappeared in their work plan 
report. Specifically, they stopped use exaggerating presumptions regarding media convergence, as 
they did in 2008-2012. Instead, they became more realistic in understanding the media 
convergence phenomenon. For example, they presented OTT and VOD as significant examples of 
convergent media and focused on what they found. In 2015, they set a policy goal to increase 
licence fees for KBS and EBS. They saw that it was necessary to protect the functions of public 
broadcasting through subscription fees so that KBS and EBS would not be commercialised due to 
excessive competition in the broadcasting market. Furthermore, they set increase of the 
accountability of public broadcasters and all-genre TV channels as the most important regulatory 
objectives. In 2016, the public interest, responsibility, and internal diversity of broadcasting were 
the main policy goals. Finally, in 2017, the public interest of broadcasting became the most 
important regulatory goal. Therefore, since 2013, KCC started to take the public interest, PSB and 
internal diversity as its main policy goals. Meanwhile, since 2013, KCC started to understand the 
concept of media convergence based on practical observations.  
 
5.4. Conclusion 
The Convergence Committee white paper, which had a major impact on the introduction of IPTV 
and policy convergence in Korea, showed how convergence discourse appeared in the process of 
policy convergence in Korea. In the white paper, two convergence discourses were found. First, 
the committee believed that media convergence is occurring very rapidly and that the boundaries 
between broadcasting and telecommunication are quickly becoming meaningless. They also 
thought that the social roles of broadcasting and telecommunication were changing rapidly. Second, 
the committee believed that Korea needed to take advantage of the opportunities of media 
convergence by relaxing existing sector-specific regulations and by making more competitive 
media markets. The purpose of this intensification of competition was to nurture global media 
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corporations. Accordingly, they believed that policy convergence should be introduced urgently to 
accomplish these tasks. 
 Furthermore, public interest and public broadcasting were neglected in the discussion of the 
Convergence Committee. The Convergence Committee focused on revitalising competition, but 
public media was expected to play a complementary role for the amendment of market failure. 
Particularly, their recognition of public interest was limited to the public interest in 
telecommunication field. That is, the committee recognised universal service and service quality 
as the most important public interest objectives. However, broadcasting sector’s public interest, 
such as internal and external diversity, impartiality and political and economic independence of 
PSB were not in their interest. They also argued that competition system may need to be introduced 
to public broadcasters. Therefore, it can be said that the convergence discourse was too strong in 
the process of discussion on media convergence in Korea.  
 KCC was established in this background. Accordingly, KCC was a faithful follower of 
convergence discourse in 2008-2012. They saw that media convergence is spreading rapidly and 
that regulation should be relaxed accordingly. In particular, they set their mission to nurture global 
media groups by easing restrictions on cross-media ownership. Their view of broadcasting and 
communication was clearly economy- and industry-centric. They deliberately ignored the socio-
cultural role and public interest of broadcasting. In the process, the political independence of the 
PSB was very weakened.  
 Eventually, massive strike of PSB followed in 2012 due to the excessive intervention of 
government. The strike was the longest ever ones in the history of Korean PSB, since it was 
established in the 1970s. At that time, the government cancelled some politically-sensitive 
broadcasting programmes using their close relationship with KCC and the CEOs of PSB. The 
strikers wanted the resignation of KCC’s chairman as well as PSB CEOs, and they suggested a 
more specific methods to secure their political independence. It happened in the last year of Lee 
government and the strikers were successful in making their issue an urgent social agenda during 
presidential election period in 2012. Indeed, the next Park government had to promise that her 
government will do something to guarantee the political independence of PSBs.  
 Furthermore, in 2013, KCC experienced big changes in its authorities and governance 
system when Park government was established. They became a regulator, and their attitude 
towards media policy was totally changed. Accordingly, core discourses were changed from 
convergence discourse to public interest discourse as shown in their policy documents published 
in 2013-2017. KCC started to focus on public interest and sector-specific values of broadcasting 
sector. KCC became interested not only in the political independence of the PSB, but also in the 
economic independence of PSB. They tried to help increasing the PSB license fees for KBS and 
EBS. They also began to develop various measuring tools for the internal diversity of broadcasting. 
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This can imply that the form of media policy institution can affect its policy style and focus. More 
precisely, a dedicated regulator is more likely to focus on sector-specific regulations, rather than 
promotional-regulatory policy institution as KCC was in 2008-2012. In other words, it seems that 
if promotional function and regulatory function are given to a single (converged) media policy 
institution, the institution can be confused with their roles, and they could fail to meet their remit 
comprehensively. In a similar vein, Ginosar and Krispil (2016) also argued that there is a tendency 
for regulators to take public interest more seriously in the regulation of broadcasting than 
government agencies. 
 Meanwhile, it is notable that in 2008-2017, Lee and Park governments was run by the same 
conservative party which has had the same attitude towards media policy. This shows that 
sometimes the political power could not be a definite factor that sets the overall character and style 
of media policy institution. This Korean case shows that civil society’s effort can also have huge 
impact on media policymaking and media governance reform.  
 In conclusion, the analysis of Convergence Committee’s white paper and KCC showed that 
convergence discourse prevailed in Korea, and this resulted in the marginalisation of sector-
specific policy principles in broadcasting. Convergence discourse affected KCC particularly 
during its initial period in 2008-2012. KCC followed convergence discourse by adopting 
deregulation and by promoting competition. In so doing, they ignored the importance of political 
independence of PSB, which is one of significant sector-specific regulatory principle in 
broadcasting. However, this resulted in massive PSB strike in 2012. This led governance reshuffle 
in 2013, and KCC was reborn as an institution which is dedicated to regulation of broadcasting 
and telecommunication. After the change, the main discourse in KCC’s policy documents were 
dramatically changed, as the discourse of public interest and PSB prevailed.  
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6. The impact of media convergence on broadcasting 
and telecommunication markets   
As examined in the definition of media convergence, media convergence phenomena can be 
discussed in four levels in media value chain. However, as reviewed in the previous studies where 
the concept of media convergence was discussed, only network convergence and device 
convergence were relevant to the concept of media convergence. And it was briefly discussed that 
media convergence in those two levels is more feasible in practice, than content convergence and 
platform convergence. In this chapter, the actual development of media convergence in market is 
analysed, by examining Korean broadcasting and telecommunication markets. 
 Network convergence means that various media services can be delivered through a single 
network. It means that the boundaries between at least two networks were disappeared. This can 
be more easily understood in the perspective of the supplier side. For example, both 
telecommunication and broadcasting services are provided together through a telecommunication 
network, or those services are provided through a broadcasting network. On the other hand, device 
convergence can be understood more easily from the media user’s perspective. This refers to the 
phenomenon that the user is able to use various media contents with a single device. Thus, it can 
be called as device convergence, as traditionally different media device has become a single device. 
For example, a variety of contents such as newspaper, broadcasting, movies, etc., can be consumed 
by a digital and internet-connected device. In other words, computer-based and Internet-connected 
devices enabled media users to receive multiple contents even in a single device. For example, 
desktop computer, laptop computer, smart TV, smartphone, tablet pc, etc., enabled users to read, 
listen to and watch digital media contents using a single converged device.  
 In this chapter, the convergences in network and device levels will be examined. However, 
it should be noted that the thesis tried to find as many as examples that can be seen as media 
convergence in all four levels in media value chain, but it was quite difficult to find significant 
ones that happened in content and platform level. Consequently, this chapter only deals with 
network and device levels. However, this also gives an important finding that the media 
convergence was not expanded to overall media value chain, and its influence was limited to 
network and device levels. The following table summarises the categories and examples of 
convergent media that are to be discussed in this chapter.  
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Table 8 Categories of Media Convergence in Practice 
Level Example How converged? 
Network 
convergence 
Cable TV’s landline telephone Broadcasting network + 
telecommunication network 
and service 
Cable TV’s internet broadband 
service 
Broadcasting network + 
telecommunication network 
and service 
IPTV (Internet Protocol 
Television) 
Telecommunication 
network + broadcasting 
network and service 
DMB (Digital Media 
Broadcasting: Mobile TV)  
Telecommunication 
network + broadcasting 
network and service, or 
mobile phone + TV 
VOD (Video-on-demand)  Interactive broadcasting 
service 
Data PP (program provider): 
Interactive channels 
Interactive broadcasting 
service 
Device 
convergence 
Internet-connected PC and 
smart devices (smart TV, 
smartphone, tablet pc) 
Computer + TV + mobile 
phone + telecommunication 
network and service  
 
6.1. Network convergence 
In this section, the thesis will examine how and to what extent the convergence of broadcasting 
and telecommunication networks actually took place in Korean market. More specifically, as 
shown in the table above, it will first examine wired (landline) telephone service and Internet 
broadband service of cable TV operators. And then it will examine Internet Protocol Television 
(IPTV) service, which is a broadcasting service provided by telecom companies. In addition, DMB 
(mobile TV), video-on-demand (VOD) and interactive TV (Data PP) channels will be examined 
as well.   
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6.1.1. Cable TV’s landline telephone 
It was in 2005 that cable broadcasters first launched a landline telephone service using their 
networks in Korea. In 2005, a cable TV company CJ Hello Vision (CJHV) launched a Voice over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP) service for the first time. VoIP is a telephone service using cable TV 
companies IP-based broadband network. And in 2006, Korea Cable Telecom (KCT) launched 
another VoIP platform. KCT was a group of different cable broadcasting companies.  
 Although there were few subscribers at the time of its first launch, both companies 
continued to grow in terms of number of subscribers and revenue since then. It seems that both 
cable TV operators succeeded in their business. That is, the total number of subscribers and 
revenue of the entire landline telephone market declined since they entered the market, but they 
have been successful to increase their market share.  
 Nonetheless, the market share of cable TV operators in the landline telephone market is still 
not very high. As of 2015, KCT's market share in fixed-line telephony was 3.7%, and CJHV's 
market share was 2.8%. The combined share of the two players was 6.5%. The graph below shows 
the number of subscribers per company in the Korean landline market. 
 
Figure 4 Landline Telephone Market Trend in 2005-2015 (by Subscriber, 000s) 
 
Source: KISDI (2016a) 
 
As shown in the graph above, the fixed-line phone market seems to be in decreasing trend, making 
its peak in 2013. But the total market shares of dominant operators, KT, LG and SK, are still 
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overwhelming. The total market share of the three companies was 91.3% (KISDI, 2016a). In 
conclusion, although the network convergence between broadcasting and telecommunication was 
occurred, its effect was quite limited in the fixed telephone market.  
 
6.1.2. Cable TV’s broadband  
Cable TV operators first launched Internet broadband services in 2006. It secured 2.5 million 
subscribers from the first year and the number of subscribers was increased to 3.2 million by 2015. 
As of 2015, cable TV operators accounted for 15.9% of subscribers. Accordingly, cable TV 
operators seem doing even better in the broadband market than in the fixed-line telephone market.  
 Nevertheless, cable TV's share of broadband subscribers has been slightly decreasing since 
its introduction. For example, their market share was 18.7% in 2007, but it was slightly decreased 
to 15.9% by 2015 (KISDI, 2016a:262). The graph below shows the overall trend in broadband 
market from 2006 to 2015.  
 
Figure 5 Broadband Market Trend in 2006-2015 (by subscriber, 000s) 
 
Source: KISDI (2016a) 
 
 In conclusion, cable television entered the landline telephone market, but its proportion 
remains at a fairly limited level. When compared their achievements in those two different markets, 
cable televisions performed better in the broadband market, but its share has gradually decreased 
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telecommunication networks was stimulated by the entry of cable TV provider, but it is difficult 
to said that they have had a decisive influence on both telephone and broadband markets.  
 
6.1.3. Telecommunication’s IPTV  
IPTV is the television service provided through telecommunication company’s network. In Korea, 
IPTV was introduced for the first time in 2008. Major players were KT, SK and LG. Those three 
companies have oligopolistic power in overall telecom markets. When IPTV was introduced first, 
there was a severe conflict between the stakeholders in telecommunication and broadcasting. 
Telecommunication companies and the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) argued 
that IPTV is a telecom service because it offers interactivity, while traditional TV does not. On the 
other hand, except those who are related to telecom industry, all other parties argued that IPTV 
was a broadcasting service. For instance, broadcasting companies, Korea Broadcasting 
Commission (KBC), the National Assembly and civil organisations claimed that IPTV was a 
broadcasting service. They argued that IPTV is a broadcast service just like cable TV, because it is 
a service that actually broadcasts same channels as cable TV provides. Some previous literatures 
that are dealing with IPTV showed that IPTV can be recognised as a Pay TV service, just like cable 
TV (see Noam, 2016).  
 As of 2018, IPTV is indeed one of the Pay TV platforms in Korea. Broadcasting Act also 
recognises that IPTV and cable TV compete in the same Pay TV market. The following two graphs 
show the number of subscribers and the sales in the Pay TV market respectively.  
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Figure 6 Pay TV Market Trend in 2003-2015 (by Subscriber) 
 
Source: KCC (2016a)  
 
Figure 7 Pay TV Market Trend in 2009-2015 (by Revenue, KRW, Millions) 
 
Source: KCC (2016a) 
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From 2003 to 2008, there were only cable TV and satellite TV in Korean Pay TV market. Since 
2009, the number of IPTV subscribers was increased rapidly. This resulted in the increase in the 
total number of Pay TV subscribers. Revenue share also showed a similar trend. Since the 
introduction of IPTV, its share of revenue was increased sharply and the gross revenue in the 
market was increased too. Therefore, it can be said that the introduction of IPTV contributed to the 
expansion of Pay TV market in Korea. As of 2015, cable TV subscribers accounted for 48.7%, 
followed by IPTV with 40.3% and satellite TV with 11% (KCC, 2016b:100).  
 Meanwhile, after establishing IPTV, telecommunication companies rapidly increased 
market share by selling bundled products that combine fixed line telephone, mobile telephone, 
high-speed broadband internet and IPTV. However, at the same time, both the number of 
subscribers and revenue of cable TV and satellite TV slightly declined. Looking at these trends, it 
seems that IPTV expanded as the subscribers of cable TV and satellite TV moved to IPTV, but at 
the same time, it can be also confirmed that IPTV helped to increase the total size of Pay TV market 
(KCC, 2016a).  
 But why did IPTV's market share grow so fast? According to Jung (2013), KCC's full 
support was the main reason for the rise of IPTV. Since its launch in 2008, KCC has shown a strong 
commitment to the IPTV business. According Jung (2013:256), KCC actively implemented 
promotional policies for the penetration of IPTV. In so doing, KCC put a lot of pressure on telecom 
companies for the success of IPTV. In this process, KCC worked with other ministries to spread 
IPTV. The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) upgraded the nationwide 
Internet network in primary and secondary schools and supported so called ‘IPTV study room’ 
project. The project aimed to provide IPTV for self-study. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) 
actively involved in IPTV distribution since 2009, providing video meeting system and IPTV 
content in military units. In addition, the Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE) supported the 
technological development and the standardisation IPTV, and helped to export Korean IPTV 
technology to Latin American countries (KCC, 2011). Due to such an ambitious support, IPTV 
could gather 6 million subscribers within the shortest time in the history of Pay TV. However, 
according to Jung (2013:264), this did not actually bring about the expected reduction in private 
education expenses. Also, the feedback on the use of services by school or military users has not 
been done properly. 
 In conclusion, since the introduction of IPTV, the total number of subscriber and gross 
revenue of the Pay TV market were increased rapidly. In due course, the number and revenue of 
IPTV were dramatically increased as well. In the meantime, the market share of Cable TV and 
satellite TV was decreased since the introduction of IPTV. However, cable TV was still the 
prominent player in Pay TV market, as they successfully managed to secure the largest number of 
subscribers and revenue in the market. In the meantime, it was claimed that the growth of IPTV 
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was possible because of the government's special support. In the next part, the thesis examines 
'bundled products' that emerged as a model of market convergence. 
 
6.1.4. Bundle service 
Bundle service means that a service that provides bundles of two or more services at a discounted 
price. In Korea's telecommunication and broadcasting sectors, bundle service can be made by 
combining landline telephone, mobile telephone, broadband internet, and Pay TV services. The 
bundle service can be divided into three different modes: Double Play Service (DPS), Triple Play 
Service (TPS), and Quadruple Play Service (QPS), depending on the number of services to be 
combined. The figure below shows the trend of the number of bundle service users in Korea in 
2007-2015.  
 
Figure 8 Number of Bundle Service Users in 2007-2015 (0,000s) 
 
Source: KISDI (2016a) 
 
 According to KISDI (2016a), there are 6.93 millions of subscribers for DPS, 6.25 millions 
for TPS, and 2.8 millions for QPS. Therefore, it seems that DPS model was the most popular one 
among those three bundle services, as of 2015. However, the number of DPS subscribers was 
gradually decreasing, while TPS and QPS were increasing. As of 2015, the most popular formats 
of DPS was the combination of Internet and TV services, accounting for 53.1% of all DPS products. 
As seen in the chart, TPS subscribers were growing in fast pace. The most popular format of TPS 
was the combination of Internet, TV and landline. It accounted for 45.9% of all TPS products. 
However, the share of this type of TPS product was declining. Meanwhile, the combination of 
Internet, mobile phone and TV bundling service became more popular over the last five years, and 
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it reached 38.6% of all TPS product. It reflected the phenomenon that more and more consumers 
cancel landline phone service and prefer mobile phones. Meanwhile, the number of QPS 
subscribers who chose to combine all telecommunication and broadcasting services, such as 
landline telephone, mobile phones, the Internet and TV was steadily increasing.  
 In general, the bundle service was provided on a contract basis. As of 2015, there were a 
total of 16 million bundle service subscribers (KISDI, 2016a). As of the end of 2015, the total 
number of households in Korea was 18.7 million, and 85.8% of households used bundle products. 
Among the total subscribers, 83.7% used telecom’s bundle services, while only 16.3% of 
subscribers used cable TV’s bundle service. The number of subscribers of telecommunication’s 
bundle services increased by 7 times between 2007 and 2015. Meanwhile, cable TV’s bundle 
service subscribers doubled in the same period (KISDI, 2016a). The reason for this rapid growth 
of telecommunication in the bundle service market was due to the power of ‘mobile-included 
bundle service’ that could be provided by telecommunication companies. Of the total bundled 
products, 48.8% included mobile communication service. Therefore, cable TV was not 
competitive because it could not provide mobile phone service (KCC, 2016b). Through an 
interview with H, who was a chief director of Korea Cable Television and Telecommunications 
Association (KCTA), the competition between cable TV and telecommunication companies could 
be understand in more detail. The interviewee was in charge of the lobbying activities towards the 
Korean government and the National Assembly as a representative of Korean cable TV companies 
for many years. He said: 
 
“When broadcasting, internet and mobile bundle service came out, we finally realised who 
was our competitor. They were not just telecom operators. They were telecom operators as 
mobile communication providers. The amount of money the telecommunication companies 
spend a year is far more than ours. It is a business that has more than KRW 50 trillion annual 
sales while cable’s total sales are only KRW 2 or 3 trillion, so how can I compete with them 
in the same market for the same subscriber? Their marketing cost itself is larger than the total 
cable sales revenue! We all know that the customers can receive subsidies of 400k -500k won 
from telecommunication companies, and we also know that it is against the law. But people 
just say ‘was it illegal? Anyway, I don’t care’. And even the public agents say to the 
telecommunication companies, ‘don’t you give me a little bit more?’ In other words, the 
market regulation framework itself does not seem to be working for fair competition (H, 7 
Dec 2015). 
 
 As a result, there can be two reasons why telecom companies’ bundle products attracted 
much more popularity than that of cable TV. The first reason is mobile service of 
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telecommunication company. That is, telecommunication companies were able to expand their 
total subscribers by bringing their customers of mobile service into their bundle service. For 
example, if a person uses a telecommunication’s mobile service, while not using cable TV, then 
the telecommunication company can offer a great discount for this customer when he decides to 
use telecommunication’s IPTV service together in addition to their mobile service. In so doing, 
telecommunication company could expand their market share.   
 The second reason is the tremendous marketing costs of telecom company. Basically, there 
was a subsidy that telecommunication company offer to customers when they move from another 
telecommunication company. For example, the telecommunication company pays the penalty that 
was imposed to the customer in the process of transfer from cable TV to IPTV. According to the 
above interviewee, the subsidy was illegal under the Fair-Trade Act, but even the public officials 
did not problematise it. In short, the size of telecom company's money and regulatory failure can 
be the main reasons of telecom’s domination in the bundle market. This also implies that the 
intention of the government, which was to make more competitive market, by bringing in IPTV 
was not fully realised. As a result, the big telecommunication companies could become even bigger, 
and this led to anti-competition and consolidation in the converged network market between 
telecommunication and broadcasting.  
 In addition, according to Jung (2013), KCC actively promoted the low-price competition 
through such combined products, in the name of consumer protection. However, according to Jung 
(2013), the introduction of such bundled products, and the introduction of unrealistically low price 
in the Pay TV market became a problem. He said that due to the too low subscription fees in the 
Pay TV market in Korea, the profitability of broadcasting programme providers had to be 
decreased, because of too fierce competition as well as low subscription fees in Pay TV market.  
 
6.1.5. M&A between leading companies 
As seen above, the situation of Pay TV market was moving in favour of telecommunication 
companies that can sell mobile phone service. In such a situation, telecommunication companies 
wanted to absorb existing cable TV subscribers more quickly by increasing their bundle service 
market share. As a result, cable TV operators were led to sell their business to telecommunication 
companies before they lose most of market share.  
 In this context, SK Telecom (SKT), the most successful mobile phone operator in Korea, 
and CJ Hello Vision (CJHV), the most successful cable TV provider, attempted to merge. At that 
time, SKT had a stable market share in the mobile communication platform market, but it was not 
quite successful in IPTV and fixed-line telephone markets compared to their competitor, Korea 
Telecom (KT). In the meantime, CJHV wanted to sell its assets as it decided that it would not be 
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easy to maintain its competitiveness in the Pay TV market as it turned into a converged 
broadcasting-telecommunication market.  
 According to H of Korea Cable Television and Telecommunications Association (KCTA), 
“CJHV had continued to invest, but when they had a research regarding their long-term investment 
plan and strategy, the result was deficit. But at that time there was no possibility of government 
policy changes... When that happens, you must sort out the business that are not likely to grow” 
(H, 7 Dec 2015). In conclusion, CJHV decided to sell its cable TV network business while pursuing 
to be a content production company (Kocca, 2016). 
 The Fair-Trade Commission, KCC and MSIP jointly reviewed the merger case to determine 
whether the merger should be approved. In the end, the Fair-Trade Commission rejected the merger, 
and SKT had to withdraw its merger application. The Fair-Trade Commission believed that if SKT, 
which was a dominant player in the mobile business, combines with CJHV, which was a dominant 
player in Pay TV market, it will hinder the competition in both Pay TV and mobile communication 
markets. Although the attempt to merge SKT and CJHV was abandoned, it seems that the M&A 
between mobile operator and cable TV would be more popular afterwards. In particular, as the 
case of SKT and CJHV showed, it is more likely that telecommunication company is to buy cable 
TV company (Kocca, 2017:52).  
 
6.1.6. DMB: Mobile TV  
Digital Multimedia Broadcasting (DMB) is a mobile broadcasting. DMB can be seen in the two 
perspectives in terms of media convergence. First, especially in the case of satellite DMB, since 
the broadcasting content is transmitted through the telecommunication network, it can be seen as 
the convergence between telecommunication network and broadcasting service. Second, it can be 
the convergence between TV and mobile phone, for it can be seen as the merging between mobile 
phone device and TV. There are two types of DMB: Satellite DMB and Terrestrial DMB. The 
biggest difference between the two is the transmission scheme. The Satellite DMB uses the satellite 
frequency (2.6Ghz), and the terrestrial DMB uses the terrestrial transmission tower and the VHF 
frequency (200Mhz). According to Jung (2009) some Korean companies and research institutes, 
who involved in DMB technology development, had a lot of intellectual property rights on video 
compression standards for DMB transmission (Jung, 2009:237).  
 Therefore, Satellite DMB is a mobile TV using satellite frequencies. There was only one 
Satellite DMB operator in Korea, named TU Media. As of 2017, it no longer exists in Korean 
broadcasting market. TU Media, a subsidiary of SK Telecom (SKT), provided technologically 
innovative service using gap-filler transmission methods. Satellite DMB subscribers were 1.85 
million in 2008. TU media had to have 2.5 million subscribers to go beyond the break-even point. 
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However, TU Media suffered losses each year since its introduction because it did not meet the 
required subscriber (Jung, 2009:235). As of 2009, TU Media's cumulative net loss reached KRW 
314 billion (Kim, 2010:35). According to TU Media’s survey in 2005, more than 80% of its 
viewers used Satellite DMB to watch live terrestrial TV programmes or terrestrial TV’s repeating 
programmes. It seems that TU Media had difficulties in management because of their lack of killer 
contents (Jung, 2009:235). 
Figure 9 Satellite DMB's Revenue in 2005-2012 (KRW, Millions) 
 
Source: KCC (2016a)  
 
 Finally, TU Media failed to meet the breakeven point and abolished its business after seven 
years of its launch. It seems that high revenues were generated in the last three years from 2010 to 
2012, because they sold existing assets and technology patents in this period. Meanwhile, Satellite 
DMB’s revenue share within total broadcast market in the year 2012 was only 0.1%, and TU Media 
recorded loss of KRW 74,163,646 in that year. Consequently, satellite DMB service do not exist 
in Korea after 2012.  
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Figure 10 Terrestrial DMB's Revenue in 2008-2015 (KRW, Millions) 
 
Source: KCC (2016a)  
 
 Terrestrial DMB was first introduced in 2005, the same year when Satellite DMB was 
introduced. It was operated by South Korea's own developed technology as in the case of Satellite 
DMB. Governments and corporations made great efforts to export Terrestrial DMB technologies 
to the overseas countries, but it was not very successful (Kim, 2010). As of 2015, Terrestrial DMB 
had 6 operators, and it can be divided into major terrestrial broadcaster and the other DMB-only 
operators. Major Terrestrial DMB broadcasters were KBS, MBC, SBS and they manage their DMB 
channels as an extra channel to their existing terrestrial TV services. And there were three other 
DMB-only platforms. Unlike Satellite DMB, which adopted subscription model, terrestrial DMB 
was run by advertisement revenue as it was their main source of income. 
 Regarding its impact on broadcasting market, terrestrial DMB's share of revenue was 0.1% 
within total broadcasting market in 2015. Meanwhile, the three DMB-only operators excluding 
KBS, MBC, and SBS recorded a net loss of KRW 997,038,000 in 2015. In addition, the percentage 
of people who use terrestrial DMB for more than one day in the last three months was steadily 
dropping from 22.2% to 18.9% in 2011-2015. The reason for this decline was the increase in 
penetration of smartphones and the introduction of online video platforms such as Over the Top 
(OTT) service providers (KISDI, 2016c). 
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6.1.7. Video on Demand (VOD)  
On the other hand, Video on Demand (VOD) is an interactive broadcasting service that enables 
viewers purchase a TV programme when they wanted to watch. Since it creates an interactive and 
non-linear type of TV viewing, it could be said that VOD is a broadcasting service that has 
telecommunication’s characteristics.  
 
Figure 11 Video-on-Demand (VOD) Revenue in 2012-2015 (KRW, Millions) 
 
Source: KCC (2016b) 
 
 As shown above, VOD services were provided by cable TV and IPTV, and their revenues 
grew steadily from 2012 to 2015. Furthermore, of all paid subscription revenue (paid by 
subscribers each month), the proportion of VOD sales continued to grow. More specifically, the 
share of VOD service revenue in total Pay TV subscription revenue was steadily increasing from 
17.7% to 22.9% in 2013-2015 (KCC, 2016b:296-297). Among all VOD sales, IPTV's VOD market 
share accounted for 73.4%, while cable TV accounted for 26.6%. In addition, as shown in the 
graph below, viewers using VOD in Korea mainly used the service to watch films and terrestrial 
TV programs.  
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Figure 12 Video-on-Demand (VOD) Revenue Share by Genre in 2015 
 
Source: KCC (2016b)  
 
6.1.8. DATA PP  
In Korea, a channel operator is called a program provider (PP). It is a provider of channels such as 
news, drama, entertainment, sport, film, etc. They offer their channels to cable TV, satellite TV 
and IPTV. PP is the sector where the largest revenue is generated in Korean broadcasting market.  
Their total revenues are 6 trillion Won, which account for 40% of total broadcasting market 
revenues in Korea, where the total revenue is 15 trillion Won (almost 10 billion in GBP). There 
are three kinds of PPs. The first one is home shopping PPs, which sell products such as clothes, 
cooking tools, etc., by promoting it on broadcasting channels. They generate almost half of total 
revenues in the PP market (about 3 trillion won). But they are not thought to be a genuine 
broadcasting business, as they do not sell broadcasting content itself. Second, General PPs are 
providers of news, entertainment, dramas, movies, and sports channels. The third is Data PP. They 
are channels that have interactive function. Thus, Data PP can be an example of convergent media. 
Data PP, for example, can provide a relevant information such as a star football player's career 
history while you watch football game, and your favourite team’s recent match results, etc. In 
addition, it provides information such as weather, news, and traffic as well as Internet and e-
commerce services. More precisely, there are two sub-categories in Data PP. The first one is 
‘Website-like Data PP’ and the second one is ‘Interactive-Broadcasting Data PP’. The ‘Website-
like Data PP’ channel is a channel composed only of text and graphics without signal of 
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broadcasting image, similar to an internet web page. Users can enjoy various entertainment 
services such as games, karaoke, weather information, stock information, and news information 
on the channel. Meanwhile, the Interactive-Broadcasting Data PP channel shows general 
broadcasting just like a General PP channels, but provides extra information related to the 
broadcasting contents in real time, so that viewers can get more information on the programme, 
and they can even buy something while they watch the channel. Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS) 
introduced the first Interactive-Broadcasting Data PP channel in Korea in 2002.  
 The main source of revenue for Data PP is e-commerce, and interactive advertisement (Jung, 
2009:243). As of 2015, Data PP accounted for 0.5% of total broadcasting market revenue. Its 
revenue share in total PP sales was 1.2%. Data PP’s revenue is decreasing as shown in the graph 
below. However, it makes some profits every year. As with the DMB discussed above, the impact 
of Data PPs was not very significant in the whole broadcasting market.  
 
Figure 13 Data PP's Revenue in 2008-2015 (KRW, Millions) 
 
Source: KCC (2016a) 
 
6.2. Device convergence 
So far, some examples of network convergence were examined. In this part, the examples of device 
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For example, a connected computer can be a good example of device convergence, as newspaper, 
radio and television can be used on the connected computer. Basically, the emergence of device 
convergence was caused by the convergence of computers and telecommunication. As noted earlier, 
the convergence between computer and telecommunication was the first media convergence model 
that was presented in the 1980s. However, as computer technology develops, small computer 
devices such as Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), smart phones, or tablet PCs were introduced. In 
this part, the penetration and the use of smart devices will be examined.  
 
Convergence or divergence?  
Computers and smart devices show very interesting results in terms of media convergence. 
Because, in one point of view, these can be understood as the phenomenon of media convergence. 
However, in another point of view, it can be seen as diversification in media.  
 First, from the viewpoint of existing mass media, such as newspapers, a smart device is 
another content distribution window. For example, in the past, newspapers could only be read in 
paper. But now newspapers are available on computers, smartphones and tablets. The contents of 
the newspaper article are almost the same, but we can use different devices to read the article. 
More precisely, it can be published as paper newspapers, but it can also be seen on its Internet 
website, or by using the newspaper app in a smartphone or tablet PC. This phenomenon is 
occurring not only in newspapers but also in broadcasting. Korean public broadcasters, such as 
KBS, MBC, and EBS, offer a variety of online websites (KCC, 2016a). They distribute their 
contents using at least five online platforms, including YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, 
and smartphone applications. It can be explained by using the word ‘multiplatform’ too. 
Multiplatform means the distribution of contents through various platforms.  
 However, when the same phenomenon was seen from the user’s viewpoint, those media 
devices are absorbed and converged into a single medium. In fact, PCs and smart devices are 
convergent media where the user can enjoy existing media contents – such as newspapers, radio, 
television, and movies. Thus, it is notable that, the Internet, has a somewhat contradictory character 
when it was seen in the framework of media convergence. That is, the Internet is a convergent 
media by itself, but it helps diversify other existing mass media. The following is the penetration 
rate of PC and smart devices in Korea.  
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Figure 14 PC and Smart Device Penetration in 2011-2016 
 
Source: KISDI (2016b) 
 
 As shown in the graph above, it can be confirmed that the total penetration rate including 
PCs and smart devices grew in 2011-2016. Among them, smartphone’s penetration was growing 
at the fastest pace. In 2011, only 21.6% of the respondents had smartphone, but only after five 
years, it was increased to 81.6%. According to KCC (2016c:11), smartphones became the most 
'essential' medium in Korea, and their impact on the society was increasing. Tablet PC, on the other 
hand, was increased slightly, but was still remained at a low rate of penetration (4.6%). When it 
comes to laptop PC, its penetration rate was steady, marking around 25%. Meanwhile, the 
penetration rate of desktop PC was gradually declined in the period. Therefore, it seems that the 
increase in the penetration rate of smart devices led to the decrease in the penetration of desktop 
PC. Nonetheless, the total number of media devices held per person has increased, as people 
purchased additional smart devices in addition to the desktop PC or laptop PC.  
 Therefore, it seems more reasonable to call this phenomenon ‘device diversification’ rather 
than device convergence. This conclusion is not different to Henry Jenkins (2006), as he argued 
that new convergence media would emerge, but that would not be a convergence to a single ‘black 
box’, and that more and more devices would emerge. In a similar vein, Fagerjord and storsul 
(2007:22) also argued that “it is common practice in most industries to offer different models, 
targeting the needs of various user groups. The mechanics of capitalism makes it perfectly sensible 
that there are more rather than fewer types of terminals.” 
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 When it comes to the usage pattern of smart devices users, a similar tendency could be found 
in smartphone users and smart tablet users. According to KCC (2016c:134), on the other hand, 
only 30% of smartphone users have viewed TV programs using smartphones. Similarly, just 7% 
of smartphone user listen to the radio using smartphone. Also, only about 12% of people have seen 
movies using smartphones. In other words, 70% of smartphone users do not watch TV programs 
at all, 93% do not listen to any radio at all, and 88% do not watch movies at all. In the meantime, 
the most common use of smartphones in regard to mass media was to read newspaper or magazine 
articles. About 80% of smartphone users responded that they regularly read newspaper magazine 
articles using their smartphones. Smart tablet also showed similar results. Only 28% of the 
respondents said they use a tablet PC to watch TV programs more than a day in a week. In the case 
of radio, only 4% of all tablet PC users listen for more than 1 day a week, and 15% of users watch 
movies more than 1 day a week. That means, 72% of tablet PC users do not watch TV broadcast 
at all, 96% do not use any radio at all, and 85% do not watch movies at all. However, the rate of 
use for newspaper or magazine articles was the highest at about 60%. 
 Furthermore, according to KCC (2016c:16), it was confirmed that among TVs, PCs, and 
smartphones that were used to watch real-time TV programs, TV was still the most popular 
medium to watch live TV, as 97% of respondent said that they watch TV using TV device. However, 
it was found that more and more people use smartphones while watching TV. According to KCC 
(ibid.), 48.7% of respondents in 2016 use their smartphones when they watch TV, and 66.3% of 
them use it for chatting or SNS. 
 In conclusion, users of smart devices tend to use new smart devices 'in addition' to traditional 
media use. In other words, this means that people use more media for more diverse purposes. As 
a result, the diversity of media device and usage pattern was increased due to the advent of 
converged smart devices. To summarise, new smart devices emerged as convergent media, but the 
overall tendency was moving toward 'coexistence' or 'co-evolution' rather than making other to 
disappear.  
 
6.3. The impact of media convergence on markets 
In this section, the overall influence of media convergence will be examined by observing Korean 
broadcasting and telecommunication markets. Specifically, the revenue share of IPTV, DMB and 
Data PP in the overall broadcasting market will be examined. And then, the market share of cable 
TV operators in the entire telecommunication market will be examined. By examining the revenue 
of these convergent media, the thesis will present the degree of influence of media convergence 
on Korean broadcasting and telecommunication markets. 
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6.3.1. The impact of media convergence on broadcasting market 
The figure below shows the total revenue shares of players in broadcasting market in 2015.  
 
Figure 15 Broadcasting Market Share in 2015 (by Revenue) 
 
Source: KCC (2016a)  
 
 When it comes to broadcasting market, IPTV's revenue share was 12.5% of the total 
broadcasting market. As seen above, IPTV attracted a large number of subscribers in a relatively 
short period of time thanks to the support from government, unfair trade through bundled products 
and unlawful subsidies offered to customers. Therefore, it is difficult to say that it was successful 
in the broadcasting market due to the merit of its service quality. Rather, it seems more appropriate 
to understand its success as the result of the government’s commitment that was based on the 
‘convergence discourse’ discussed in the previous chapter. On the other hand, the market share of 
Data PP was just about 0.5%. And as shown above, its total revenue was decreasing. Meanwhile, 
Satellite DMB was withdrawn since 2012. In the last year of operation, the revenue of Satellite 
DMB accounted for only 0.1% of total market revenue (KCC, 2013). On the other hand, three 
terrestrial DMB-only operators made massive deficits, and their sales revenue was only 0.1% of 
the total broadcasting market. In conclusion, the influence of convergent media on Korean 
broadcasting market was generally insignificant. However, the growth of VOD can be seen as an 
important move. But, the importance of Data PP and DMB seems not to be increased in the future. 
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Especially, in the case of DMB, the amount of their deficit was increasing, due to other internet-
based audiovisual service was introduced with the increase of smart phone use (KISDI, 2016c). 
As whole, the convergent media (IPTV, DMB, and Data PP) account for 13.1% of the broadcasting 
market. However, this is largely due to the growth of IPTV which made 12.5%. The remaining 
convergent media, DMB and Data PP, was not influential in the market. 
 When it comes to the traditional broadcasting, terrestrial broadcaster's revenue share was 
26.8%. Cable TV accounted for 14.8%. Despite the recent decline in market share, cable TV's 
revenue share was still higher than IPTV, accounting for almost half of Pay TV sales. On the other 
hand, General PP made 19.3% of market share. Therefore, when combined those three main 
broadcasting operators, they account for 60.9% of the total broadcasting market. In conclusion, in 
the Korean broadcasting market, terrestrial broadcasters, cable TVs and general PPs were still 
dominant.  
 
6.3.2. The impact of media convergence on telecommunication market 
There are three major telecommunications markets: Landline telephone, mobile telephone, and 
internet broadband markets. The telecommunication services of cable television are landline 
telephone service and internet broadband service. Meanwhile, there exists a mobile 
communication service provided by cable TV operators. As discussed above, cable TV’s landline 
service and internet broadband services had some impacts on telecom market. In this part, the 
actual impact of media convergence on the telecommunication markets will be examined. 
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Figure 16 Landline Telephone and Internet Broadband Market in 2015 (by Revenue) 
 
Source: KISDI (2016a)  
 
 As the figure above shows, cable TV's share in the telecom market was around 8%. On the 
other hand, it can be seen that the share of sales of the three dominant telecom carriers is still very 
high in these markets. Precisely, the three dominant players, KT, SK and LG accounted for 89% 
of the landline and broadband markets. Compared to IPTV's rapid penetration in broadcasting 
market, the influence of convergent media service of cable TV on telecommunication market was 
not significant.  
 
6.4. Conclusion 
This chapter examined what convergent media were emerged in Korea, and to what extent the 
convergent media actually influenced on Korean broadcasting and telecommunication markets. In 
the case of network convergence, there were converged services including cable TV’s landline 
telephone service and broadband service. On the other hand, there were broadcasting services 
converged with telecommunication’s network and telecommunication’s interactive characters. 
Accordingly, IPTV, bundle service, Satellite and Terrestrial DMB, VOD and Data PP were 
examined as the converged media products. In general, it was shown that the convergent media’s 
influence on broadcasting and telecommunication markets was not significant. Among those 
convergent media, IPTV and bundle service seemed the most influential media services. However, 
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it seems that the quick penetration of those convergent media service was not purely by their own 
merits. As some studies showed, the Korean government drove the development of IPTV. 
Furthermore, as a lobbyist from cable TV said, the success of bundle service seems due to the 
successful lobbying and marketing activities from big telecommunication companies. Having said 
that, therefore, the overall impact of converged media on broadcasting and telecommunication 
markets can be less regarded than it shows. When it comes to device convergence, the spread of 
converged smart devices increased the diversity of device in a household and the diversification in 
the media usage pattern. Through these examinations, it was found that device convergence did 
not lead to the emergence of one-size-fits-all device. In the meantime, it was difficult to find a 
certain phenomenon called ‘content convergence’ or ‘platform convergence’ in Korean media 
markets. And it is notable that, in Korea, broadcasting programmes were categorised for a long 
time according to the classification of traditional genre concepts such as news, drama, 
entertainment, documentary, art, and sports, and this classification was not changed in the given 
period of examination (see KCC, 2016b). 
 In addition, Fagerjord and Storsul (2007) also examined some European cases to see how 
the media convergence actually brought about changes in different levels in media ecology: 
Content, platform, network and terminal (device). For example, at the network level, network 
convergence was found, such as broadcast services utilizing telecommunication’s networks. At the 
same time, new forms of networks such as Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) and other 
various mobile networks (i.e. GSM, UMTS) were emerged. In the case of terrestrial television 
networks, continuity has also been found, as the traditional functions of TV were still maintained. 
They saw the reason for this network diversification because people are using the network for a 
variety of purposes. In addition to the network, similar trends have been found in the areas of 
terminals (devices), services, rhetoric (genre), market and regulation. Based on the observation, 
they argued that while some convergence phenomenon was occurred, the opposite phenomenon, 
the diversification, also occurred in the process. Therefore, they contended that:  
 
“Digitization contributes to the blurring of boundaries between different media. This does, 
however, not imply that boundaries disappear. Rather, what we see is a stronger differentiation 
of media in which elements from earlier separate media and sectors are combined in new 
ways with new boundaries. These developments are all related to digital technology – but 
apart from that, the phenomena are quite diverse. […] What we see are several parallel 
developments resulting in a higher level of complexity, with new alignments of networks, 
terminals, services and markets. Labelling them all under the one umbrella of ‘convergence’ 
does not contribute to a better understanding of the ongoing changes” (Fagerjord and Storsul, 
2007:27). 
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 In the next chapter, the governance changes caused by media convergence will be examined. 
As noted earlier, market convergence can develop to policy (or regulatory) convergence, as a 
convergent framework for media policy and regulation is needed for converged media markets. 
Accordingly, some countries including Korea adopted the integration between broadcasting 
agencies and telecommunication agencies. The Korean case of policy convergence showed some 
typical phenomena in the process of integration, as well as some unusual side-effects from the 
policy convergence. Therefore, it can be said that the analysis of policy convergence in Korea 
generates new empirical evidence, and also it can give some practical recommendations for better 
media governance.  
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7. The influence of policy convergence on media policy 
governance  
In this chapter, the influence of policy convergence on Korean media policy governance will be 
examined. In the first part, the historical background of the establishment of KCC will be examined. 
In the second part, KCC’s governance system and its political independence issues will be 
investigated. In the third part, the hegemony struggle happened in KCC will be examined. In 
conclusion part, some theoretical findings and practical recommendations will be discussed.  
 
7.1 Turf war between agencies 
As convergence develops in the market, some duplicated areas emerged. This led to the conflict 
between media companies and relevant media agencies. The following table shows conflict zones 
between three media agencies involved in the discussion of media convergence. KBC was a 
broadcasting policymaker as well as a regulator and was an independent agency, MCT was a 
government department who managed cultural policies and some parts of broadcasting industry. It 
was mostly relevant to the promotion of export of broadcasting contents to overseas market. Lastly, 
MIC was another government department which was in charge of policymaking and supporting 
for telecommunication sector.  
 
Table 9 Conflict Areas Caused by Media Convergence 
Organisations Conflict areas 
KBC vs MCT Broadcasting contents and broadcasting advertisement 
KBC vs MIC Introduction of IPTV and other new convergent media  
MIC vs MCT Online digital contents 
Source: Convergence Committee (2008)  
 
7.1.1. Dispute over IPTV 
Among those conflict areas, the most urgent issue was the introduction of IPTV, as it was thought 
that the introduction was being too delayed, whereas relevant technologies for the service were 
ready. However, the introduction of IPTV was not easy, for the dispute between KBC and MIC 
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were so severe. The following table shows the history of development of IPTV in Korea, as well 
as the dispute between KBC and MIC over the jurisdiction of IPTV.  
 
Table 10 The History of Dispute between KBC and MIC over IPTV 
Year Events 
1998 The first IPTV model was introduced. But live broadcasting was not possible. 
1999 
‘Broadcasting Reformation Committee’ established. The Committee suggested the 
introduction of policy convergence for the first time. But it was not realised.  
2000 Instead, an expanded KBC was established. 
2002 
SK Telecom succeeded to develop live broadcasting technology for IPTV.  
KBC and MIC conflicted as they wanted to be in charge of IPTV policy.  
A temporary committee was established by KBC and MIC, but the dispute was not 
resolved.    
2003 
President Roh pledged to introduce an integrated media policy institution.    
KBC and MIC kept fighting on the jurisdiction of IPTV and the way of 
establishing a converged policy institution.  
2004 
Government tried to arbitrate in the dispute between KBC and MIC by establishing 
some committees where KBC and MIC can discuss it jointly, but it was not 
successful.  
2005 
KT showed a technologically completed version of IPTV in a showcase.  
(But still there was no official IPTV service yet, due to the conflict between KBC 
and MIC. As the introduction of IPTV was too much delayed, many stakeholders 
criticised it.) 
The conflict between KBC and MIC reached the highest point ever. They tried to 
lead the situation by proposing a bill or revising a related law.  
2006 Convergence Committee was established.  
2007 IPTV Act was passed in National Assembly.  
2008 
KCC was established by Lee government.  
IPTV licence was given to major telecommunication companies.   
Source: Lee and Kim (2006); Kim, Sung and Jung (2008) 
As shown above, the first model of IPTV was created in 1998, and a complete model was made in 
2005, but the service was delayed until 2008. The delay was due to the turf war between KBC and 
MIC. Thus, it was thought that the merging of KBC and MIC could be a solution to finish the 
dispute. In other words, it was becoming more obvious that the matter of governance structure and 
the introduction of IPTV should be done together. Indeed, Convergence Committee’s white paper 
noted that “it was decided that the completion of the reorganisation should be discussed first, 
before discussing the introduction of IPTV and other agendas” (Convergence Committee, 2008:29). 
In other words, since the ‘turf war’ between KBC and MIC became the most obvious barrier for 
the introduction of IPTV, the committee thought that if the two institutions were merged, the 
introduction of IPTV can be achieved afterwards.  
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 Meanwhile, as the focus was fixed to the arbitration between media policy institutions, the 
overall discussion in Convergence Committee became like a ‘administrative engineering’ 
discussion (Shin and Venkatech, 2008; Youn, 2008). In a similar vein, Kim and Youn (2010) 
criticised that the committee did not show proper interest in other important factors in media, and 
they too much focused on the administrative reshuffle for media agencies throughout the reform 
process. In the meantime, this kind of conflict was not a totally new happening in Korean media 
history. In fact, whenever a new medium such as cable TV and satellite TV were introduced in 
Korea, there were conflicts between relevant policy institutions such as government department 
and media agency (Lee and Kim, 2007).  
 
7.1.2. Comparison of the reform plans of KBC, MIC and MCT 
As shown above, there were conflict areas between KBC, MIC and MCT, and particularly the 
dispute between KBC and MIC on IPTV had long history. Moreover, they had different views on 
the way of the integration between them. The table below presents their different suggestions on 
the way of media governance reform. 
 
Table 11 Reform Plans Suggested by KBC, MIC and MCT 
 Reform Plan 
K
B
C 
1. The Independence of the institution should be guaranteed  
2. As media convergence is rapidly developing, the full integration of 
broadcasting and telecom policy is desirable.  
3. The integrated institution should deal with both promotional and regulatory 
policies 
4. The integrated body can be a ministry or a commission  
M
I
C 
1. Separate promotional policy institution and regulatory policy institution  
2. The regulatory policy institution needs to be a commission model.  
3. The regulatory policy institution should be attached to the government, to make 
it easy to cooperate with the promotional institution, which is government 
ministry.  
4. Broadcasting’s independence, fairness and impartiality should be ensured. 
5. Content standard regulation should be separated from the government, to ensure 
the political independence of broadcasting.  
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M
C
T 
1. Separate promotional policy body and regulatory policy body. 
2. Promotional policy should belong to government ministry. 
3. Broadcasting content promotion for MCT, and network promotion for MIC. 
4. Regulatory policy can be dealt by a non-government regulator.   
Source: Convergence Committee (2008) 
 
As shown in the above table, the three policy institutions came up with different reform plans with 
different reasons. However, their rationales for reorganisation plans were difficult to be 
compromised to each other. As a result, it was difficult to close the gaps in Convergence Committee.  
 There were two contentious issues in the discussion. First issue was whether to establish an 
integrated organisation responsible for both promotional and regulatory policies, or to establish 
two separate institutions which respectively oversees promotional policy and regulatory policy. 
Second issue was whether the integrated institution should be a ministry or a commission. The 
ministry means a normal government department where a top minister has absolute power and 
responsibility in decision-making process. And as the minister is appointed by the president, it can 
be said that president can influence on the decision making process of a ministry. On the other 
hand, the commission model is an institution where its members share the power and responsibility 
of decision-making. However, this cannot be absolutely free from political power, as the 
commissioners are normally appointed by government or president. But the institution’s decision-
making process can be more democratic, as the commissioners make their votes in policymaking, 
based on what they discussed.  
 Regarding the form of converged institution, the three institutions have proposed different 
plans. In the case of KBC, it first stressed the independence of the agency as a very important 
principle in adopting policy convergence. And they recognised that media convergence was in 
'rapid progress', and accordingly, they thought the establishment of an integrated institution was 
an urgent task. Therefore, they suggested an integrated commission model that oversee both 
promotional and regulatory policies. They were the one who suggested the most comprehensive 
model, among those three parties.  
 On the other hand, MIC proposed to establish separated institutions that respectively deals 
with promotional and regulatory policies. More precisely, they suggested to make a government 
ministry that manages promotional policy and to make another commission-style regulator that 
belongs to the government. Furthermore, in regard to the content standard regulation, MIC 
proposed the establishment of a non-ministry institution in order to guarantee political and social 
impartiality in broadcasting contents. 
 The MCT also proposed the establishment of a separate organisations for promotional and 
regulatory policies, similar to MIC. And as MIC proposed, MCT also argued that promotional 
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policy needs to be handled by government ministries, and the regulatory policy can be dealt by a 
commission-style regulatory body. However, in the case of promotional policy, they wanted to 
separate content promotion and network promotion. MCT, who was in charge of some content 
promotion work, wanted that content promotion function is not be moved to other institution, while 
network promotion policy can be belonged to MIC.  
 In sum, the KBC suggested a wholly integrated commission that has both promotional and 
regulatory functions. MIC proposed a separated model, making a communication ministry for 
promotional policies and another commission-style institution that is dedicated for regulation. 
MCT had similar approach with MIC, but they wanted to separate content and network policies. 
Although they proposed different models, they all agreed to adopt policy convergence by 
reforming governance structure, in order to prepare for so-called ‘media convergence era’. 
 
Expanding the scope of authority  
Meanwhile, when we examine those three parties reform plans, it can be found that everyone in 
the discussion wanted to maintain or expand their authority, not losing any of their authorities. In 
other words, none of them wanted to abandon any of the authorities that they already possessed. 
In addition, they did not want dynamic changes. To put differently, they did not want to make a 
system that they are not familiar with. More precisely, KBC suggested to establish a fully 
integrated one, which is the most similar structure to theirs. In other words, as they had promotional 
and regulatory functions together, they wanted to keep this structure, even when they become a 
fully integrated organisation.  
 On the other hand, MIC wanted to establish a system that is the most similar to their system 
at that time. Then, MIC was responsible for promotional policy as a government department, where 
the minister had ultimate power and responsibility. Therefore, they wanted to maintain the form, 
by suggesting the separation between promotional and regulatory functions. Meanwhile, there was 
Telecommunication Commission, which was in charge of telecom regulation. Their job was such 
as the arbitration of company dispute and the regulation of online contents. Telecommunication 
Commission was an affiliate quasi-government institution attached to MIC. Therefore, MIC 
literally had management power on Telecommunication Commission. Thus, as they were familiar 
with this structure, MIC suggested that the converged regulator should be attached to the 
government.  
 Lastly, MCT wanted to separate promotional ministry and regulatory commission as MIC 
proposed. At that time, they only had a little part of content promotion work. And the most of 
promotional authorities related to broadcasting content was belonged to KBC. Thus, MCT wanted 
to take advantage of the reform process to obtain more authorities in broadcasting policy. But the 
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content promotion was all they wanted. They contended that content policy and network policy 
should be separated, and MIC might have the authority on it.  
 On the other hand, Fair Trade Commission (FTC) also tried to expand their authorities over 
broadcasting market. Fair Trade Commission is a quasi-government institution that oversees 
competitions in general markets. However, they did not have clear authority regarding 
broadcasting markets. This was because the competition regulation function was also given to 
KBC, and traditionally KBC was in charge of the competition issues in broadcasting. But FTC 
showed that they also wanted to have more power in broadcasting market. Thus, FTC presented 
the reason that they, who has expertise in regulating competition, are better suited to oversee 
competition issues than KBC, who basically has expertise mostly on cultural matters. However, 
KBC refuted this argument, saying that the competition in broadcasting field is not like those in 
other industries. Precisely, KBC argued that the competition in broadcasting market involves 
cultural as well as economic factors, which in turn makes the competition regulation more 
complicated than other industries (Convergence Committee, 2008:105).   
 In conclusion, those parties tried to expand or at least maintain their powers and systems in 
media governance. Consequently, KBC, MIC, and MCT did not lose their authorities at all. The 
reason why all the agencies were able to maintain their authority is probably that the Convergence 
Committee itself was quite close to those government departments. That is, it might be burdensome 
for the prime minister to coordinate those ministries later, if the Convergence Committee was 
ended up with a loss to any of them. In other words, the prime minister presumably had to 
implement a win-win strategy, or compromise strategy for all agencies in the debate process. In 
the following section, Convergence Committee’s final decision on governance reform will be 
examined in detail.  
 
7.1.3. Convergence Committee’s contradictory settlement 
The difference between the functions and principles of broadcasting and telecommunication 
became more evident in the process of institutional integration. Although the Convergence 
Committee held many meetings with the relevant ministers as well as the stakeholders in private 
sectors, the different stances of the three major institutions were unchanged. Nonetheless, it has 
been universally acknowledged that the integration of broadcasting and telecommunications 
should be accomplished. In other words, they all saw that media convergence was taking place at 
a very fast pace, and therefore they should adopt policy convergence very soon (Convergence 
Committee, 2008:77).  
 But as examined above, there were two critical issues that should be settled if the policy 
convergence is to happen. The first was whether they will converge promotional and regulatory 
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functions altogether by making a wholly integrated institution. The second was whether the newly 
established institution should be a government body or an independent body.  
 On the first issue, Convergence Committee asserted that “it is difficult to distinguish 
promotional and regulatory functions in the era of convergence. And more importantly, having two 
or more organisations in broadcasting and telecommunication would cause serious conflict and 
inefficiency. Therefore, it would be desirable to integrate rather than separate them” (ibid., 124). 
Thus, the long-lasting conflict between KBC and MIC became the key reason for integration. In 
fact, the conflict between KBC and MIC was the most clearly identified issue during the whole 
process of discussion in Convergence Committee. Accordingly, the Convergence Committee 
finally made a decision to just merge KBC and MIC, in order to prevent potential conflicts in the 
future. Consequently, Korea adopted the FCC model of the US, or the MIC model of Japan, which 
has both promotional and regulatory functions in a single body.  
 On the second issue, Convergence Committee made a decision for the converged body to 
be a mixture of a ministry and a commission. As noted above, the Convergence Committee 
acknowledged that in terms of promotional policies a government ministry is a better option, as its 
decision-making structure is better for fast decision-making. And the committee also admitted that 
in terms of regulation, a commission would be better, because it can increase the transparency and 
impartiality in the policymaking process (ibid., 76). However, after choosing to merge both 
promotional and regulatory functions in pursuit of preventing conflicts between policy bodies, it 
was not easy for them to decide whether they should make KCC as a ministry or a commission. 
Finally, the committee proposed a compromised, more adequately, a ‘contradictory’ model for 
KCC. More specifically, the Convergence Committee decided to organise KCC in the form of a 
commission, because KCC was to oversee media regulation. But at the same time, as KCC was to 
have promotional function as well, the committee suggested to add the character of ministry model 
to commission model, by letting president to have some hierarchical relationship with KCC’s 
commissioners. Consequently, the committee adopted a contradictory model for KCC in which 
commission and ministry models are mixed.  
 But the problem was that this model could eventually mean almost nothing but a 
compromise. This is because those models’ characters can collide to each other. More specifically, 
a ministry model is good for efficiency and speed. However, introducing this model may result in 
the reduction of transparency and impartiality compared to the commission model. Meanwhile, a 
commission model is good for transparency and impartiality. However, introducing this model can 
result in the reduction of efficiency and speed. Therefore, taking both model into a single body 
may just result in the neutralisation of all advantages of both models. As a result, KCC had to be 
divided into two different agencies later. This will be discussed in more detail below. In the 
  130 
following part, the KCC’s governance structure and their issues regarding their political 
independence will be examined in more detail.  
 
7.2. KCC’s governance system and independence 
In this part, the process of the establishment of KCC and some issues regarding its governance 
system and political independence will be examined.  
 
7.2.1. How KCC was established 
Convergence Committee proposed a bill for the establishment of KCC to National Assembly in 
2007. National Assembly discussed the bill, but the bill was rejected, for they thought that 
promotional and regulatory policies are better to be separated. The reason for the separation was 
that the inclusion of the ministry character in commission system would undermine the nature of 
the commission system and make it difficult to secure transparency and impartiality (Jung, 2009). 
It was also suggested that the president should not have authority to appoint every five members 
in the commission, and National Assembly should involve in the appointment process. It seems 
that National Assembly worried about the concentration of power in government over media, if all 
KCC’s commissioners are appointed by government. Eventually, the KCC establishment bill was 
not passed in National Assembly.  
 However, when a new government came to power in 2008, the government established KCC 
when they formed new government structure. KCC was established as a commission that is 
attached to the president. The Convergence Committee’s bill was mostly accepted, but some 
amendments were made. Particularly, some specific clauses were amended to prevent KCC from 
being controlled by president. Also, some rules on the appointment of KCC members were 
amended, reflecting what National Assembly suggested. As a result, president could directly 
appoint only two out of five commissioners. In the past bill, the president was able to appoint all 
five commissioners directly. But in the amended bill, National Assembly could recommend three 
KCC commissioner for the appointment. But National Assembly had to recommend one 
commissioner who is suggested by the president’s party. Therefore, only two persons could be 
recommended by the opposite parties. Therefore, president can directly appoint two 
commissioners including the chairman of KCC, and his party can recommend one commissioner 
for the appointment by president. Consequently, president and his party could appoint three out of 
five members in KCC. It meant that president and his party can always hold the majority in KCC. 
The following figure shows how it works.  
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Figure 17 KCC's Governance System 
 
Source: Broadcasting Act 
 
 More specifically, according to Broadcasting Act, president basically appoints two members 
of KCC including the chairman, at his/her discretion. But KCC’s chairman ought to be qualified 
through an official hearing held by National Assembly, before he is officially appointed. Other 
three members are also appointed by president, but the appointment should be made on the 
recommendations from National Assembly. The National Assembly can recommend one 
commissioner chosen by president’s party, and other two commissioners chosen by the other 
parties. Consequently, three out of five members have always been people who has a political 
relationship with ruling party. This structure made the converged institution to be politically biased. 
Therefore, in KCC’s meeting records in 2008-2013, three commissioners of the ruling party and 
two commissioners of the opposition party formed two political coalitions and fought to each other 
when they need to discuss politically sensitive media policies. For example, in 2009, the ruling 
party and the opposition party members strongly conflicted over the matters of ownership 
deregulation in broadcasting and the broadcasting permissions for conservative newspapers. In a 
such process, final decisions were made through their votes. However, as the majority was always 
the commissioners who have relationship with president and his ruling party, even when all of the 
two commissioners from the opposition party side rejected a policy bill, they could not win. 
Therefore, when examining the meeting records of KCC commissioners, it was often the case that 
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after a heated debate between commissioners, the opposition member eventually gets angry, 
boycotts the decision process, and leaves the meeting room.  
 Meanwhile, as KCC was established as a quasi-government body, content standards policy 
had to be separated by establishing another institution that is not directly linked to president and 
government. Accordingly, Korea Communications Standards Commission (KCSC) was 
established at the same year when KCC was established, to oversee media contents standards. The 
following figure shows how the governance structure was made for KCSC.  
 
Figure 18 KCSC's Governance System 
 
Source: Broadcasting Act 
 
 As presented above, there are nine commissioners in KCSC including the Chairman of 
KCSC. President appoints three out of nine members, including the Chairman, at president’s 
discretion. Other six members are appointed by president too, but on the recommendations from 
both the chairman of National Assembly and relevant Small Committees in National Assembly. 
The Chairman of National Assembly recommends three candidates, and a selected small 
committee, which is in charge of the media legislation, recommends three candidates. But the 
Chairman of National Assembly should include a commissioner who is not relevant to president’s 
party. And the Small Committee can recommend one from ruling party and two from other parties. 
Consequently, it makes normally the 6:3 ratio in KCSC regarding political identities of the 
commissioners. Therefore, as in the case of KCC, the governance structure of KCSC had to be 
politically biased, in favour of the president and his party. As a result, it was evident that the 
number of penalties levied by KCSC was increased in 2008-2010, as the media content standards 
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institution gave it more frequently onto some politically sensitive broadcasting news programmes 
which criticised government policies (Choi 2010).  
 In line with this, C (1 Dec 2015), the chief manager of KCSC’s media content monitoring 
team, who worked in the institution since it was established in 2008, agreed that the politically 
biased structure of the KCSC eventually results in politically biased deliberation. She said, despite 
of many efforts and legal safeguards for political independence of KCSC, it was not achieved due 
to the obvious bias in the structure. Furthermore, she seemed recognising government’s informal 
interruptions to KCSC’s Chairman and other commissioners.  
 In the meantime, J (26 Nov 2015), who was in charge of KCC's terrestrial broadcasting 
policy, showed slightly different perspective on the matter of political independence of KCC. That 
is, he said, the lack of expertise of KCC’s committee members and the lack of social trust can be 
more fundamental factors that ruined the independence of KCC, than its governance structure. He 
cautiously mentioned that KCC’s commissioners do not have proper expertise on various issues in 
broadcasting, so they just had to follow what they were asked by the president and government. 
Moreover, as the commissioners were appointed politically, the political difference was the most 
salient feature between the commissioners, and this reinforced them to represent political parties 
they are related. Therefore, as they did not have enough skills in media policy and they were 
appointed by political logic, they could not detach themselves from political circle. Therefore, he 
argued that a thorough assessment for the commissioners’ expertise should be carried out before 
and after they are appointed, so that the expertise and professionalism of commissioners can be 
improved, and then political independence of KCC can be improved.  
 Meanwhile, the matter of political independence of KCC can be seen in the framework of 
regulatory state (Iosifidis, 2016). As media sector became more globalised and complicated 
environment, the government tries to set up more specific and professional regulator, but as they 
do not want to lose their power on the industry, they make a regulatory body that they can control 
when they need to. In a similar vein, Lunt and Livingstone (2012) argued that governments in 
today's global environment tends to maintain their control over the media by creating a new 
powerful regulator through a media system reorganisation. They said: “The state spawns new 
regulatory agencies that permit it to act in a more dispersed and flexible manner. Such regulatory 
reform enables the dispersal of power downwards, and functions of the state are performed through 
regulation rather than through legislation and the work of central government departments” (Lunt 
and Livingstone, 2012:5).  
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7.2.2. PSB’s political independence   
The most problematic result of policy convergence in Korea was the ruined political independence 
of PSB (Choi, 2012; Chung, 2013; Park, 2011; Yeon, Kim and Kim, 2013). Indeed, as briefly 
mentioned in Chapter 5, the massive strike of PSB in 2012 was a painful experience to Korean 
PSB. Many PSB workers lost their jobs, and their families had difficult times together, and many 
talented PSB workers were seriously discouraged. In this part, the changes in PSB governance, 
which was caused by policy convergence, will be examined.  
 Basically, KCC was given the authority to recommend and appoint PSB directors and CEO. 
This authority was transferred from KBC, which was a broadcasting policymaker-regulator, 
replaced by KCC. But KBC was an institution that did not have direct relationship with 
government, so they could make a good distance to president and the government (Son, Chang-
yong, 24 Nov 2015). However, KCC was established as an institution that is directly affected by 
president. And this resulted in decrease of political independence of PSB. The following figure 
shows the governance system between KCC and Korean PSBs.  
 
Figure 19 Governance System of Korean PSB 
 
Source: Broadcasting Act and other related Acts 
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 As shown above, KCC formed a politically biased structure, where president’s party always 
form the majority among the commissioners. But as KCC had an absolute power in the process of 
appointment of PSB directors and CEOs, the influence of president and his party could flow in to 
each PSB. Precisely, KCC had the authority to recommend all members in KBS board of directors 
(11 people) to president for appointment. By default, 7 out of 11 directors should be someone who 
was related to president’s party, which means, again, president’s party always forms majority in 
the KBS Board of Directors, as in KCC. Then KBS Board of Directors recommends a CEO 
candidate to president for an appointment. Thus, it can be said the biased political structure of 
KCC was reproduced in KBS Board of Directors and affected the appointment of KBS CEO. When 
it comes to Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) and Educational Broadcasting System 
(EBS), the situation is even worse. For them, KCC directly appoint every director and auditor. 
Then MBC Board of Directors appoints its CEO. The thing is that MBC Board of Directors was 
also meant to be politically biased group. When it comes to EBS, it gets even worse, as KCC 
appoints EBS CEO directly without any engagement of EBS board of directors. In conclusion, 
when it comes to the structural setting of PSB governance, there is no doubt that KCC has an 
absolute power in Korean PSB governance, and this could be problematic because KCC is not a 
politically independent institution.  
 In the interviews with PSB workers who had actively participated in PSB strike, it was 
confirmed that the political independence of PSB was dramatically ruined after the establishment 
of KCC. Lee, Geun-haeng (MBC, 25 Nov 2015) and Choi, Sun-wook (KBS, 2 Dec 2015) said that 
after KCC’s establishment, MBC and KBS were totally dominated by the president and his 
political party. Their experience shows the interruption of president and his party was harsh and 
obvious. For example, Lee, Geun-haeng of MBC was a producer who made famous current affairs 
programs like 'PD Note'. However, after participating in the strike, he was blacklisted by the 
executives of the company and was forced to move to the non-production section of the company. 
When I met him, he was working at a studio control room for DMB broadcasting. His job was to 
make sure that MBC's terrestrial DMB programme was being broadcast properly. When I asked 
him to tell his recent experiences about strike in MBC, He said:  
 
“I participated in strike for 39 days in 2010. MBC fired me first, but I was able to return after. 
Two years later, we (MBC trades union) have accumulated energy and struck again in 2012, 
but now we are totally defeated. Now it is completely like a Japanese colonial period. We are 
absolutely dominated by government. I feel like we are living in 1940 (Lee, Geun-haeng, 25 
Nov 2015)”.  
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 Furthermore, he added that the regime took control of the broadcast because they strongly 
believed that public broadcasting had turned left-wing during the last decade of the progressive 
government. In a similar vein, Son, Chang-yong (24 Nov 2015) who was a senior official of KCC 
and MSIP, who worked in broadcasting agencies for more than 20 years, also said that,  
 
“The progressive government was made by the big support of civil organisations. But when 
conservative party came to power, to their eyes, the PSB had changed a lot in the last ten 
years. So, they thought that they should restore the public broadcasting as they want it to be. 
Therefore, they have attempted to put conservative ideology into PSB by appointing 
conservative people as CEO of public broadcasters”. 
 
 However, when looking back the history of Korean PSB, this happening was not surprising. 
That is, PSB union’s strike after high-handed appointment was repeated in Korean broadcasting 
history, particularly since the 1980s (Joo, 2012). Having no clear remit and purpose, PSB was 
implemented as a tool for propaganda of dictatorship governments for many years since its 
introduction in the 1940s (Na 2012). Thus, it can be said that Korean PSB never enjoyed full 
autonomy throughout its history since then (Cho, 2012). Thus, the political independence of PSB 
has always been the main issue in Korean PSB studies since then (Hwang, 2008). However, in 
spite of thirty years of democratisation, the degree of political independence has not improved 
enough (Jung, 2011). This implies that there could be an inertia of social recognition on the degree 
of political independence. As the degree of political independence was set as low in the early years 
of PSB, this tradition can be continued for longer, even after some degree of political 
democratisation was achieved in the society.   
 Furthermore, the environment of PSB was not helpful for PSBs to focus on their political 
independence issues. That is, PSB itself became quite obsessed with ratings share in last few 
decades, because of the increase of competition in broadcasting markets since the 1990s. But this 
made PSB to be less influential, as their rationale for existence was not fulfilled well in the society. 
Rather than focusing on marginalised issues that other broadcasters avoid, PSB gave its focus on 
popular social issues that can lure many audiences (Cho, 2012). In other words, Korean PSB was 
not very much successful in differentiating themselves to other players, despite exclusive supports 
including licence fee, etc. But as Na (2012) said, PSB should be a unique public sphere, where 
diverse fields and opinions, and particularly, the voice of minor groups can be seen and heard. The 
next part will discuss natures and some critical lessons for political independence of media 
institutions by examining some European cases.  
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7.2.3. How political independence is made 
On the other hand, according to Schulz (2015), no regulatory body can be independent in a vacuum. 
All social institutions are influenced in terms of power, finance, and knowledge, and these factors 
work together at the same time. In addition, regulatory agencies are affected by three pillars: 
government, industry, and civil society. Thus, independence can be achieved by maintaining a 
well-balanced relationship with these surrounding subjects in arm's length. Therefore, the collapse 
of independence means that the balance of power has collapsed. 
 Meanwhile, Hans Bredow Institute for Media Research, et al (2011) argued that the 
independence of media regulators is determined by political, socio-cultural factors of each country. 
That is, even if media regulators are legally guaranteed to be independent, the independence that 
is practically implemented is determined by political and socio-cultural level of the country rather 
than the existence of law. In other words, there is no correlation between explicit independence 
and de facto independence.  
 Furthermore, Irion and Radu (2013) also argued that the degree of independence is not 
determined by whether the institutions is converged or separated. They said, “the fact that national 
specificities tend to be replicated in both converged and non-converged models could be the main 
reason why there is no empirical evidence that would support the superiority of the converged 
regulator over the more traditional IRA (Independent Regulatory Authority) specialized in 
television and radio regulation, in particular with regard to the issue of political interference” (Irion 
and Radu, 2013:41). 
 Therefore, it is necessary to keep in mind that there can be high possibility of concentration 
of power in a country like Korea where the history of democracy is short, and the politicisation 
level is high. Thus, for example, the reform of media policy organisation can be used as a tool to 
facilitate government’s access to media. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the political and 
socio-cultural elements of each country when carrying out the reform of the media policy system. 
Indeed, in the case of AGcom of Italy, regulatory convergence was used as a tool for more powerful 
politicisation (Psychogiopoulou, Casarosa and Kandyla, 2013:233). Furthermore, Hungary 
established a converged regulator that had substantial power, and despite the legally guaranteed 
independence of the regulator, the actual independence has not been achieved in practice (Irion 
and Radu, 2013:41). Thus, in countries that has not yet achieved mature political culture, it may 
be safer to avoid reform, or apply a more radical tools to block potential political interruption. If 
there is no such strong safeguard, then the media regulator can be politicised in the reform process, 
even though there are relevant laws that prohibits the interruption of political power. In conclusion, 
the key factors in political independence are the political culture of specific nation and informal 
activities in relation to media policy, rather than written words in law.   
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7.3. Hegemony struggle between KBC and MIC 
As KBC and MIC were quite different institutions in its style, administration, culture, scale, wages 
etc., it was difficult to make them truly converged. The conflict between the members of KBC and 
MIC continued even after policy convergence, but it soon resulted in the victory of MIC. 
Compared to KBC, MIC was more hierarchical and unified group, and telecommunication sector 
was bigger than broadcasting as much as 3-4 times by revenue. Notably, Korean 
telecommunication companies are sister companies to huge conglomerates such as LG and SK 
which is often called as Chaebol. They are among top 10 companies by capitalisation in Korean 
stock market as well. Moreover, as MIC members had the same qualification as public agents and 
there was clear hierarchy in them, so they tend to be more unified than KBC, which had free and 
individual characters compared to MIC.  
 Indeed, most interviewees saw that the conflict between MIC and KBC ended up with 
MIC’s victory. Son, Chang-yong (24 Nov 2015) said, “If the influence of MIC was 100, the 
influence of KBC, which was private organisation, was 80. People whose identity is a public 
official lead the organisation. Human relations in the bureaucratic world was strong. The 
bureaucrats had strong hegemony”. In line with this, H (7 Dec 2015) mentioned that:  
 
“Who succeeded and who fell? The KBC lost and MIC won. So, the decision makers that 
influence the major decisions of MSIP and KCC are all from MIC. They all have a 
telecommunication-friendly mindset. They do not have much interest in how to make 
broadcasts in the mid-to-long term, such as policy, regulation, restructuring … and in how to 
make broadcasts survive. Their main interest is in short-term performance. There is no 
guarantee that the former KBC would have done better, but it would have had a bit more 
interest in long-term policies”. 
 
 Meanwhile, according to Kim and Youn (2010), after the establishment of KCC, especially 
those who had high positions in KBC, received relatively lower positions when they came into 
KCC. In addition, they said that KBC employees’ opinions were not reflected well in KCC. As a 
result, many of KBC members were marginalised and left KCC. Furthermore, KCSC's content 
standard team manager, C (1 Dec 2015) also confirmed that employees from KBC had to be in a 
lower position in KCSC too, and their salary was reduced in KCSC compared to the amount they 
received in KBC. Thus, Kim and Youn (2010) argued that MIC's hegemony within KCC could be 
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one of the reasons for the prevalence of telecommunication policy principles, such as universal 
service, market competition and consumer satisfaction principles.  
 
7.4. Conclusion  
To sum up, KBC, MIC and MCT faced conflicts in the process of the introduction of IPTV and 
governance reform, and they wanted to expand their power and system. Meanwhile, Convergence 
Committee could not correct the disputes, but just followed and reflected what KBC, MIC and 
MCT wanted. As a result, KCC was established as a contradictory institution that deals with 
promotional and regulatory policies. This also resulted in KCC’s contradictory governance system, 
as it was a commission model as well as a government ministry model. In other words, it was 
established as a commission that is actually a government department. Furthermore, KCC was an 
institution that was vulnerable to political interruption from president and his party. This led KCC 
to be more like a government department. Meanwhile, the closeness between KCC and political 
power caused serious damage in the political independence of Korean PSBs too. In the meantime, 
the organisational conflict between KBC and MIC lasted longer, and it resulted in the victory of 
MIC in KCC. MIC had more unified culture and their industry was bigger than that of KBC.  
 Based on the examinations above, four practical suggestions for media policy can be drawn. 
First, media policy institutions tend to expand their power when they face governance reform. 
Furthermore, their opinions and preference were so strong, so it was too hard to solve it in the 
social debate. This hostile relationship between agencies continued even after the policy 
convergence was finished. Furthermore, if the social discussion is led by government, then it is 
more likely to be the administrative discussion, and also it can result in mere compromise between 
stakeholders. Therefore, it seems that a professional committee, which consists of media policy 
experts who do not have specific relationship or interest with media governance, can be a better 
option when discussing media governance reform. 
 Second, regulatory and promotional functions are better not to be merged into a single 
institution. As KCC’s case showed, the promotional and regulatory functions can collide when 
they are merged, and it can result in imbalance in policy provision. More precisely, Korean case 
showed that promotional policy is better managed by government department, and the regulation 
is better conducted by dedicated and independent regulator.  
 Third, the independence of media regulator is crucial for its function and expertise, and even 
for personal lives and social value. When the balance of distances from stakeholders around media 
policy institution was not managed well, the institution can incline to the one that is close to them. 
As KCC and PSB case showed, the loss of political independence of KCC resulted in social 
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conflict, confusion, distrust and discouragement of talented media workers. Furthermore, as 
examined in Chapter 5, the strong association of KCC and government resulted in KCC’s biased 
approach on media policy. The problem of association is that it harms the balance, and impartiality 
in media policy. Moreover, the association can also obstruct the institution’s opportunities to grow 
their expertise and professionalism too.  
 Fourth, when two different policy institutions are merged, an institution that has more 
unified culture and has bigger industry is more likely to win the hegemony in the integrated 
institution. Particularly, the institution and its industry tend to form a coalition, so if the lobbying 
power of the industry is bigger than the other one, then it is more likely that the institution can 
have hegemony in overall discussion as well as in the integrated organisation. Furthermore, it was 
confirmed that broadcasting policy institutions and telecommunication policy institutions were 
quite different in Korea, so it was so difficult to make chemical integration between them. This 
also implies that the separation of institutions could be another good strategy for the diversity in 
media governance.  
 The next chapter will examine the impact of policy convergence on actual media policies 
and sector-specific regulations. By examining the changes and continuities in KCC’s media 
policies in 2008-2017 and sector-specific media regulations after policy convergence, the degree 
of influence of media convergence on media policy and regulation will be analysed. 
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8. Changes and continuities in policies after policy 
convergence 
This chapter examines the influence of policy convergence on actual media policies. It consists of 
three parts and conclusion. The first part examines the changes in the policy systems of 
broadcasting and telecommunication in Korea. In this part, media laws and authorities are 
examined by comparing the legal system and authorities before and after policy convergence in 
Korea. The second part examines KCC’s promotional and regulatory policies. By examining the 
KCC’s annual reports in 2008-2017, this part analyses the overall achievements of the institution 
and the changes in their promotional and regulatory policies. In the third part, sector-specific media 
regulations are examined. As examined in previous chapters, sector-specific regulations were often 
regarded as marginalised in the process of policy convergence. However, some argued that the 
sector-specific regulations would not disappear because of policy convergence. But little research 
was done to check whether, and to what extent the prospect was realised in practice. Bearing this 
in mind, the third part examines how sector-specific regulations in broadcasting, 
telecommunication and newspaper were changed and whether these are still valid in practice after 
policy convergence. The conclusion part summarises and discusses the findings of this chapter.  
 
8.1. Legal and jurisdictional systems  
In this part, changes in media-related laws and jurisdiction of media policy institutions will be 
examined. To this end, relevant Acts in broadcasting and telecommunication sectors and the 
authorities of policy institutions will be examined. As policy convergence was adopted in 2008 
when KCC was established, the Act and authorities in 2007 and 2017 will be compared, to see to 
what extent policy convergence affected media policies and authorities in Korea. The following 
two tables show the laws and authorities respectively in 2007 and after 2007.  
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Table 12 Broadcasting and Telecommunication Laws and Jurisdictions in 2007 
Policies Broadcasting Telecommunication 
Law 
Broadcasting Act, 
etc. 
Telecommunication 
Business Act, etc. 
Promotional policy 
KBC (General) 
MIC (Technology) 
MIC 
MCT (Broadcasting 
Content) 
Regulatory 
policy 
Policymaking 
KBC 
MIC 
Application 
MIC, 
Telecommunication 
Commission 
Content 
regulation 
Telecommunication 
Ethics Commission 
 
 As shown in the table above, there were broadcasting and telecommunication Acts which 
sets general policies as of 2007. Promotional policies in broadcasting were generally managed by 
KBC. MIC only involved in small parts such as radio spectrum technologies, etc. MCT involved 
in investment and export of broadcasting contents. In broadcasting regulation, KBC had all 
responsibilities on it. In terms of Telecommunication’s promotional policies, MIC was fully in 
charge of it. When it comes to telecommunication regulation, MIC and other small affiliated 
commissions shared authorities on it. However, as policy convergence was adopted in 2008, there 
was changes in laws and authorities. The following table shows those changes in 2008-2017.  
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Table 13 Broadcasting and Telecommunication Laws and Jurisdictions in 2008-2017 
Policies Broadcasting Telecommunication 
Law 
Broadcasting Act, 
etc. 
Telecommunication 
Business Act, etc. 
KCC Establishment Act (2008) 
Framework Act on Broadcasting-
Telecommunication (2010) 
Promotional policy 
KCC (2008~2013)  
KCC (2008~2013) 
MSIP (2013~2017) 
MSIP (2013~2017) MCT (Broadcasting 
Content) 
Regulatory 
policy 
Policymaking 
KCC 
Application 
Content 
regulation 
KCSC 
 
 In the above table, the yellow coloured cells show the areas that were newly made, compared 
to what presented in the table of 2007. In regard to broadcasting and telecommunication laws, 
several new Acts were made since 2008, including KCC Establishment Act (2008), and 
Framework Act on Broadcasting-Telecommunication (2010). These were all additional Acts to 
existing Acts such as Broadcasting Act. In Promotional policy of broadcasting, KCC was given 
most of authorities in 2008, but it was transferred to the new government department, MSIP since 
2013. Meanwhile, MCT maintained the broadcasting content promotion function as it had in the 
past. And in broadcasting regulatory policies, most of them were merged into KCC. However, as 
KCC became a quasi-government institution which is linked to the president, KCSC (Korea 
Communications Standard Commission) had to be newly established and content regulation 
function had to be moved from KCC to KCSC. When it comes to telecommunication promotional 
policies, all of the authorities were moved from MIC to KCC and it lasted for 5 years in 2008-
2013, but as MSIP was established in 2013, the authorities were scattered to other government 
departments and KCC. This is notable that not all authorities were transferred from KCC to MSIP, 
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but it was scattered to several government ministries and MSIP. Maybe the most converged part 
was telecommunication regulation sector. Compared to 2007, where more than three committees 
were in charge of telecommunication regulation, those authorities were merged into only two 
institutions, the KCC and KCSC.  
 The overview of laws and authorities in broadcasting and telecommunication shows that 
convergence and divergence happened together after policy convergence. That is, relevant Acts 
stayed almost the same, but additional Acts were made, and in terms of authorities, some of them 
was converged but others were diverged. Therefore, it is notable that the policy convergence did 
not always result in merging of existing laws and authorities, but diversification also occurred in 
the process. There were some examples of diversification. That is, some Acts had to be added due 
to the establishment of KCC, and some promotional functions of MIC had to be scattered to other 
bodies. More specifically, when MIC was abolished and merged into KCC, its various functions, 
except for telecommunication policymaking function, had to be transferred to other existing 
ministries. For example, telecommunication sector’s promotional policies such as informatisation, 
information security, telecommunication standard and online content promotion policies were 
allocated to other government departments, such as MCT and Ministry of Public Administration 
and Security. Consequently, more than fifteen policies that were under the jurisdiction of the MIC 
were scattered into other ministries.  
 In addition, it is notable that the Framework Act on Broadcasting-Telecommunication was 
made in 2010 and this led to confusion in understanding existing concepts of broadcasting and 
telecommunication. In the Act, a compound word, 'Broadcast-Telecommunication' was introduced. 
According to the Act, the concept of broadcast-telecommunications refers to “the activities 
involving the transmission or reception of broadcasting and telecommunications contents through 
wired or wireless or other electronic means”. This was to indicate a new or existing converged 
medium, but even IPTV was not categorised as an example of broadcast-telecommunication, but 
it was just categorised as a broadcasting service in Broadcasting Act. In other words, the concept 
of broadcasting-telecommunication was a concept that only exists as an additional concept, which 
is not useful in practice. Moreover, there were still separated Acts which define broadcasting and 
telecommunication differently. Thus, the introduction of new concept meant that it just added an 
additional definition of broadcasting and telecommunication. Therefore, it can be said that the 
complexity of concepts in whole media sectors was increased by the introduction of the new 
concept.  
 In conclusion, the policy convergence brought about the convergence and divergence 
together in overall media policy system in Korea. That is, the inertia of existing media Acts was 
strong, so even though the organisational convergence between KBC, MIC and MCT was 
completed, the relevant Acts could not be merged. Instead, other new laws had to be made. 
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Meanwhile, some jurisdictions were maintained as organisations were merged, but others had to 
be separated as a result of policy convergence. The next part will examine KCC’s promotional and 
regulatory policies in 2008-2017. In so doing, the impact of policy convergence on actual media 
policy will be analysed.  
 
8.2. KCC’s policies in 2008-2017 
In this part, KCC’s overall policy achievements will be examined, to see the influence of policy 
convergence on media policies. From 2008 to 2013, KCC was a wholly integrated policy 
institution that had both promotional and regulatory authorities, covering all policy areas in 
broadcasting and telecommunication. However, in 2013, KCC's promotional functions were 
transferred to a newly established government department, Ministry of Science and ICT Future 
Planning (MSIP). MSIP was made to manage private sectors in broadcasting and 
telecommunication industries. Accordingly, KCC was changed to be a regulatory agency which 
oversees only broadcasting and telecommunication regulations. As a result, KCC's policy style and 
actual policies were significantly changed after 2013. The table below shows KCC’s main policy 
achievements presented in their annual reports published between 2008 and 2017. The words in 
each bracket shows some key words in their annual reports.  
 
Table 14 KCC's Policy Achievements in 2008-2017 
Year Policy Achievements 
2008 
-2010 
1. The expansion and promotion of digital convergence (IPTV, Smart TV) 
2. Promotion of competition in broadcasting market (DMB) 
3. Promotion of competition in telecommunication market (Wibro, Price limits) 
4. Making of safe and sound environment for media users (Protection of personal 
information, Internet of Things, Cloud service) 
2011 
-2012 
1. Realisation of global ICT hub Korea 
2. Making of smart media ecology and new industry (Cloud, M2M, NFC, 3D 
broadcasting) 
3. Promotion of digitalised broadcasting (Global media company, Deregulation of 
ownership) 
4. Promotion of user welfare and information security (Competition in 
telecommunication market, Internet culture) 
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2013 1. Realisation of impartiality and trust in broadcasting (Public interest, Public 
responsibility) 
2. Welfare of media user as a citizen (Citizen’s participation, Protection of young 
people) 
3. Support for creative industry and media convergence (Public interest of 
broadcasting advertisement) 
2014 1. Making of trusted broadcasting (Public interest, PSB governance, Media 
diversity) 
2. Support for broadcasting-telecommunication service (UHD, MMS, Deregulation 
of broadcasting advertisement) 
3. Achievement of user protection and citizen’s welfare (Personal information, 
Internet culture, Disabled people) 
2015 1. Reinforcement of the public responsibility, public interest, and impartiality of 
broadcasting (Public responsibility, Media diversity) 
2. Vitalisation of broadcasting-telecommunication service (MMS, Deregulation of 
broadcasting advertisement, UHD) 
3. Fair competition and user protection (Fair competition, Internet culture) 
2016 1. Increase of the public responsibility of broadcasting (PSB licence fee, User 
interest, Media diversity) 
2. Promotion of fair competition and user protection (Fair competition, universality, 
Internet culture) 
3. Reinforcement of content competitiveness and revitalisation of new service 
(UHD, MMS) 
2017 1. Reinforcement of public responsibility and public interest in broadcasting (Media 
diversity, Regional broadcasting) 
2. Realisation of safe and fair broadcasting-telecommunication market (Price 
management) 
3. Increase of vitality of broadcasting-telecommunication market (Broadcasting 
contents, UHD, MMS) 
4. Increase of media literacy (Media education, Freedom of speech in Internet, 
Disabled people) 
Source: KCC Annual Report (2008-2017) 
 
 As shown in the table above, in 2008-2012, KCC’s policy achievements were mostly related 
to the promotion of competition and technology. In this period, KCC mainly focused on 
promotional policies that support the industries. Those promotional policies can be divided into 
  147 
three categories. The first category was to develop ‘the convergence infrastructure’. Accordingly, 
KCC made the Framework Act on Broadcasting-Telecommunication, and supported researches 
relevant to the development of convergence infrastructure. The second category was to support 
‘the dissemination of convergent media’, such as IPTV, DMB, and smart devices. The third 
category is to support ‘the exports of contents and technology’ of broadcasting and 
telecommunication. KCC used a lot of budget for those promotional policies.  
 However, Park, Jae-bok (25 Nov 2015, Head of Department in Overseas Sales Department, 
MBC), who has been in charge of exporting broadcasting contents for a long time at MBC and has 
made a great contribution to the success of the Korean Wave drama, said that KCC's promotional 
policies did not really help. According to him, rather, KBC effectively supported their export to 
overseas countries such as the Arab, Central Asia, and Central and South America. According to 
him, these countries were places where a broadcaster felt difficult to find its market, but KBC 
helped them to find a business opportunity. In addition, he said, Korea Creative Content Agency 
(KOCCA), which is an affiliate of MCT, was the biggest contributor for the export of broadcasting 
contents. He said that KOCCA has consistently provided excellent support for exporting Korean 
audiovisual contents to international markets such as MIPTV, MIPCOM in France and NATPE in 
the USA. In a similar vein, Bae, Gi-hyung (10 Dec 2015, Chief Manager in Overseas Sales 
Department in KBS), who has been working for many years in content export sales department of 
KBS, stressed that KCC emphasised industrial aspects but was not a great help to them. Like Park, 
he also said that KOCCA, an affiliate of the MCT, was more helpful in exporting their content in 
overseas markets. 
 When it comes to the KCC’s regulation in the period of 2008-2012, KCC actively pursued 
deregulation in cross ownership. As a result, newspaper-broadcasters were able to enter the 
broadcasting market in 2011, and this intensified the competition in the market. However, the new 
entrants in broadcasting market were all related to conservative newspapers. Thus, in the process 
of ownership deregulation, the conflict between conservative and progressive parties were severe. 
However, KCC was not able to make their voice, but just followed what the conservative party 
pursued in general. In this period, their ambitions for making competitive media markets as well 
as global media companies were very high. Even though their regulatory achievement includes 
public welfare, etc., it seems fair to say that those regulations were not the core interest of KCC.  
 In 2013, as promotional policies of KCC were transferred to MSIP, KCC became a 
regulatory institution for broadcasting and telecommunication. As a result, KCC’s overall attitude 
towards regulation was dramatically changed since 2013. Terms such as public interest, public 
responsibility, citizen welfare, media diversity, etc., were used quite frequently in their reports, 
showing that their interest was changed from economic values to normative values (see Just, 2009; 
Vick, 2006). Moreover, they started to focus on PSB’s values, so they made some efforts to give 
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technological, economic and political supports for PSB. Furthermore, the purpose of their 
competition regulation was also changed. In the past, they wanted to increase competition in order 
to nurture converged media and ultimately globally successful media conglomerate. But in 2013-
2017, their purpose of competition was to secure fairness and low price, so as to protect market 
players and consumers in broadcasting and telecommunication markets.  
 In conclusion, KCC’s actual policies were changed a lot in last decade in 2008-2017. In 
their early years of 2008-2012, their main achievements were competition and deregulation, which 
was aimed to make successful business in media. However, after they became a regulatory body, 
their main focus was changed to public interest issues. But as examined in previous chapters, the 
factors affected this change of KCC were not simple. At least there can be three factors which 
influenced the change. The first one is PSB strike in 2012, which affected overall discourse in 
broadcasting policy since 2013. The second one is the close relationship between the president and 
KCC. Because the president Park, Geun-hye pledged to rectify PSB’s political independence 
problem, it seems that PSB and public interest issue became an important one for KCC. Last but 
not least, their change in focus was more feasible because they became a more specific institution, 
as a media regulator. Consequently, Korean case showed that policy convergence and 
establishment of KCC resulted in the marginalisation of public values in its early years, but after 
it experienced strong challenges from civil societies, it had to reposition itself as a regulator which 
focuses on public interest in media.  
 In the next part, sector-specific regulations in newspaper, broadcasting and 
telecommunication will be examined, to see whether the sector-specific regulations are still valid 
after policy convergence. To this end, historical examination of each sector’s regulations and the 
comparison of regulations will be conducted.  
 
8.3. Comparison of sector-specific regulations  
It was often claimed in previous literature that sector-specific media regulations were marginalised 
due to policy convergence in some Western countries such as the UK. Indeed, the overall trend of 
marginalisation could be seen in Korean case, as shown in Chapter 5 as well as in this chapter. 
However, there were little studies which traced the practical changes in sector-specific regulations. 
Moreover, there seems no study that introduced sector-specific media regulations of Korean 
broadcasting and telecommunication. Thus, in addition to the analysis of changes in policy systems 
and KCC’s policies, this chapter analyses the changes in sector-specific regulations of newspaper, 
telecommunication and broadcasting. Notably, newspaper was one of sectors that were affected by 
media convergence. In fact, Korean newspapers had big changes in terms of their ownership rules, 
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due to media convergence. Therefore, the question of the next part can be as follows: What were 
sector-specific regulations in Korean newspaper, broadcasting and telecommunication? To what 
extend these sector-specific regulations were changed after policy convergence? Is competition 
regulation replaced sector-specific regulations in practice? Accordingly, the sector-specific 
regulations are discussed in four sections; entry regulation, ownership regulation, competition 
regulation and content regulation.  
 
Act and Enforcement Decree  
Before examining the influence of media convergence on sector-specific regulations, some policy 
terms need to be defined first. Basically, ‘media policy’ means the sum of different media-related 
laws, and what media policy authority has done. However, there are hierarchical levels in the media 
law. In the highest level of the law system, there is ‘Act’. An Act is usually made in National 
Assembly. But in many cases the ‘Act’ cannot cover every little thing that happen in media practice. 
Therefore, in most cases the Act just sets the overall direction of a media policy, and the rest of it 
is assigned to relevant policy agencies. Then the agency makes the second highest laws according 
to the Act, which is called in Korea as ‘Enforcement Decree’ (Decree, hereafter). Media policy 
agencies such as KCC and MSIP has exclusive authorities in making and conducting Decrees. 
Thus, how they make Decrees can be seen as a parameter of their policy activities and directions. 
However, the Decree should follow what is written in the relevant ‘Act’. Therefore, when examine 
the Decrees to examine the activities of media policy agency, it is needed to read it across with 
relevant media Acts.  
 
8.3.1. Entry regulation  
As of 2017, there are four difference levels in entry regulation, and each level stands for different 
degrees of requirements for companies who want to enter the media market. The strictest level of 
entry regulation is ‘permission’ which requires the players to get official assessment and 
permission to enter the market. The next strict level is ‘approval’, which needs official permission 
too, but only simple check is required. And the next below level is ‘registration’ which requires 
companies to let the policy agencies know and officially register what they will do. Last, the most 
relaxed one is called ‘declaration’ and it just requires the players to let media agencies know. In 
general, broadcasting has been subject to stronger entry regulations than telecommunications and 
newspapers in Korea. When compared, broadcasting is the strictest market to enter, 
telecommunication is moderate, and newspaper is the most relaxed one in terms of entry regulation.  
 
  150 
Table 15 Entry Regulations for Newspaper, Telecom and Broadcasting 
Medium Categories 
Regulatory 
authority 
Level of entry regulation 
Newspaper 
Daily Governor 
of the 
Region 
(City) 
Registration 
Weekly 
Internet 
newspaper 
Telecom 
Infrastructure 
Telecom 
MSIP 
Permission 
Quasi-infra 
Telecom 
Registration 
Additional 
telecom 
Declaration 
Broadcasting 
Terrestrial 
KCC Permission 
MSIP Frequency test 
Satellite TV MSIP Permission 
Cable TV 
MSIP Permission 
KCC Agreement to the permission 
All-genre 
and News PP 
KCC Approval  
Home 
shopping PP 
MSIP Approval  
General PP MSIP Registration 
IPTV MSIP Permission 
IPTV CP 
MSIP 
Approval (Home shopping), 
for others, registration or 
declaration 
KCC 
Approval (All-genre and 
News CP)  
Source: Newspaper Act, Telecom Business Act, Broadcasting Act  
 
 As shown in the table above, it is only needed for a company or a person to 'register' to start 
newspaper business. No matter if it is daily newspaper, weekly newspaper or internet newspaper, 
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all they have to do is register to the governor of the city or region. Thus, government is not involved 
in the entry regulation. The reason of the loose entry regulation is to guarantee the freedom of the 
press. 
 On the other hand, in telecommunication, there are three categories of business in the 
telecom market. These are ‘Infra-telecom’, ‘quasi-infra telecom’, and ‘additional telecom’. Infra-
telecom provides fixed line telephone service, mobile communication and internet service and 
owns its own network. If someone wants to do infra-telecom business, the person or company must 
get a permission from the MSIP minister to enter the market. On the other hand, quasi-infra 
telecom operates by borrowing infra-telecom's network and provides the same services as infra-
telecom. To do this business, a registration is required. Meanwhile, ‘additional telecom’ provides 
any other telecom services which is not the same with infra-telecom service, but they still borrow 
the infra-telecom’s network. A declaration is needed before starting the business.  
 Finally, in the case of broadcasting, there is no business that can be started by declaration. 
In general, permission or approval from KCC or MSIP is needed to start a broadcasting business. 
Among them, approval is needed to start all-genre and News PPs broadcastings which have 
journalism function. All other major players such as terrestrial broadcastings, cable TV, satellite 
TV, and IPTV services are subject to permission. All of these players must get re-permission in 
every five years. Registration is required to start a channel operating business, such as General PP 
or IPTV CP. Therefore, it is much easier to start a non-journalistic broadcasting business than a 
broadcasting with journalism functions.  
 
Distribution of radio spectrum 
In addition, when it comes to spectrum distribution, broadcasting and telecommunication were 
subject to different rules. That is, the spectrum for broadcasting is distributed by the government, 
and the spectrum for telecommunication is distributed through an auction. In broadcasting, 
government allocates spectrums according to their assessment on broadcasters. However, since 
2011, the auction system was introduced in spectrum distribution in telecommunication sector. But 
before then, the government’s permission was needed to use the spectrum in telecommunication 
too. Then the government charged telecommunication companies with rents for using the 
spectrums. However, since 2011 the auction system was adopted, and there were three auctions in 
2011, 2013 and 2016. In these auctions, three oligopolistic telecommunication companies (KT, SK 
and LG) competed, and they were allowed to use spectrums for 5 years or 10 years.  
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8.3.2. Ownership regulation 
In this part, ownership regulation in newspaper, telecommunication and broadcasting sectors will 
be examined. By comparing those regulations, the overall trend in ownership regulation will be 
presented, and the differences between those regulations will be discussed.  
 
Ownership regulations in newspaper 
In 1980, anyone could own only one of newspapers or news agencies. In other word, one person 
or group could have only one medium. This restriction continued for about 20 years since 1980. 
However, in 1998, newspaper ownership regulations began to be relaxed. Before then, only limited 
periodicals were able to receive foreign capital investments. But since the revision of the 
Newspaper Act in 1998, all newspapers have been allowed to receive a certain level of foreign 
investment. Furthermore, in 2009, by the amendment of the Newspaper Act, the ownership 
regulation was significantly eased, so a newspaper could own another newspaper in the same sector. 
Before then, for example, daily newspapers could not own another daily newspaper. Moreover, the 
regulations on the mutual ownership between daily newspapers and news agencies was also 
abolished.  
 
Table 16 Ownership regulations in newspaper 
 
Daily 
newspaper 
Weekly 
newspaper 
Internet 
newspaper 
Conglomerate 1/2 - - 
Foreigner 49% - - 
Daily newspaper 
and News agency 
- - - 
Source: Newspaper Act  
 
As a result of deregulation in the sector, as of 2017, there remains little ownership regulation in 
newspaper. Particularly, there are only two restrictions in terms of ownership regulation. First, 
conglomerate cannot own more than half of any daily newspapers. Second, foreign capital cannot 
own more than 49% of any daily newspaper. The next part examines overall trend in ownership 
regulation in telecommunication and broadcasting since 1990.   
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Deregulation trend in telecommunication and broadcasting  
The deregulation in ownership regulation in Korean broadcasting and telecommunication began 
in 1990. This is similar to the general trend of marketisation and privatisation in the US and Europe 
since the 1980s (Hesmondhalgh, 2013). The following table shows the trend of ownership 
deregulation in Korean broadcasting and telecommunication since 1990.  
 
Table 17 Deregulation of Ownership Rules since 1990 
Year Revision on cross ownership rules 
1990 
⚫ Deregulation of broadcasting ownership up to 30% from 0% (But 
conglomerate, daily newspaper, news agencies, and foreigner were not 
permitted to own broadcasting) 
1998 
⚫ Telecom ownership limit was abolished 
⚫ Deregulation of ownership rules for foreigner to have telecom 
2000 
⚫ Deregulation of ownership rules for conglomerate, daily newspaper, 
news agencies, and foreigner to have cable TV (up to 33%) 
⚫ Deregulation of the ownership rules between broadcasting companies 
2001 ⚫ Deregulation of foreigner ownership rules for Korea Telecom (KT) 
2002 ⚫ Privatisation of KT 
2004 
⚫ Abolition of cable TV ownership limit applied for conglomerate 
⚫ Deregulation of foreigner ownership rules for cable TV and PPs 
2007 ⚫ Deregulation of ownership rules for conglomerate to have satellite TV 
2008 
⚫ Loosing criterion that was used to set as a conglomerate (Revenue 
threshold criterion was changed from 3 trillion to 10 trillion won) 
⚫ Deregulation of the limit of market share for cable TV and PP 
2009 
⚫ Deregulation of ownership rules for conglomerate to have terrestrial 
TVs, all-genre channels, and news channels (the ownership permitted 
for the first time in the history) 
⚫ Abolition of ownership rules for satellite TV by conglomerate 
⚫ Deregulation of ownership rules for daily newspaper and news agency 
to have terrestrial TVs, all-genre channels, and news channels (the 
ownership permitted for the first time in the history) 
⚫ Deregulation of ownership rules for daily newspaper and news agency 
to have cable TV 
⚫ Deregulation of ownership rules for foreigner to have terrestrial TVs, 
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all-genre channels, and news channels (the ownership permitted for the 
first time in the history) 
⚫ Deregulation of ownership rules for foreigner to have satellite TV and 
IPTV CP 
⚫ Deregulation of ownership rules between terrestrial TVs and cable TVs 
2013 
⚫ Abolition of telecommunication ownership rules for foreign countries 
with Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
Source: Broadcasting Act, Telecommunications Business Act  
 
 As shown above, the trend of deregulation in telecommunication and broadcasting 
ownership continued in 1990-2013. Particularly, telecommunication sector abolished restrictions 
on conglomerate’s ownership of infra-telecom as early as 1998. As a result, conglomerates entered 
telecommunication market in around 2000, and they had M&As with smaller companies. This led 
them to be more dominant players in the market. Furthermore, Korea Telecom (KT) was privatised 
in 2002. Consequently, KT and two large conglomerates, SK and LG, have dominated 
telecommunication markets since the early 2000s.  
 On the other hand, in broadcasting, strong ownership regulations were applied by 
dictatorship government in the 1980s. However, in 1990, ownership regulations were relaxed, so 
it became possible to own up to 30% of broadcasters' shares. However, conglomerates, daily 
newspapers, news agencies, and foreign capital still could not own broadcasters’ shares. In 2000, 
as Broadcasting Act was revised, the ownership regulation was greatly eased. Precisely, 
conglomerates, daily newspapers, news agency and foreigners were allowed to own up to 33% of 
cable TV and satellite TV for the first time in broadcasting history. In 2004, restrictions on the 
ownership of cable TV for conglomerates were abolished. In 2007, the restrictions on ownership 
of satellite TV for conglomerates were reduced from 33% to 49%. Consequently, it can be said 
that the ownership regulation in broadcasting has been steadily eased since the 1990s. Nonetheless, 
this deregulation of ownership was mostly about pay TVs such as cable TV and satellite TV. The 
ownership of terrestrial TV and other channels with journalism function were still prohibited until 
2008.  
 However, in 2008, conservative party and KCC tried to increase competitions in 
broadcasting and telecommunications through deregulation of ownership. KCC actively relaxed 
ownership regulations in 2008 through amendment of decrees. For example, KCC relaxed the 
criterion of conglomerate. At that time, a corporate with the revenue of over KRW 3 trillion (about 
2 billion in GBP) was recognised as a conglomerate, and if a company was regarded as a 
conglomerate, there comes more restriction for them in owning broadcasting companies. However, 
KCC eased the criterion to KRW 10 trillion, allowing more companies to own broadcasting.  
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 On the other hand, 2009 was the year in which the biggest ownership deregulation took 
place. In this year, cross media ownership regulations between newspapers and broadcasting were 
greatly relaxed. The conservative government and the conservative party that formed majority in 
National Assembly, pushed the ownership deregulation in the pursue of competition in 
broadcasting market. As a result, for the first time in history, large conglomerates, daily newspapers, 
news agencies, and foreign capital were allowed to own broadcasting companies that have 
journalistic functions. The notes on amendment to the Broadcasting Act, in 2009, provides the 
reasons for the amendment as follows:  
 
“The reason for the relaxation of regulations such as prohibiting the possession of shares or 
ownership of stocks under the current law, is to respond to the new media environment change 
that the newspaper, broadcasting, and the Internet converge, and respond to the global market 
trend. We intend to relax regulations, such as prohibition of ownership, in order to strengthen 
the competitiveness of our broadcasting industry and to create an environment suitable for 
the development of the media industry”.  
 
 However, the opposite party, which was then progressive party, fiercely opposed the 
deregulation of cross-media ownership between newspaper and broadcasting. They resisted 
because they believed that the government and the conservative party were trying to make 
favourable media environment by making more conservative broadcasters in the market. But the 
revision in relevant Acts was passed, and conservative newspapers could enter the broadcasting 
market in 2011. Consequently, it is evident that for more than twenty years since 1990, the trend 
of ownership deregulation in broadcasting, telecommunications and newspaper sectors continued. 
In particular, since 2008, government, conservative party and KCC all together pushed the 
deregulation in ownership.  
 
Result of ownership deregulation in broadcasting 
As a result of ownership deregulation, four conservative newspapers entered the broadcasting 
market as all-genre PPs in 2011. These all-genre PPs are important players in the broadcasting 
market, for they could provide news programme. The name of the broadcasters was: TV Chosun, 
Channel A, JTBC and MBN. As a result, the competition for viewership in broadcasting market 
was increased. And the rating share of terrestrial broadcasters, including PSBs, was gradually 
declined. The following figure shows the share of viewership from 2010 to 2015 after all-genre PP 
entered the broadcasting market. 
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Figure 20 Rating share of main broadcasters in 2010-2015 
 
Source: KCC (2016b)  
 
 As shown in the graph above, the rating shares of all-genre PPs increased rapidly. When it 
was launched in 2011, its market share was only 2.5% but it grew fast and reached 18.7% in 2015. 
In the same period, the share of terrestrial broadcasters KBS, MBC, and SBS continued to decline. 
On the other hand, CJ, a dominant PP who owns many influential channels including tvN and 
M.net, lost its rating share since 2011.  
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Figure 21 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of rating shares in broadcast advertising 
market in 2010-2015 
  
Source: KCC (2016b)  
 
 On the other hand, according to KCC (2016b), due to the increase of competition in 
broadcasting market, the HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) of the broadcasting advertising 
market declined from 1600 to 1143 in 2010-2015. The HHI is one of the frequently used indices 
which can be used to measure the degree of market concentration. If the HHI index is 10000, it is 
classified as a monopolistic market, more than 2500 is a concentrated market, 1500-2500 is a 
moderately concentrated market, and less than 1500 is a competitive market (Noam, 2016:21). 
Therefore, according to KCC, with the advent of new broadcasters, the broadcasting advertising 
market, which had been formerly moderately concentrated market, became a competitive market. 
But the problem was that most of new all-genre channels are relevant to conservative newspapers. 
In fact, those broadcasters received many criticisms because it overtly showed political bias in 
their news programmes (CCDM, 2017) 
 The following two parts investigates ownership regulations in telecommunication and 
broadcasting in more details. In so doing, the comparison between ownership regulations will be 
conducted.  
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Ownership regulations in telecommunication 
From 1991 to 1997, anyone except the government was not allowed to own more than 10% of the 
infra-telecom. The most dramatic deregulation on ownership happened in 1998. When compared 
to newspaper’s case, most of ownership regulations in telecommunication were completely lifted 
ten years earlier. Especially, in 1998, the one-person share restriction on infra-telecom was 
abolished. Moreover, the restriction between domestic infra-telecom was lifted in the same year. 
But this deregulation should be understood in relation to FTA (Free Trade Agreement) which was 
discussed at that time. That is, before some FTAs came into force, Korea abolished cross ownership 
restrictions between domestic infra-telecom companies, in fear of domination of foreign capital on 
their infra-telecom. Thus, it seems that Korea had to allow big Korean companies to own 
telecommunication businesses, to protect their infrastructure from hostile foreign capitals. The 
following table shows the ownership regulations in telecommunication as of 2017.  
Table 18 Ownership regulations in telecommunication 
Owner Infra-telecom 
Quasi-infra 
telecom 
Additional 
telecom 
Conglomerate 49% - - 
Foreigner - - - 
One-person -* - - 
Source: Telecommunication Business Act 
* If a person wants to get more than 15% of share, or to become a major shareholder, the person should get the approval from minister 
of MSIP.   
 
 As shown above, there is almost no restriction for the limit of ownership in most of 
telecommunication businesses. However, the possession of infra-telecom for conglomerates is 
limited to 49%. Meanwhile, since 2004, some ownership regulations were added to prevent market 
failure in infra-telecom. Precisely, an approval from MSIP minister started to be required if an 
infra-telecom wants to merge or sell any part of their business. And if someone wants to own more 
than 15% of the shares of the infra-telecom, or if someone wants to become a major shareholder, 
an approval was required. However, any ownership regulation on quasi-infra telecom and 
additional telecom does not exist as of 2017. 
 In the meantime, with the abolition of such duties, universal service duty was established 
since 1998. The universal service obligation is to make sure that all users can be provided telecom 
services at affordable price. It can be understood as a public interest rule that is made to remedy 
potential market failure. The universal service is achieved by the following process. First, the 
minister of telecommunication department chooses a leading company in the market and let them 
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provide such universal service. Secondly, the rest of telecommunication companies support the 
leading company to compensate the company’s expenses for universal service. In the next part, 
ownership regulations in broadcasting will be examined.  
 
Ownership regulations in broadcasting  
Similar to entry regulation, ownership regulation in broadcasting is much more complicated than 
in newspaper and telecommunication. Unlike newspapers and telecommunications, it has been 
very strictly regulated. As seen above, since 1990, broadcasting ownership regulation continued to 
be deregulated for more than 20 years. And in 2008 and 2009, the most dramatic deregulation 
happened in Korean broadcasting history. Nevertheless, compared to newspapers and 
telecommunications, the ownership regulation in broadcasting is still incomparably more 
complicated and demanding than newspaper and telecommunication. The following table shows 
ownership regulations in broadcasting as of 2017.  
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Table 19 Ownership regulations in broadcasting (%) 
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(a) The FTA countries are not considered as foreigners. 
(b) Daily newspapers should submit data such as the total circulation before getting the permission to enter the market. However, if the 
subscription rate exceeds 20%, it will not be allowed to own shares in broadcasters.  
(c) A terrestrial broadcaster can have up to 7% of one terrestrial broadcasters. However, when terrestrial broadcasters already have 
another terrestrial broadcaster’s share, it is limited to 5%.  
(d) Anybody cannot hold more than 10% of any terrestrial broadcaster.  
(e) Maximum of 3% of the number of operators, and up to six PPs can be owned.  
(f) This means 20% of the total number of PPs or CPs. 
(g) Anybody cannot own two or more satellite TVs. 
(h) The sum of PP sales cannot exceed 33% of total PP sales. 
 
 As shown above, the ownership regulation in broadcasting is very complicated. But it can 
be understood more easily by understanding the hierarchy of ownership regulations in 
broadcasting. That is, the regulations can be divided into four levels according to the degree of 
strictness. Firstly, terrestrial broadcasting is subject to the most demanding ownership regulation, 
for they use radio spectrum and have journalism function. Accordingly, they have been the most 
influential players in Korean broadcasting history. Moreover, as they are usually PSBs, who are 
supposed to keep impartiality, terrestrial broadcasters are subject to the strictest ownership 
regulations. Secondly, there are all-genre PP (Programme Provider), news PP and all-genre and 
news CPs (Content Provider, virtually same to PP). Those are Pay TV channels who have 
journalism function. Although they are subject to lighter ownership regulations than terrestrial 
broadcasters, they are still subject to rather strong ownership restrictions compared to the other 
players, as they can affect public opinion. Thirdly, there are Pay TV platform players such as cable 
TV, satellite TV, and IPTV. They had radical deregulation since the 1990s as the overall Pay TV 
industries expanded. Accordingly, they are subject to lighter ownership regulations than terrestrial, 
all-genre and news channels. Fourthly, there are general PP and CP, which do not have journalism 
function. The lowest level of ownership regulation is applied to them. In addition, it is notable that 
political parties can not own the shares of broadcasters. This restriction can be understood as an 
attempt to secure political independence of broadcasting. In case of newspapers or 
telecommunications, there is no restriction like this. In the next part, competition regulation of 
newspaper, telecommunication and broadcasting will be examined and compared.  
 
8.3.3. Competition regulation  
In this part, competition regulations in newspaper, telecommunication and broadcasting will be 
examined. The below table compares the competition regulations in those media.  
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Table 20 Competition regulations in newspaper, telecom and broadcasting 
Media Category 
Competition 
regulation 
Post regulation 
Newspaper 
Daily 
- 
Public opinion 
survey 
Weekly 
Internet 
Tele-
communication 
Infra 
- 
Competition 
research 
Quasi-infra 
Additional 
Broadcasting 
All 
Broadcasting 
Up to 30% of  
rating share 
(except for KBS, 
EBS) 
Media Diversity 
Committee & 
Competition 
Committee 
Cable TV, 
Satellite TV 
and IPTV 
Up to 1/3 of  
total subscribers 
Source: Newspaper Act, Telecommunication Business Act, Broadcasting Act 
 
 As shown above, there is no competition regulation in newspaper and telecommunication 
markets. However, public opinion survey and market competition research are conducted as post 
regulation to check the degree of concentration in the markets.  
 Meanwhile, in broadcasting, there is a 30% rating share limit to any broadcasters except for 
some PSBs. When this limit is exceeded, the broadcaster is forced to reduce the rating share to less 
than 30%. However, the government-owned public broadcasters KBS and EBS are not subject to 
this regulation. This shows their special status as PSB. When it comes to Pay TV platforms, the 
number of subscribers should not exceed a third of the total number of Pay TV subscribers. 
Furthermore, it is notable that KCC established several committees to prevent too much 
concentration. Firstly, KCC established 'Media Diversity Committee' to check the degree of 
diversity in public opinions. The committee developed a measure to check the overall 
concentration of journalism media in newspaper and broadcasting. Secondly, in 2011, KCC 
established the ‘Competition Committee’ to monitor the competition in broadcasting and 
telecommunication markets. These can be understood as post regulations of KCC to prevent 
market failure.  
 In conclusion, it is evident that broadcaster’s competition regulation is more demanding 
than that of newspaper and telecommunication. On the other hand, it was found that in most cases, 
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there are back-up regulatory measures which is used to monitor the degree of concentration in the 
market. In the next part, content regulations in newspaper, telecommunication and broadcasting 
will be examined.  
 
8.3.4. Content regulation   
In this part, content regulation between those media will be compared. The table below presents 
content regulations and relevant institutions in newspaper, telecommunication and broadcasting.  
 
Table 21 Content regulation in newspaper, telecom and broadcasting 
 Content regulation 
Newspaper The Press Arbitration Commission 
Telecommunication KCSC 
Broadcasting 
Compulsory 
retransmission 
KBS and EBS 
Compulsory 
channel 
Government channel 
National Assembly channel 
Religious channel 
Channel for disabled people 
Regional channel 
Public interest channel 
Compulsory 
production 
ratio 
Domestic production ratio  
(in TV, animation, and film) & 
Independent production ratio   
Programme 
assessment 
KCSC 
Broadcasting Assessment Committee, 
Universal Service Committee, 
Audience Right Committee, etc.  
PSB KBS, EBS and MBC 
Source: Newspaper Act, Telecom Business Act, Broadcasting Act 
 
As shown above, there were no special rules in newspaper and telecommunication for content 
regulation. In newspaper sector, the Press Arbitration Commission deals with the disputes related 
to newspaper articles. Telecommunication sector also does not have specific rules for content 
  164 
regulation, but KCSC oversees online contents. In general, self-regulation is a dominant form in 
content regulation of newspaper and telecommunication sectors. 
 However, in broadcasting, there are many content regulations regarding channels and 
contents. Firstly, there are some public channels that Pay TV companies must include. More 
precisely, cable TV, satellite TV and IPTV should re-transmit the main live channels of KBS and 
EBS. It is to fulfil universal service remit of KBS and EBS, as people pay license fees for the two 
broadcasters. In addition, government channel, National Assembly channel, religious channels, 
channels for disabled people, regional and additional public interest channels should be included 
in pay TV’s channel portfolio, no matter their customers want them or not. Furthermore, there are 
production quotas for terrestrial and all-genre broadcasters. Accordingly, they are obliged to 
broadcast domestically produced contents, as well as contents that are created by independent 
production companies. In terms of content standard, KCSC and other content-related committees 
work together for the assessment of broadcasting contents.  
 Moreover, broadcasting has PSBs. Although the clear concept of public broadcasting in 
Korea is not specified in Broadcasting Act, KBS, EBS and MBC are generally recognised as public 
broadcasting in Korea. This is based on three public standards: spectrum use, public ownership, 
and public appointment. Among those three PSBs, KBS and EBS meet all three public criteria 
mentioned above. They all use spectrum and national broadcasters, and they are owned by Korean 
government, and their Board of Directors and CEOs are appointed through public procedure, and 
they receive licence fees from the public. MBC is slightly different to KBS and EBS, but they also 
have some public characters, as they use spectrum, and they are owned by a public institution, and 
their directors and CEOs are appointed through public process. However, MBC is run by 
advertisement revenue. In particular, in the case of KBS, the Broadcast Act stipulates the purpose 
of KBS’ establishment and their remit as a public service. According to the Broadcast Act, KBS 
was established ‘to make a fair and sound broadcasting culture’. KBS 's public responsibility 
includes fairness, public interest, universal service, viewer convenience, national culture 
promotion, and national harmony. These responsibilities are similar to what European scholars 
have suggested as common remits of public broadcasters (Hanretty, 2012:16; Iosifidis, 2012:8; 
Siune and Hulten 1998:24). 
 In conclusion, the content regulation in newspapers and telecommunication are almost 
absent, compared to that of broadcasting. Precisely, as newspaper’s freedom of speech has been 
regarded as the most important regulatory goal, newspaper was not subject to strict content 
regulation. In terms of telecommunication’s content regulation, the personal conversation and 
private information have been regarded as something that should not be regulated, because the 
regulation could obstruct the people’s privacy. Accordingly, KCSC was only one who was in 
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charge of contents on the internet. However, in broadcasting, various rules were applied as content 
regulations, and there are PSBs who have public responsibilities to create desirable contents.  
 
8.4. Conclusion  
To sum up, policy convergence brought about both convergence as well as divergence in overall 
legal systems and authorities in media policy. Korean case showed that policy convergence did not 
result in the reduction of number of laws and authorities. In other words, it can be said that the 
convergence itself was an additional factor that increases the diversity in legal system and authority.  
 Meanwhile, KCC’s policy was dramatically changed in last decade. In its early period, the 
institution mainly focused on promotional policies and economic principles, but it was changed 
after it was repositioned as a regulator. KCC started to focus on regulatory policies and public 
interest issues. Therefore, it can be said that policy convergence in Korea affected the changes in 
media policies, but it gradually lost its influence as some bad side effects of policy convergence 
appeared, and as some critical changes were made regarding its organisational structure and 
authorities accordingly.  
 In the meantime, despite of the overall trend of deregulation, sector-specific regulations in 
newspaper, telecommunication and broadcasting were generally maintained. As seen above, the 
broadcasting regulatory system has been more complicated and demanding than those of 
telecommunication and newspaper regulations. This difference is due to the fact that newspapers, 
telecommunications, and broadcasting serve different public interests and social values (Iosifidis, 
Steemer and Wheeler, 2005; Michalis, 1999; Vick, 2006). Therefore, it seems that there was 
‘resistance’ or ‘inertia’ in media regulations, despite of technological development in media. 
Therefore, as Iosifidis (2002:40) said, “convergence arrives slowly. […] Technology might change 
the media environment, but that does not imply that concerns about pluralism, diversity, free 
speech, etc, traditionally protected by sectoral regulation, are less valid.” Furthermore, Fagerjord 
and Storsul (2007:26) emphasised that the ‘different regulatory principles of different media’ are 
still significant in digital environment. They said: “even if digitized, different media still vary in 
their characteristics, usages and purposes. Different media play different roles in society and 
politicians and regulators still perceive the need for regulation to be different”. Therefore, it can 
be said that policy convergence brought about convergence as well as divergence in media laws 
and authorities. Furthermore, its influence was gradually decreased on media policies. Lastly, 
sector-specific regulations were generally maintained, despite of policy convergence and 
deregulation trends in media. The next chapter summarises the whole thesis and discusses some 
important theoretical points and practical findings from this thesis.    
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9. Conclusion  
This thesis examined media convergence in terms of its concept, discourse, and influence. The 
influence of media convergence was examined regarding market, governance and policy. In this 
conclusion chapter, the findings from above examinations will be discussed, and some practical 
recommendations for media policy will be presented.  
 
9.1. The problem of concept of media convergence  
This thesis examined four problems of the concept of media convergence. Firstly, the concept’s 
broadness was addressed as a problem, for this led to hasty generalisation. Therefore, more detailed 
explanation of media convergence was presented, by suggesting media value chain model in 
understanding the concept. Thus, on the basis of examinations on relevant literatures as well as 
practical observations, it was argued that the concept is little related to contents and platform levels, 
but it is more relevant to network and device levels in media value chain. Secondly, it was 
addressed that the term can be overlapped with other existing words, such as telematics, vertical 
and horizontal integrations. Therefore, it was argued that this overlapping character of the concept 
can increase confusion. Thirdly, in line with those problems presented above, it was also addressed 
that the term had strong character of exaggerated presumptions. The concept was often used in the 
context which sees the media convergence would expand rapidly, because the concept itself 
contained strong character of presumption. The presumption of the concept was that the blurring 
between overall media is happening and would continue in the future. Lastly, it was shown that 
sometimes the concept was paradoxically used to describe a phenomenon which seemed quite 
opposite to what it means. That is, the concept was frequently used in practice to describe what 
was actually the divergence of media. For example, in many cases the concept was used to stand 
for what multimedia and multiplatform means. This is paradoxical, as it actually described a 
diversifying trend in media when the term itself was supposed to describe something converged. 
Therefore, this thesis argued that this paradoxical presentation of the concept could lead to even 
more confusion in understanding the term.  
 A practical recommendation for media policy can be made on the basis of the above 
examinations. That is, even though it could be hard to define a new term when it was newly 
emerged, the term should be carefully defined and explained on the basis of actual examinations. 
As the understanding of concept can ultimately affect policy decision making in the process of 
policy discussion, the term used in the field of media policy has to be clarified. And once policy 
decision is made, for example, if a governance reform was applied, this is not easy to reverse. 
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Moreover, it can be suggested that there need some studies that can update the policy terms as time 
goes by. Notwithstanding the suggestion above, it seems more likely that there would be confusion 
while a technological development is in progress. However, the clarification might have done as 
the understanding of the concept of technology has developed. However, in the case of media 
convergence, this seemed not achieved, as the first concept of it made in the 1980s continued to 
be used as similar in relevant studies and policy debate for more than 30 years. Therefore, it seems 
right to be careful enough when using a concept, and it would be better studying and clarifying the 
concept, before using it when the phenomenon of concept is not thoroughly examined. The 
undesirable consequences of the ambiguity of the concept were well presented in this thesis.  
 
9.2. The emergence of convergence discourse  
Due to the ambiguous character, the concept was easily manipulated to make some discourses. As 
some studies showed, the discourse was relevant to liberal ideology, which was prevalent when 
the term emerged. The convergence discourse was a social belief that media convergence is 
proceeding rapidly, so deregulation and policy reform should be introduced quickly in reaction to 
this change. This belief contributed to the development of media convergence in overall media 
sectors from technology to policy. Notably, as in Korean case, the convergence discourse 
contributed to the application of policy convergence, because the country’s ambition to make 
global media conglomerate was very high. Accordingly, media convergence was used to justify 
deregulation and restructuring of the policy system. However, as shown in Convergence 
Committee’s white paper, public values and PSBs were marginalised, as convergence discourse 
was predominant.  
 By examining the discourses shown in the process of policy debate as well as in converged 
agency’s official papers in Korea, it was confirmed that the convergence discourse was there, and 
the discourse led the converged agency to be the follower of convergence discourse, particularly 
in its early days of establishment. Furthermore, it was evident that convergence discourse was 
relevant to liberal ideology. Thus, when compared to other cases, it can be said that convergence 
discourse in Korea was similar to what found in the process of establishment of Ofcom in the UK. 
Furthermore, as Ofcom showed liberal approaches to broadcasting policy particularly in its early 
days, KCC also showed competition-centred style during first 5 years of its establishment. But, as 
there was a government reshuffle after 5 years in Korea, KCC was changed to be a regulator and 
the core discourse in their publications was dramatically changed.  
 In conclusion, it is notable that this kind of discourse can be made again in the future when 
following two preconditions are made. First, new technology. As shown in Korean case, the 
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discourse can be formed when new technologies and new business opportunities arise. Therefore, 
it seems better for policymakers to bear in mind that in the early stages of the development of new 
technology, the expectation as well as reckless presumption on the technology could occur, and 
this can lead to the formation of a discourse, which is not quite helpful in understanding the 
development of new technology more accurately. Second, strong politico-economic ideology. As 
shown in the cases from the UK and Korea, a discourse can be formed by the political and 
economic ideology which is quite prevalent in that day. However, as a certain politico-economic 
ideology can brought about biased approach to media policy, it seems important to make 
ideological balance in policymaking. Furthermore, from the analysis of discourse, it could be 
reaffirmed that the definition of a concept does really matter, for when it is not clearly defined, it 
can be easily manipulated as a discourse by someone who has the power for agenda-setting. 
 
9.3. Influence on market 
This thesis also examined how and to what extent the media convergence actually influenced on 
Korean broadcasting and telecommunication markets. The analysis showed that something that 
can be called as ‘content’ convergence was not found, and traditional genres of audiovisual 
contents were still dominant. Furthermore, ‘platform’ convergence was also difficult to found, but 
instead a new over-the-top (OTT) players such as Netflix was presented as an important player. 
However, in network and device levels, some significant examples could be found. In terms of 
‘network’ convergence, it brought bundle service such as TPS and QPS to customers. However, in 
Korea, it resulted in an increase in telecommunication’s market share. On the other hand, IPTV 
was the most successful media convergence model in Korea, but it was partially due to the vigorous 
support from KCC. Meanwhile, convergent media such as DMB and Data PP had a very small 
impact on the market. When it comes to device convergence, its development was triggered by 
smart devices which was basically a ‘connected mobile computers’. However, rather paradoxically, 
the device convergence resulted in diversification of media possession and usage patterns rather 
than convergence.  
 In conclusion, it can be said that media convergence affected the market, but it mainly 
affected network and device levels in media value chain. Furthermore, except for some converged 
network services such as bundle services and IPTV, most of convergent media have played 
peripheral roles in broadcasting and telecommunication market even after 10 years of its 
introduction. In device level, the convergence brought about both convergence and divergence. 
Therefore, in general, despite of the media convergence, the existing broadcasting and 
telecommunication markets maintained as in the past. In other words, media convergence was not 
  169 
a big bang or a comet that had decisive impact on the Korean markets. Therefore, Korean case 
showed that the new technology and new services are more likely to have limited influence on 
media market, in practice.  
 
9.4. Influence on governance  
The influence of media convergence on the governance system of broadcasting and 
telecommunication was an important subject that this thesis investigated. As the convergence 
discourse promoted the reform of the governance system of broadcasting and telecommunication, 
Korea adopted policy convergence by integrating policy agencies. In the thesis, there were three 
sections for the examinations of the influence on governance. Firstly, the process of policy 
convergence was examined, by analysing Convergence Committee’s white paper. Secondly, the 
overall process of establishment of KCC and its governance system were examined in relation to 
PSB’s political independence. Thirdly, the power struggle within KCC was examined. The 
following sections will discuss those in more details.  
 
9.4.1. Turf war between agencies 
It could be said that the Convergence Committee was established to solve the long-lasted conflict 
between KBC and MIC. As noted, those two agencies fought for almost a decade because they 
wanted to have the jurisdiction of the new convergent service, IPTV. Notwithstanding much efforts 
to solve the conflict in early 2000s, it was not successful. In Convergence Committee, those two 
bodies continued to insist for what they wanted. In the process of governance reform debate, it was 
found that those who participated in the discussion tended to extend their jurisdiction and power 
over media. In the case, none of them suggested to reduce their own authorities voluntarily on any 
policies they managed. Moreover, it was found that all of them suggested a governance system 
that is similar to theirs. This showed that there can be a strong resistance from media agencies in 
the process policy governance reform, because they tend to keep what they had before. In Korean 
case, this irreconcilable gaps between agencies led Convergence Committee to make a 
compromising settlement after all. That is, as the committee tried to satisfy all agencies while not 
making their own decision, they made KCC as an institution with contradictory remits regarding 
regulation and promotion. However, it was almost nothing more than a compromise, and it was 
found that this contradictory settlement had to be reorganised later, as governance structure needed 
to be divided according to the different principles of broadcasting and telecommunication policies.  
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 On the basis of this analysis, a practical recommendation can be drawn. As Convergence 
Committee was established as a government-centred institution where many stakeholders 
discussed, the overall discussion was led to somewhat administrative engineering debate. This was 
because the government’s focus was mainly on solving the long-lasted conflict between relevant 
agencies. However, as there are various principles and values in media policy, which should be 
considered when conducting the reform of a policy system, it seems better to make a professional-
centred institution for the discussion of media policy reform. Therefore, people who have specific 
expertise in media policy, such as media policy researchers and relevant law makers, can be the 
most appropriate participants in that kind of social discussion. Indeed, some scholars who 
participated in the process of discussion pointed out that the discussion of media convergence was 
too much biased to economic value. Furthermore, National Assembly rejected the KCC 
Establishment Bill first, as they understood that there should be differentiated approaches to the 
governance systems of broadcasting and telecommunication.  
 
9.4.2. Political independence issues 
On the other hand, Korean case showed that the power concentration could occur by policy 
convergence. Moreover, it was also found that highly politicised countries can be further 
politicised through media policy reform. In the case of Korea, the contradictory status of KCC 
eventually resulted in a close relationship between KCC and the president. Accordingly, the 
president was able to affect PSB programmes through KCC and CEOs he appointed. This 
interference eventually provoked the biggest and longest-ever PSB strike. During the strike, many 
PSB workers had to be fired, transferred, suspended and had their wage cut. As confirmed in 
personal interviews with PSB workers, this was something that could not be recovered soon. But 
thanks to their relentless effort, the issue could be known by the public, and accordingly, the 
president candidates pledged to solve the political independence problem of PSB. Moreover, some 
clauses in Broadcasting Act were amended to prevent appointing a person close to the president as 
a commissioner of KCC. In the meantime, some European studies regarding political 
independence showed that the degree of political independence of media agency can be determined 
by the degree of political democratisation of individual country. That is, the written and formal 
statement which declares the political independence of media policy agency is not likely to be a 
decisive factor for actual independence of media agencies.  
 Reflecting the examinations above, some practical suggestions can be made. As noted above, 
informal activities between political power and media are more decisive factor for political 
independence. Therefore, if there was an institution where the journalists can anonymously report 
the ‘informal’ interruptions, then the political independence matter could have been managed better. 
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Furthermore, some educational and cultural effort can be also made to promote the social 
recognition of PSB’s independence. In the meantime, Korean case reaffirmed that the legislation 
of clear definition and remit of PSB are so important for its desirable function in the society (see 
Feintuck and Varney, 2006). As examined above, Korean PSB was conceptually unclear at the time 
when Convergence Committee was held, and this led to the marginalisation of PSB in the 
discussion, and this resulted in the marginalisation of PSB values, including its political 
independence and impartiality. In addition, it can be addressed that presidential election period 
could be a good timing for making an issue social agenda, as shown by PSB strikers. Moreover, 
some influential social media platforms such as Youtube and Facebook can be useful tools for civil 
society, as it helped them in disseminating what they are about. Korean PSB workers strategically 
conducted the protest during presidential election period using various social media, and they 
successfully made their agenda recognised by the people and the president candidates. Eventually, 
most of president candidates pledged that they will solve the political independence problem of 
PSB. And, as will be examined later in this chapter, the actual changes in broadcasting policy were 
made.  
 
9.4.3. Hegemony struggle  
The conflicts between KBC and MIC began in early 2000s and lasted almost for a decade. But 
their hostile relationship could not be recovered even after the establishment of KCC. The 
organisational war could be finished when MIC succeeded in grabbing hegemony in KCC. This 
meant that the fight was eventually ended by the victory of telecommunication side. Accordingly, 
some argued that the ascending of telecommunication’s policy principles, such as competition and 
universal service, was due to the predominance of MIC members in KCC. However, in a different 
perspective, it can be said that MIC could win KCC because their policy principles were similar 
to government’s general policy principles. This can be a reasonable approach, because it was 
evident that the relationship between government and KCC was very close.  
 Based on the examinations above, two practical lessons can be learned. Firstly, it would not 
be a wise approach to merge two totally different agencies into one agency, particularly when they 
had conflict for a long time. As in Korean case, MIC and KBC were quite different in their 
organisational culture, wages, and viewpoints on media policies. Accordingly, it would have been 
better to establish a new policy institution for converged media, rather than merging existing 
agencies. Secondly, it is worth considering the scale of relevant industry as well as the 
organisational culture when integrating policy institutions. That means, it is more likely that a 
policy institution of bigger industry can be more powerful than a policy institution of smaller 
industry. As an interviewee said, the lobbying power of industry is related to the overall influence 
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of the policy institution. Thus, if there is a media policy agency that is relevant to a big industry, 
such as telecommunication, the policy institution also can be quite influential in government as 
well as in National Assembly. Furthermore, it is more likely that an institution who has more 
unified culture and clearer hierarchy can be more powerful than less unified and less hierarchical 
institution.  
 
9.5. Influence on policies 
In the last chapter of this thesis, the actual policies in broadcasting, telecommunication and 
newspaper were examined, to see the degree of influence of policy convergence. To this end, the 
changes and continuities in media laws and jurisdictions were examined. And then, KCC’s actual 
policies in last decade were analysed by examining its annual reports. Lastly, the sector-specific 
regulations in broadcasting, telecommunication and newspaper were also examined. Details of the 
examinations will be discussed below.  
 
9.5.1. Systematic changes in laws and authorities  
It was found that the policy convergence brought convergence as well as divergence in relevant 
media Acts and policy institution’s authorities. That is, existing laws such as Broadcasting Act and 
Telecommunication Business Act remained almost the same as in the past. However, due to the 
new convergent media such as IPTV, an additional Act had to be made. KCC Establishment Act 
and Broadcasting-Telecommunication Development Act were also additional laws that increased 
not only the number of related laws, but also the complexity within overall media policy system. 
Furthermore, when it comes to the jurisdiction of media policy institution, there happened both 
convergence as well as divergence. Maybe, it is more reasonable to think that many jurisdictions 
were merged into the converged institution rather than diverged, as a result of policy convergence. 
But the actual result showed that some jurisdictions had to be scattered, and even an additional 
body, such as KCSC, had to be established, as a result of policy convergence. Therefore, in Korea, 
policy convergence brought not only convergence, but also divergence in the media policy system. 
From this examination, it can be learned that the existing legal system and authorities can be quite 
rigid to changes, so the convergence of existing laws and authorities can be a difficult task.  
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9.5.2. Competition-centred policies  
On the other hand, competition-oriented policies were found as the result of policy convergence. 
In fact, in the early years of KCC, they showed competition-oriented and economic-centred style 
in broadcasting policies. They focused on competition and economic values, while ignoring sector-
specific values and socio-cultural principles. However, as will be discussed below, the internal 
diversity and socio-cultural values cannot be promoted by the competition alone. Competition, in 
particular, is more suitable as a tool for promoting external diversity. Therefore, specific measures 
for internal diversity is needed.  
 
The value conflict in media policy 
According to Vick (2006), telecommunication and broadcasting developed differently as they 
pursued quite different values that are difficult to be compromised. In particular, 
telecommunication and newspaper were recognised as areas where market competition and 
autonomy can be applied as the main regulatory principles. However, broadcasting, especially 
public broadcasting, was recognised as the field where many strict regulations on entry, ownership, 
competition and content were applied. Therefore, Vick (2006:59) argued that if telecommunication 
and broadcasting policies are merged into a single policy institution, the ‘value conflict’ between 
those two principles can occur. In a similar vein, Just (2009:102) argued that “convergence 
exacerbates this value conflict in communications because it unites sectors with historically 
diverse regulatory models (print vs. broadcasting vs. telecommunications), in which cultural and 
economic values prevail to different extents.”  
 Indeed, telecommunication and broadcasting have developed different policy principles. 
When it comes to telecommunication, it was thought to be an area where natural monopoly could 
take place, therefore, competition, universal service, and access right were the most important 
principles (see Michalis, 1999). However, the personal communications made through 
telecommunication networks have been regarded as private ones which should remain confidential. 
Therefore, there was little regulation in regard to the contents of telecommunication. In line with 
this, most of the content distributed through internet heavily relied on self-regulation (ibid.). 
However, broadcasting began as a state monopoly in most countries, but it soon developed as dual 
monopoly and then oligopoly system where public services compete with several private 
broadcasting companies (Siune and Hulten, 1998:27). However, due to its use of radio spectrum 
which belongs to the public, as well as its considerable influence on the public, broadcasting 
regulations has been relatively more comprehensive and stronger than any other media regulations 
(Gibbons, 1998:4-5). However, due to the advent of Pay TV broadcasting such as cable TV, 
satellite TV and IPTV, the regulatory logic based on frequency scarcity was weakened 
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(Hesmondhalgh, 2013:131-132). Nonetheless, the concern about the monopoly or oligopoly of 
private companies emerged as a new challenge to the broadcasting regulation (Freedman, 
2008:105-121). Furthermore, content regulation in broadcasting was a crucial, which differentiates 
broadcasting regulation from the others (Iosifidis, 2002:33-38). The importance of content 
regulation continues because the social influence of media contents can be considerable 
notwithstanding the development of media technology. Therefore, as Dwyer (2010:14) said, 
"traditional concerns do not just disappear because of new media delivery modes." 
 On the other hand, some predictions were made that there would be the dominance of 
competition law or economic logic and the marginalisation of sector-specific regulation or socio-
cultural principles after regulatory convergence. And this was proved in the US, the UK and some 
European countries (Iosifidis, 2011). In line with this, Latzer (2009:417) also argued that “an 
expected effect of convergence is the increased economization of the media sector. At the same 
time, there are fears that socially motivated regulation is being undermined, even endangering the 
principles of public service broadcasting. The strengthening of the role of the general competition 
law in the convergent communications sector at the expense of sector specific regulators can be 
regarded as an indication of the undermining of socially motivated regulation.” Furthermore, Just 
(2009:113) also criticised that “supporting a shift from sector-specific communications regulation 
to the sole application of general competition law, for instance, is merely a shift to another 
normative goal.”  
 
Why competition law is not sufficient?   
Meanwhile, there have been a number of studies that pointed out the limitations of competition 
law in media policy (see Albarran, 2013; Born and Prosser. 2001; Cornia, 2016; Doyle, 2013; 
Feintuck and Varney, 2006; Freedman, 2008; Gibbons 1999; Graham, 2013; Iosifidis, Steemers 
and Wheeler, 2005; Just, 2009; Lunt and Livingstone, 2012; Noam, 2016; McQuail, 1992; Napoli, 
1999; Park, 2014; Vick, 2006; Weeds, 2013). To summarise these arguments, the most significant 
reason why competition law is insufficient was that competition law cannot guarantee ‘internal (or 
content) diversity' by itself alone.  
 
External diversity  
According to these studies, there are two kinds of diversity that matter: External diversity and 
internal diversity. First, external diversity refers to outlet diversity. More precisely, when there are 
many different players in the market, it can be said that external diversity is high. And at the same 
time, external diversity also means diversity of ownership. For example, if there are many media 
companies, but these are owned by relatively small people, we cannot say that the external 
diversity is high. Therefore, when various owners provide many different types of media, it can be 
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seen as a market with high external diversity. To guarantee the high external diversity, competition 
law is applied. Thus, the purpose of competition law is to secure various players as well as various 
ownerships in media market.  
 Many theorists, on the other hand, saw that media market is likely to form a natural 
monopoly due to factors such as economies of scale, economies of scope, as well as frequency 
scarcity. In other words, it is a market where the external diversity naturally decreases. In 
Broadcasting and telecommunication markets, it is difficult to enter the market because of the high 
initial cost in starting the business, and therefore a small number of operators are likely to dominate 
the market. When it comes to media content production, it costs a considerable amount of money 
to create the first original copy, but it costs little to make the additional copies of it. Therefore, the 
more you sell with a content through the various windows or platforms, the more profit you have. 
Usually, media business is run with high fixed cost for facilities, equipment, and human resources. 
Therefore, securing as much market share as possible is an essential key for success and stable 
management of media companies. For this reason, media companies seek vertical integrations such 
as mergers between network company and content company, or horizontal mergers between 
network companies and another network companies. Therefore, the media industry has been 
recognised as one of the industries where economies of scale are applied. In addition, making 
additional profits by using the audiovisual contents (i.e. TV animation) can be a good strategy for 
media companies. Thus, they try to sell content-relevant goods (i.e. character toys) to earn 
additional profits. Furthermore, the goods business can help the consumption of actual TV content 
itself. In other words, it creates a virtuous cycle of consumption. Because of this principle, the 
broadcasting industry has been known as a field where ‘economies of scope’ can be applied. Disney, 
for example, does not only make TV and film animations, but also it runs a theme park, the Disney 
World and sells character goods such as Mickey Mouse. Therefore, economies of scale and 
economies of scope make media companies naturally seek to be more monopolistic in relevant 
markets.  
 Meanwhile, particularly in broadcasting and telecommunication markets, the external 
diversity can be lowered because of their use of frequencies. Basically, the frequency is scarce and 
belongs to everyone. Therefore, the number of frequency users must be limited, so there have been 
entry (licencing) regulations for the businesses. Moreover, as it is natural material like an air, 
someone who uses the spectrum should be subject to public responsibility. Due to these specific 
characters of radio spectrum, the both have been recognised as the industries that can form 
oligopolistic markets. 
 In addition, the broadcasting contents is an ‘experience goods’, so it is hard to know the 
actual value of this product until someone actually has watched it. For this reason, media 
companies use strategies that allow consumers to believe in the value of media contents. The first 
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strategy is to hire famous stars. Film makers or broadcasters use the star’s fame to give consumers 
a high expectation. And this means the increase in overall costs, which in turn leads to economies 
of scale and scope. That is, as they invested much money into the star actors or actresses, they 
would have to sell the contents as much as possible to compensate the cost. And the second strategy 
to secure many audiences, is doing marketing activities. Indeed, media companies spend huge 
amount of money for marketing. But this kind of marketing activities also increase the overall 
expenditure, and in turn, it makes them to pursue as much as economies of scale and scope. For 
these reasons, the broadcasting sector is likely to form monopolistic or oligopolistic market. And 
this can cause market failure such as unfair trade, cartel, price-fixing and price increase. To prevent 
the market failure, competition law is applied, and it is there to prevent a specific company from 
being too powerful in the market. Therefore, it is an important regulation that is indispensable to 
the broadcasting as well as telecommunication policy fields.  
 
Internal diversity  
However, internal diversity is not necessarily achieved through the activation of such competition. 
Internal diversity means not only content (genre) diversity but also opinion and cultural diversity 
reflected ‘within’ each audiovisual content. This internal diversity is important because it promotes 
the development of democratic society and it also helps understanding different cultures in the 
society.  
 However, a large number of operators (with many owners) in the market does not guarantee 
that there are diverse voices (viewpoints) and cultures. Rather, the opposite is more likely to 
happen. Basically, media companies compete to each other for profit. This is the foremost goal of 
commercial media companies. And it is more likely to be a secondary goal for them to increase 
democracy and to educate social and cultural issues. Moreover, it is more realistic to think that the 
commercial companies would pursue those goals only when the activities make a good profit. 
Consequently, commercial media companies make contents that appeals to as many people as 
possible. In so doing, it is likely that they produce the most popular contents, not socially desirable 
ones. Furthermore, it is also possible that the owners or CEOs of media companies, who have a 
major influence on media companies, can eventually have similar political views or similar social 
biases. Even if the number of owners is big enough, the diversity of opinions, cultures and social 
representations may not be different enough. In other words, there is always the probability that 
the increase of external diversity will not eventually result in the increase of internal diversity, 
even if the various owners run various media in the market.  
 On the other hand, broadcasting, especially television broadcasting, still has the greatest 
influence among many media. It is also non-excludable and non-rival because it is a ‘public goods’. 
That is to say, broadcasting programmes flow in the air, so that it is impossible to stop watching 
  177 
broadcasting (non-excludable) and is supplied in abundance, so that someone’s consumption does 
not limit other’s consumption (non-rival). Due to these characters as public goods, broadcasting 
suppliers cannot secure money because they cannot exactly charge its audience. In turn, it can be 
argued that the broadcasters cannot maintain their service, if they are not subsidised. This has been 
a major reason for imposing licence fee to the public. Nowadays, there are many people who 
subscribe Pay TV, but terrestrial broadcasting is still being watched. Especially, countries such as 
the UK are actively using terrestrial multi-channel platforms, for example, Freeview. Furthermore, 
broadcasting is 'merit goods’, and generates 'externalities’ for the whole society. Good broadcast 
programmes not only provide enjoyment, but also promote citizenship and thus have a positive 
effect on the whole society in a long-term basis. On the contrary, negative externalities can be 
made through anti-social, obscene, and violent programmes. Therefore, broadcasting is a public 
goods with high impact, so it can cause the high degree of externalities, whether it is good or bad. 
Therefore, there is a need for a system that can always provide socially desirable content and make 
‘positive’ externalities. In other words, internal diversity needs to be guaranteed in broadcasting 
regulation. The public service broadcasting (PSB) is a unique system that was created for this need. 
Therefore, public service broadcasting is run by license fee to be free from economic influence. If 
there is an economic interference in PSB, it would be hard to ensure their internal diversity. And 
PSB’s political independence has been regarded as an important precondition for their internal 
diversity and impartiality. By creating such a special environment, public service broadcasting can 
provide citizens with various genres, viewpoints, and cultures.  
 In conclusion, external diversity and internal diversity are both important in broadcasting 
and telecommunication market. Competition law guarantees external diversity. However, the 
increase of external diversity does not always result in the increase of internal diversity. Therefore, 
a special measure is needed to positively increase the internal diversity. Public media, therefore, 
should work with competition law to maximise the external and internal diversity altogether. In 
other words, when applying the competition law in the broadcasting and telecommunication 
markets, it is important to secure the internal diversity by strengthening the public service 
broadcasting system at the same time.  
 
9.5.3. Correlation between system and policy  
On the other hand, the correlation between policy system and actual policy was examined by 
examining KCC’s organisational change. As seen above, KCC was reformed in 2013 as a 
convergence regulator when a new government came to power. Since then, KCC’s focus was 
changed, especially in terms of broadcasting regulation. Before it was reorganised, KCC’s main 
focus was the economic and industrial aspects of broadcasting. In other words, they were a faithful 
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follower of convergence discourse. Since 2013, however, they started to pay more attention to 
public interest and public broadcasters. As noted above, there could be several other reasons for 
KCC's change, such as civil society’s effort including PSB strike, etc. Nevertheless, it would be 
hard to say that the systematic changes of KCC never affected the actual policy changes of KCC 
at all.  
 Consequently, KCC’s case showed that regulatory agencies can be more interested in public 
interest than a converged media policy agency who should manage both promotional and 
regulatory policies. Therefore, a practical lesson can be learned from this, that it would be more 
appropriate to establish a dedicated regulator for media regulations, and to allocate the promotional 
policies to government departments.  
 
9.5.4. Inertia of sector-specific regulations 
Last but not least, the thesis examined how the regulations on newspapers, telecommunications 
and broadcasting in Korea were affected by policy convergence. As examined, since the 1990s, 
there were overall trends of deregulation in newspaper, telecommunication and broadcasting in 
Korea. However, in 2008 and 2009, after the introduction of policy convergence, cross-ownership 
rules between newspaper and broadcasting were deregulated. As a result, relevant sector-specific 
regulations were lifted. Nevertheless, even after more than 10 years of policy convergence, those 
sector-specific regulations regarding entry, ownership, competition and content regulations, were 
generally maintained. Particularly, based on the comparison between the sector-specific 
regulations of newspaper, telecommunication and broadcasting, it was found that broadcasting 
regulations were the strictest and the most complicated among them. Furthermore, it was evident 
that this trend was maintained with considerable gaps between broadcasting and others, and it 
seems that the difference will be maintained afterwards, too.  
 
9.6. Conclusion 
So far, the theoretical findings and practical recommendations of this thesis were discussed. The 
thesis argued that there were some problems regarding the concept of media convergence, and 
these problems are relevant to the emergence of certain discourses, which were called as 
convergence discourses. The thesis argued that convergence discourse was not quite helpful in 
making effective and efficient media policy and governance system, for it marginalised certain 
policy principles that cannot be dismayed. However, this imbalance did not last forever. Eventually, 
the governance system and many relevant institutions and policies were reorganised, renamed, 
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redistributed and revitalised. But all of these could be done after enormous social conflict, personal 
discourages, family sufferings and huge cost of money and time. And it seems to be a right moment 
to say that this thesis was written on this criticism. But it was not to say that the media convergence 
did nothing good in media, but it was to say that behind all the shining developments of digital 
media, there were some problematic points which should not be ignored.  
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